Circumstantial evidence which may permit an inference that the defendant committed a burglary may include "a defendant's unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary," Poncio v. State, 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (concluding appellant's unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary in conjunction with the fact appellant pawned the property very close to the burglarized home was sufficient to support appellant's burglary of habitation conviction); a defendant's physical proximity to the location of the burglary, see id.; see also Miranda v. State, No. 05-16-01187-CR, 2017 WL 2774454, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that the logical force of the circumstantial evidence, which included the defendant's proximity to the burglarized vehicle, was sufficient for a rational jury to determine the essential elements of burglary of a vehicle were met)
Id. See also Miranda v. State, No. 05-16-01187-CR, 2017 WL 2774454, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Miller concedes the trial court complied with the requirements of article 42.07, but argues there is also a common-law right to allocution that is broader than the statutory right. He further contends that such a right has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court and some of our sister courts, and maintains their decisions should persuade us to also recognize that right. Miller, however, did not assert a common-law allocution right in the trial court.