Opinion
B323439
06-25-2024
FRANCISCO MIRANDA, JR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GUESS? RETAIL, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Mikael H. Stahle, and Debra J. Tauger, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Seyfarth Shaw, Andrew M. Paley, Elizabeth M. Levy, and Kiran Aftab Seldon, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. BC702270 Kenneth R. Freeman, Judge. Reversed.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Mikael H. Stahle, and Debra J. Tauger, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Andrew M. Paley, Elizabeth M. Levy, and Kiran Aftab Seldon, for Defendant and Respondent.
MORI, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant and plaintiff Francisco Miranda, Jr. (Miranda) is a former employee of a retail clothing store operated by defendant and respondent Guess? Retail, Inc. (Guess). In his third amended complaint, Miranda asserted a single cause of action: a claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) that sought civil penalties on behalf of himself individually and as a representative of other current and former Guess employees. The PAGA claim was premised on Guess's alleged violations of the statute governing reimbursement of expenses incurred by employees in the discharge of their duties.
PAGA is set forth in the California Labor Code at section 2698, et seq. Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Labor Code. Non-individual PAGA claims are sometimes referred to by courts as "representative" PAGA claims.
Guess moved to dismiss the PAGA claim based on unmanageability of the non-individual claim. The trial court ordered the parties to provide briefing on the impact of a case issued by the U.S. Supreme Court during the pendency of the motion, Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 (Viking River). The court granted Guess's motion, dismissing the non-individual PAGA claim for lack of standing and manageability. This appeal followed.
No judgment was entered, and the dismissal order did not dispose of the individual portion of the PAGA claim alleged in the third amended complaint, which was stayed pending appeal. We treat the dismissal order as appealable under the "death knell" doctrine, which provides that an order is immediately appealable where it is one that allows a plaintiff to pursue an individual claim but prevents him from maintaining claims as a representative of other aggrieved employees. (Miranda v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 196, 200 [death knell doctrine applies to PAGA claims].)
While this appeal has been pending, our Supreme Court issued opinions that bear upon both bases for the trial court's dismissal order. As for the first basis, Guess concedes that Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 (Adolph) establishes that Miranda has standing to pursue the nonindividual PAGA claim. We agree Miranda has standing and reverse the dismissal order to the extent it indicates otherwise. As for the second basis, our Supreme Court's decision in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582 (Estrada II) resolved a split of authority and held that courts lack the inherent power to dismiss PAGA claims due to manageability concerns. Therefore, we reverse the order dismissing the nonindividual PAGA claim as unmanageable.
In Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th 1104, the California Supreme Court held that, where a plaintiff has brought a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of the individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of standing as an aggrieved employee to litigate claims on behalf of other employees. (Id. at p. 1114.)
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Between 2016 and 2018, Miranda was a stockroom worker at the Guess retail store in Santa Monica. That store, he testified, was what was described internally as a "showcase store"; it served as an example for others. Corporate representatives from all over world visited multiple times a week to see merchandise and how it was displayed.
According to Miranda, managers notified employees that they expected employees to wear Guess clothing on corporate visit days. Miranda recalled hearing that employees were sent home when they did not do so. Miranda testified he bought two or three pieces of Guess clothing during his employment. Miranda also testified that he used his personal cell phone to perform work-related tasks, such as photographing damaged displays and communicating with management. Miranda alleged Guess did not pay for the clothing and cell phone usage.
According to Guess, it operated 53 stores between 2017 and 2022, and more than 6,280 employees worked in Guess's California stores between 2017 and 2021. Guess contended that employees were not required to purchase or wear Guess clothing but instead were subject to a dress code that "encouraged" employees to use their discount to build a Guess wardrobe. Under Guess's dress code, clothing or accessories with logos other than Guess were considered "inappropriate," and management "reserve[d] the right" to send an employee home if the employee's dress did "not meet GUESS standards." Guess also contended that employees generally were not required to use cell phones in their job duties, but when they were required to do so, the expense would be reimbursed if the employees submitted reimbursement requests and proof of payment.
B. Procedural Background
1. Miranda's PAGA Claim and the Stay Orders
In May 2018, Miranda filed a putative class action complaint against Guess that alleged wage and hour violations and a claim for unfair and unlawful business practices. In June 2018, he filed a first amended complaint that added a PAGA claim.
Court-ordered stays and an agreement of the parties halted discovery on the PAGA claim for almost three years. In August 2018, the case was stayed while Guess sought and obtained an order compelling arbitration of Miranda's claims except for the non-individual PAGA claim. Then, PAGA-related discovery remained stayed until May 2021 pending the resolution of two other PAGA cases against Guess. Miranda asked the trial court to lift the stays at least six times between early 2019 and late 2020.
The parties' and trial court's description of what claims were compelled to arbitration vary throughout the record and briefing. Guess's 2018 motion sought to compel arbitration of "all alleged claims, except those under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ('PAGA') not seeking victim-specific relief ...." The trial court's order granting the motion stated, "Compel Plaintiff's claims (with the exception of the PAGA representative claim) to individual arbitration ...." Later, however, the parties took the position that only "non-PAGA" claims had been ordered to arbitration. In its motion to dismiss, Guess contended it had not previously sought to compel any PAGA claim to arbitration because California law in effect at the time prevented it from doing so. The trial court, in its dismissal order, stated Miranda's "individual claims" had been compelled to arbitration in 2018, "leaving only the PAGA representative claim." At the same time, the court acknowledged that the later-filed third amended complaint alleged "a single PAGA representative and individual claim." The dismissal order, which is discussed in more detail, infra, did not dispose of the individual PAGA claim. In its appellate briefing, Guess argues that only Miranda's "non-PAGA" claims were compelled to arbitration, but then it later states that Miranda retained standing to pursue a non-individual PAGA claim "even after his individual PAGA claim was sent to arbitration." (Italics added.)
In late August 2020, Miranda agreed to narrow the PAGA claim, and by stipulation, filed second and third amended complaints. In the operative third amended complaint, Miranda asserted a single cause of action titled "Representative Action for Civil Penalties [Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698-2699.5]" that sought civil penalties for Guess's alleged violations of section 2802, subdivision (a). Miranda alleged he was a proper plaintiff to bring a civil action on behalf of himself and other employees of Guess. He further alleged that Guess failed to reimburse him and other aggrieved employees for purchases of Guess clothing worn during store visits and usage of personal cell phones for work-related tasks. Guess answered the third amended complaint in early October 2020.
Section 2802, subdivision (a) states that an employer "shall" indemnify an employee "for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful."
In early 2021, the trial court ordered that the discovery stay be lifted in May 2021. Trial was set for January 2022, but by stipulation, was continued to July 2022. In May 2021, the parties agreed to refrain from conducting formal discovery until after a mediation they scheduled for August. The mediation was unsuccessful.
At an October 2021 status conference, Guess requested a briefing schedule on a trial plan. Miranda opposed the request because his discovery was not completed, and the trial date was then almost nine months away. The trial court stated that a trial plan would be discussed at the trial readiness conference, which it scheduled for April 20, 2022.
2. Miranda Seeks the Contact Information of Other Guess Employees, and Guess Files a Motion to Dismiss
In mid-November 2021, Miranda served a special interrogatory that sought contact information for all California employees of Guess retail stores from 2017 to present.
In January 2022, Guess objected to the interrogatory based on overbreadth, privacy, relevance, and because Miranda, "has made no showing that a representative action involving all nonexempt store level employees is appropriate." Guess responded that it would "provide a sample of the requested information subject to a court order implanting [sic] a Belaire-West procedureprior to the provision of any responsive information."
In a class action for wage and hour violations, courts may compel an employer to identify its current and former employees after sending those persons an "opt-out" notice (i.e., requiring them to object in writing to prevent disclosure of their contact information). (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 14:135:10, citing Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 (Belaire-West); id. at ¶ 14:135.3 [precertification discovery may include contact information such as addresses and telephone numbers of putative class members].) Our Supreme Court has recognized the use of Belaire-West notices in PAGA actions. (See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 555 (Williams).)
Miranda's informal efforts to obtain the contact information were unsuccessful, and he was unable to solicit Guess's comments on a proposed Belaire-West notice.
In February 2022, in the midst of the discovery dispute and a week before an informal discovery conference with the court, Guess moved to dismiss the PAGA claim. Guess asserted that the trial court had inherent power to dismiss PAGA claims as stated in Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746, 755 (Wesson), and Miranda's PAGA claim was unmanageable because, among other reasons, there were many individualized issues.
In early March 2022, when the informal discovery conference did not yield Guess's cooperation, Miranda filed a motion to compel a further response to the interrogatory, setting the hearing for April 20, 2022.
In the meantime, Miranda opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing he could not demonstrate that the claims could be manageably tried until he had completed discovery. Miranda argued he needed more information about Guess's policies and procedures related to dress codes and cell phone use and how these policies and procedures were carried out in the stores. Further, he argued he was entitled to other employees' contact information, so he could learn more about their experience with Guess's cell phone and dress code policies.
In mid-March 2022, the trial court vacated the trial date, continued the trial readiness conference to June 2022, and ordered Miranda to file a trial plan by May 12, 2022.
On April 20, 2022, the trial court issued a tentative ruling, indicating its intent to grant the motion to compel, order Guess to produce the contact information, and deny Guess's request to limit the information to only a sample of employees.
At the hearing, Miranda's counsel asked that Guess be ordered to produce the contact information to the administrator handling the Belaire-West notice and that his early May deadline to submit a trial plan be extended to mid-July. The trial court took the matter under submission, ordered the parties to confer further and advise it of any matters on which they agreed, and if they filed nothing within seven days, a final ruling would be issued.
In mid-May, Miranda filed an amended opposition to the motion to dismiss, advising the trial court of a recently published decision, Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685, 697 (Estrada I), review granted, June 22, 2022, S274340), in which the Fourth District held that a trial court had no authority to dismiss or strike a PAGA claim based on manageability concerns.
In late May, the trial court issued an order that neither granted nor denied Miranda's motion to compel but instead ordered the parties to file a report describing the matters still in dispute. In early June, the parties reported they agreed to the contents of a Belaire-West notice, but they disagreed as to whether Miranda was entitled to contact information of all aggrieved employees or just a sampling.
3. The Trial Court Dismisses the PAGA Claim
On June 16, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Guess's motion to dismiss. Because the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. 639, the day before the hearing, the trial court requested supplemental briefing on any impact the case had on the motion to dismiss. In its supplemental briefing, Guess argued that Miranda's "'individual' PAGA claim . . . should be sent to arbitration," and the "representative PAGA claim would need to be dismissed."
Viking River held that PAGA actions are severable into individual and non-individual claims, and that an employee with an applicable arbitration agreement must pursue an individual PAGA claim in arbitration, not in court. (Id. at p. 662.) Further, while arbitration agreements cannot foreclose non-individual PAGA claims, the claims nevertheless should be dismissed for lack of standing after individual claims are sent to arbitration. (Id. at p. 663.)
On September 9, 2022, without ruling on the discovery motion, the court issued its dismissal order. The trial court noted that, after granting Guess's motion to compel arbitration in 2018, only Miranda's "PAGA representative claim" remained, but due to the subsequent filing of the third amended complaint, there was again a "PAGA representative and individual claim." Nevertheless, the trial court found it significant that Miranda's individual claims had previously been ordered to arbitration. It held Miranda lost standing to assert a non-individual PAGA claim under Viking River and the arbitration agreement. The court dismissed "the PAGA representative claim."
The trial court gave several reasons in support of its ruling but relied upon Viking River to hold Miranda lacked standing. The parties do not argue that any of the court's reasons, absent Viking River, would support the court's holding. We agree with this conclusion.
The trial court also determined it had authority to dismiss PAGA claims that are "unmanageable and incapable of classwide proof. Wesson[,] [supra, 68 Cal.App.5th] at [pp.] 765-766." It found Miranda's non-individual claim was unmanageable because, based on the employee declarations submitted by Guess, "highly individualized determinations would be needed to litigate [Guess's] potential liability and affirmative defenses." The court found that Miranda had neither submitted a proposed trial plan nor presented evidence showing how even a part of the nonindividual claim could be managed. The trial court found the outstanding discovery "[did] not have any bearing on the Court's manageability determination." The court noted that because the action had been pending for four years, Miranda had time to figure out how to make it manageable.
Miranda asserts that the trial court's first reason for granting the motion was invalid; our high court has made clear he has not been stripped of standing to pursue the non-individual PAGA claim because his individual claims were ordered to arbitration. (Adolph, supra, 45 Cal.5th at p. 1114.) This argument is uncontested, and we agree that the dismissal of the non-individual PAGA claim for lack of standing must be reversed. We therefore focus our discussion on the trial court's alternate basis for granting the motion to dismiss, lack of manageability.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
1. PAGA
"California's Labor Code contains a number of provisions designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers." (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 80 (Kim).) "Employers who violate these statutes may be sued by employees for damages or statutory penalties." (Ibid.; see, e.g., § 203.) "Statutory penalties, including double or treble damages, provide recovery to the plaintiff beyond actual losses incurred." (Ibid., citation omitted.) "Before PAGA's enactment, only the state could sue for civil penalties." (Ibid.)
"In 2003, the Legislature enacted PAGA to remedy 'systemic underenforcement' of the Labor Code." (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 598, citation omitted.) PAGA provides for civil penalties for various Labor Code violations and authorizes "aggrieved employees," acting as private attorneys general, to recover such penalties. (Id. at pp. 598-599, citations omitted.) An "aggrieved employee" is "any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed." (§ 2699, subd. (c).) The term "aggrieved employee" governs the party who has standing to bring a PAGA claim as well as the persons entitled to recover a share of penalties. (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 599.)
A "PAGA plaintiff may seek penalties for violations involving aggrieved employees other than the PAGA plaintiff." (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 599, citation omitted.) The courts have sometimes referred to this as a "representative" or "non-individual" PAGA claim. (Ibid., citations omitted.)
"Civil penalties recovered on a PAGA claim are split between the state and aggrieved employees." (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 599, citation omitted; see § 2699, subd. (i) [75 percent of civil penalties go to state labor law enforcement agency, 25 percent go to aggrieved employees].) "'[C]ivil penalties recovered on the state's behalf are intended to "remediate present violations and deter future ones," not to redress employees' injuries.'" (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 599, citation omitted.) "An employee suing under PAGA 'does so as the proxy or agent of the state's labor law enforcement agencies.'" (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81, italics omitted.) "Every PAGA claim is 'a dispute between an employer and the state.'" (Ibid., citations omitted.)
"'PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the procedural characteristics of class actions.'" (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 599, quoting Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 655 and citing Hamilton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 39 F.4th 575, 583 (Hamilton) [summarizing distinctions].) "'A class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by contrast, represents a single principal, the [Labor and Workforce Development Agency], that has a multitude of claims.'" (Ibid., quoting Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 655.) "Thus, because PAGA actions do not adjudicate individually held claims, the due process rights of third parties are not paramount." (Ibid.)
2. The Split of Authority as to Whether Courts Could Dismiss PAGA Claims Due to Unmanageability
Until 2024, a split of authority existed as to whether courts could dismiss or strike non-individual PAGA claims due to unmanageability, a concept imported from class action jurisprudence. (See Woodworth v. Loma Linda University Medical Center (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1047, review granted Nov. 1, 2023, S28717.)
In Wesson, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 746, the plaintiff brought a PAGA claim against Staples on behalf of 345 general managers, alleging that those managers had been misclassified as exempt executives. (Id. at p. 755.) Staples moved to strike the PAGA claim, arguing it was unmanageable and that litigating it would violate Staple's due process right because Staples intended to raise an affirmative defense that general managers were properly classified as non-exempt employees. That defense, Staples argued, would require individualized proof for each employee. The trial court granted the motion. A panel of this division affirmed, finding: (1) "courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims can be fairly and efficiently tried and, if necessary, may strike claims that cannot be rendered manageable;" and (2) "as a matter of due process, defendants are entitled to a fair opportunity to litigate available affirmative defenses." (Id. at p. 756.)
Subsequently, the Fourth District reached a different conclusion in Estrada I, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 685, where the PAGA claim was predicated on allegations that defendant Royalty failed to provide meal and rest breaks and issued inadequate wage statements. The trial court dismissed the meal break portion of the claim on the ground that numerous individualized issues rendered the claim unmanageable. (Id. at pp. 709-710.) The Fourth District reversed, concluding that dismissal of PAGA claims based on manageability would improperly "graft a class action requirement onto PAGA claims" and "interfere with PAGA's purpose as a law enforcement mechanism by placing an extra hurdle on PAGA plaintiffs that is not placed on the state." (Id. at pp. 697, 712.)
In June 2022, the Ninth Circuit also held that the manageability requirement for class actions cannot be imposed in PAGA actions under the guise of a court's inherent powers. (Hamilton, supra, 39 F.4th at p. 590.)
Our Supreme Court granted review in Estrada I on June 22, 2022 to answer this question: "Do trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) will be manageable at trial, and to strike or narrow such claims if they cannot be managed?" (Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills (June 22, 2022, S274340) Cal.4th [294 Cal.Rptr.3d 460, 461].)
3. Estrada II Resolves the Split of Authority
Our high court began its opinion in Estrada II (issued on January 18, 2024) with the observation that courts "do not have the authority to adopt procedures or policies that conflict with statutory law [Citation]," and inherent powers "'"should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation or frustrate legitimate legislative policy."'" (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 598, citation omitted.) Our high court rejected Royalty's and amici curiae's argument that "'trial courts have broad inherent authority to strike any type of claim, irrespective of its nature, to foster judicial economy,'" to preserve judicial resources, and to prevent trials from becoming excessively complex and time-consuming. (Id. at pp. 601, 602, italics omitted.)
Our high court reasoned that structural differences between PAGA and class claims made it "inappropriate to impose a class action-based manageability requirement on PAGA actions." (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 606.) "[M]anageability bears upon questions of superiority and the predominance of common issues, requirements unique to the class action context." (Ibid., italics added.) In a class action, the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that the class action is manageable, and the trial court must "'carefully weigh the respective benefits and burdens of a class action, and to permit its maintenance only where substantial benefits will be accrued by both litigants and the courts alike.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 607, italics omitted.)
In contrast, a non-individual action seeking civil penalties under PAGA "need not 'satisfy class action requirements.' [Citation.]" (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 607.) "[A] PAGA plaintiff need not demonstrate that common issues predominate or that a representative or nonindividual PAGA claim is superior to other forms of adjudication ...." (Id. at p. 608.) A superiority requirement would be "in tension with" "the Legislature's intent [ ] to maximize the enforcement of labor laws ...." (Ibid.)
Therefore, "the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate the manageability of a class claim does not establish a similar manageability requirement for any related PAGA claim." (Ibid., italics omitted.)
Our high court concluded that "while trial courts may use a vast variety of tools to efficiently manage PAGA claims, given the structure and purpose of PAGA, striking such claims due to manageability concerns-even if those claims are complex or time-intensive-is not among the tools trial courts possess." (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 594.) Our high court specifically "disapprove[d] the Wesson court's conclusion that 'trial courts . . . if necessary, may preclude the use of this procedural device [i.e., a PAGA claim].' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 594, fn. 4.)
B. Miranda's PAGA Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed as Unmanageable
Whether a trial court has a particular inherent authority is a question of law subject to de novo review. (People v. Lujan (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507, citing Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 460.)
The trial court lacked the inherent authority to strike Miranda's non-individual PAGA claim on manageability grounds, as our Supreme Court has now made clear. (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 607, 594, fn. 4.) Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal order.
Guess contends dismissal should be affirmed because, even after Estrada II, the trial court retained its power to narrow the scope of Miranda's PAGA claim. Citing Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 38 (Duran) and Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 616-617, Guess argues that the trial court could insist that Miranda demonstrate that his PAGA claim could be effectively tried by (1) making a "threshold showing that any representative proof," including a survey, would be "statistically reliable;" and (2) submitting a trial plan that explained how individualized issues could be tried. Because Miranda failed to do either, Guess argues, the trial court properly "limited" the scope of the non-individual PAGA claim by dismissing it.
Guess's arguments are unpersuasive. It is true that in Estrada II our high court recognized trial courts retain the ability to limit the types of evidence a plaintiff may present or use other tools to ensure non-individual PAGA claims can be effectively tried. (Estrada II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 619). However, the trial court did not do that in this case. Rather, it expressly dismissed the non-individual PAGA claim in its entirety on the basis that it was unmanageable, citing Wesson. The court did what Estrada II made clear it could not do.
Duran does not support affirmance of the dismissal order either. Duran was a wage and hour class action with no PAGA allegations that was tried to verdict. (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 12.) Our high court concluded that the trial court erred in conducting its own sampling exercise at trial, without input from experts, in a manner that unreasonably deprived the class action defendant of the opportunity to support its affirmative defense. (See Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 33.) Duran did not involve the pre-trial limitation of evidence to be presented or use of other case management tools in a PAGA case.
In this case, the trial court did not merely limit the evidence that Miranda could present in support of its nonindividual PAGA claim at trial. Because the trial court did not rule on the motion to compel it tentatively granted, it effectively precluded Miranda from discovering evidence. Miranda was unable to obtain contact information for other potential aggrieved employees. We note that in a post-Duran PAGA case, our high court described such contact information as "a legitimate 'starting point for further investigations'" through which a plaintiff may educate himself concerning the parties' claims and defenses and "determine the proper extent of any representative action." (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552, citation omitted, italics added.) The trial court did not utilize tools to limit the scope of Miranda's PAGA claim, as Guess asserts, or ensure that it could be effectively tried. Rather, it did not rule on the motion to compel, which may have interfered with Miranda's ability to determine the proper scope of the PAGA claim, and when Miranda did not show the court the case was manageable, the court dismissed it, believing at the time that it could do so.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal order.
We express no views on the merits of Miranda's PAGA claim or Guess's affirmative defenses, nor as to whether or to what extent the case can be effectively tried.
DISPOSITION
The dismissal order is reversed, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Appellant is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: CURREY, P. J. COLLINS, J.