Opinion
94 Civ. 0476 (CSH)
May 31, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After deliberations on October 27 and 30, 2000, a jury in the case at bar, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rendered a verdict dismissing claims of excessive force against all defendants. The jury also returned a verdict on the claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, finding in favor of Officer Deaderick, but finding Officers Robles and Amoia liable to the plaintiff. The jury awarded one dollar in nominal damages against those two officers and awarded $10,000 in punitive damages from Amoia, and $5,000 in punitive damages from Robles.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, and again at the close of all the evidence, all the defendants moved under Rule 50(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., for judgment as a matter of law. Those motions were denied by the Court. Pursuant to Rule 50(b), defendants Robles and Amoia renew those motions made on their behalf. Alternatively, these defendants move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), or for a remittitur. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants Deming, Januchowski, Amoia, Robles, and Deaderick, corrections officers employed by the New York State Department of Correctional Services and working at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing"), violated his constitutional rights, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, by subjecting him to excessive force. Additionally the plaintiff alleged that Robles, Deaderick, and Amoia violated those same rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
On December 21, 1993 the plaintiff was an inmate at Sing Sing in Housing Block "C" ("HBC") of the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). On that date, Deming came to the SHU to prepare the plaintiff for transfer to another correctional facility. As part of that preparation, Deming allowed the plaintiff to exit his cell to observe Deming's inventorying of the plaintiffs property on a table in the hallway immediately outside the cell. While reviewing plaintiff's personal property, a dispute erupted between the plaintiff and Deming. According to the plaintiff, Deming began to read the plaintiff's legal papers at which point the plaintiff "snatched" them from his hand. Transcript of Trial ("Transcript") at 9. Accounts differ as to what happened next. According to the plaintiff, Deming responded to plaintiff's grabbing of the papers by taking a swing at the plaintiff, to which he responded in kind. By contrast, Deming testified that the plaintiff, despite two orders to "stop and go back on the other side of the table," came around the table and began striking him repeatedly, eventually knocking Deming to the floor. Transcript at 129. Both agree that moments later Januchowski came up behind the plaintiff, after having yelled at him to stop, and physically forced him to the ground where he was handcuffed.
The remaining sequence of events is almost entirely disputed. Plaintiff's version of events is as follows. After Januchowski restrained the plaintiff, he and several other correctional officers accompanied the plaintiff to the housing block entrance hallway. There the plaintiff was allegedly assaulted by various correctional officers, including Januchowski and Amoia, the latter striking him with her radio. The plaintiff was then taken to the Sing Sing emergency room/infirmary area by officers including Januchowski and Robles. Inside the infirmary, the plaintiff was taken into a locker room in the back, where he claimed at trial that he was assaulted a second time by Robles, Deaderick, and other officers. It is unclear how much time passed, but soon thereafter the plaintiff was examined "head to toe" by a nurse and photographs were taken of the plaintiff's various injuries. Transcript at 15; photographs, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.
After examination, the plaintiff returned under escort to his housing block, the HBC area, where he alleged a third and final assault occurred, involving Deaderick, Robles, and other officers. After that third and final assault he was placed in his cell. While there the plaintiff claims he unsuccessfully requested medical attention for his injuries. The plaintiff specifically asked Amoia for medical assistance. She not only ignored this request, but also discouraged a superintendent from responding to it, by telling the superintendent that the plaintiff had already been treated. Transcript at 21.
The next day, after receiving no further medical attention, the plaintiff was transferred to another facility where he was again photographed. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. At trial the plaintiff testified that although an abrasion on the rear of his head was not found by medical personnel at Sing Sing, the personnel downstate (the location transferred to) did document such an injury. Evidence submitted at trial indicated that the defendant was later given medicine.
The defendants' version of events from the moment Januchowski entered the scene is quite different. According to the defendants, Januchowski responded to the altercation between Deming and the plaintiff when he observed the plaintiff striking Deming. Transcript at 157. He then had to use physical force to overcome the plaintiff's assault on Deming, as plaintiff refused to cooperate with the officers. Amoia arrived at the scene and provided handcuffs to place on the plaintiff, who was then escorted, without incident, to the Sing Sing emergency room/infirmary area. Deming and Januchowski were sent to Phelps Memorial Hospital for treatment, while the plaintiff was treated and photographed at the Sing Sing infirmary, again without incident. Following the treatment, Robles and Deaderick escorted the plaintiff to HBC without incident. The defendants claim that, despite various medical personnel passing by the plaintiff's cell throughout the day, the plaintiff never requested medical attention from anyone following these alleged incidents. While the defendants concede that the examination given the next day, at a downstate facility, indicated the presence of a swollen right knee and an abrasion on the back of the head which were previously unreported, they insist that all the injuries were minor and no treatment of the plaintiff was warranted.
It is unclear whether anyone else accompanied the plaintiff and these officers back to the plaintiff's cell or the NBC.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court submitted to the jury (a) plaintiffs claims that defendants Deming, Robles, Januchowski, Deaderick, and Amoia used excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (b) plaintiffs claims that defendants Robles, Deaderick, and Amoia were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the same constitutional rights.
The Court submitted the case to the jury in the form of a special verdict. The special verdict form contained five separate sections, one for each of the five individual defendants, the Court having instructed the jury that it must consider plaintiffs claims against the defendants separately.
The first question in each section asked whether plaintiff had established "by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of excessive and unnecessary force while he was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility as a result of the acts of" a particular defendant. If the jury answered "yes" to the first question, the following four questions dealt with damages, compensatory and punitive, in respect of the claims for excessive force. However, the jury rejected all the plaintiffs excessive force claims. As to each defendant, the jury answered the first question in the negative and, obedient to the Court's instructions on the special verdict form, answered no further questions as to that claim against that defendant.
Those verdicts put an end to plaintiffs case against defendants Deming and Januchowski, since the only claims against them were for the use of excessive force. But defendants Deaderick, Amoia and Robles were in a different position, since plaintiff charged each of them with using excessive force and with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs. Accordingly, the special verdict form's sections relating to these three defendants began with the same five questions in respect of excessive force, but then asked a series of questions in respect of deliberate indifference, the first question in this series inquiring whether plaintiff had established "by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition as a result of the acts of" a particular defendant. If the jury answered that first question "yes," the following questions dealt with damages, compensatory and punitive, on the deliberate indifference claim, but the jury answered no further questions on that claim in the event of an initial negative answer.
The jury signified by its answers that plaintiff had failed to prove a deliberate indifference claim against defendant Deaderick, and so the case against him was at an end. However, the jury found that plaintiff had proven that claim against Amoia and Robles. Accordingly the jury turned to the damages questions. As for compensatory damages, the jury awarded the nominal sum of $1.00 against both Amoia and Robles. The jury also stated that plaintiff was entitled to awards of punitive damages against Amoia and Robles.
Following the preferred practice in such cases, the special verdict form did not ask the jurors to fix an amount of punitive damages until the defendants in question had been given an opportunity to testify before the jury concerning their personal financial resources and obligations. Both Amoia and Robles gave such testimony. The jury then retired, deliberated further, and in a supplemental special verdict form returned a verdict of $10,000 punitive damages against defendant Amoia and $5,000 against defendant Robles.
Judgment was entered accordingly. This motion on behalf of defendants Amoia and Robles followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Judgment as a Matter of Law
A.
Defendants Robles and Amoia move for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") under Rule 50(b) of the Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 50(a)(1) provides:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
Rule 50(b) allows a party to renew such a motion made at the close of evidence by filing a motion not later than 10 days after entry of judgment. In "ruling on a renewed motion, the court may: (1) if a verdict was returned . . . (C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law." Rule 50(b)(1)(C). These defendants now renew their motion made at the close of the evidence.
In ruling on a motion for JMOL, the trial court is required to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence. The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury.Tolbert v. Oueens College, 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In making its evaluation, the court should "review all the evidence in the record, " but
it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. . . . That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
It follows from these principles that a trial court is required to deny a motion for JMOL unless, "viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.'" Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir. 1995), citing Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1994) ( quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970)).
Accordingly, "`judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's finding could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].'" Barbara Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College, 239 F.3d 476, 479-480 (2d Cir. 2001), quoting DiSanto v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 220 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2000). In sum, the moving party "faces a high bar." Barbara Lavin-McEleney, 239 F.3d at 479.
B.
The defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law "because it is clear from all the testimony" that both Amoia and Robles "acted lawfully and were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Reverse, Vacate, or Modify the Judgment ("Defendants' Memorandum") at 10.
In order to "state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.'" Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000), quoting, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). The standard for deliberate indifference includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). First, "the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious." Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 (citations omitted). Second, "the defendant must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Id. A prison official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "[T]he deliberate indifference standard requires the plaintiff to prove that the prison official knew of and disregarded the plaintiffs serious medical needs." Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Prison officials are not liable "if they responded reasonably to a known risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Cole v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 977, 2000 WL 760749 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2000), citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826.
The defendants first argue that the plaintiff "failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that he suffered a serious injury to either his head or knee sufficient to be deemed a serious medical need." Defendants' Memorandum at 12. The "only medical evidence presented," say the defendants, "was that plaintiff had a "minor abrasion to his head' and had a "swollen right knee'." Id., quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit #3. For these injuries "no immediate treatment" and no "follow-up treatment" was required. Id. The plaintiff's allegations "did not evince an "urgency, risk of degeneration or death, or extreme pain."' Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law at 3, quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). Additionally, argue the defendants, the plaintiff had pre-existing conditions with respect to his right knee and headaches. Lastly, the defendants reason that because the jury "concluded that no excessive force had been used by any defendant, thus ipso facto plaintiff could not have suffered a serious medical need." Defendants' Memorandum at 12 (emphasis in original).
Defendants' arguments on this question are unconvincing, and based upon an inaccurate reading of the record. First, the medical evidence presented to the jury consisted of more than the finding of a minor head abrasion and a swollen knee. According to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence without objection, the nurse who first examined the plaintiff in the Sing Sing infirmary area documented on the "Report of Inmate Injury" that the plaintiff had "multiple contusions on back, no skin breaks, redness on right and left wrist area, contusions, right and left shoulders — shoulder area, contusions on forehead, minor abrasion . . . ring finger." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Transcript at 16 (read into evidence without objection). Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, stipulated to by the defendants, consisted of an "Ambulatory Health Record," prepared in conjunction with the plaintiff's transfer from Sing Sing to Attica, which documented the same injuries found in the Report of Inmate Injury. Another "Ambulatory Health Record," Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 (accepted into evidence without objection), was created downstate, at Attica, after the transfer from Sing Sing. This report notes, with regard to the plaintiff, "MULTIPLE ABRASION [sic] ALL OVER BODY (BACK) [sic] both wrists are red but NOT bruised or swollen has redening [sic] of both shoulders [,] rt forehead and small abrasion on rt ring finger | some swelling of rt knee," and later in the report, "Head — minor abrasion on Back of head" (emphasis in original).
In addition to these medical reports, the plaintiff testified that his head was "cracked, " his legs "swollen up," and that he had "problems not breathing because it seemed they kept hitting [him] on [his] kidney." Transcript at 21. Also, photographs were taken both at the Sing Sing infirmary (eight photographs admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6) and downstate (five photographs admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 7). The plaintiff testified that these photographs (though admitting "they are not clear pictures") depict the injuries he sustained during the three physical altercations with correctional officers at Sing Sing. Transcript at 20, 26.
Second, defendants' argument that plaintiff required no treatment for his injuries is oversimplified. According to the medical records, treatment was given to the plaintiff for contusions (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 "Treatment Provided: Obs/cool compresses [sic?] to all contusions; Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, "Obs/cool compresses [sic?] to all contusions"), and medicine was given to the plaintiff (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Feldene, Advil, and an x-ray listed on Ambulatory Health Record). The extent to which the medication, in whole or part, addressed injuries which predated the date of the incidents involved in this case is unclear. However, whether an alleged reaggravation of existing injuries occurred or whether the injuries, in whole or part, were entirely of recent vintage or entirely preexisting, does not foreclose a finding by the jury that the plaintiff had, on or just after December 21, 1993, serious medical needs.
Defendants submitted into evidence dozens of pages documenting the plaintiffs medical history. Defendants' Exhibit G. During cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that medical records revealed he had a history of headaches and knee problems. Transcript at 63-66.
Third, defendants' argument that once they held that no excessive force was used, the jury was, ipso facto, no longer at liberty to hold the defendants liable for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is a non-sequitur. The defendants did not previously make this argument, and should properly have brought this objection to the Court's attention when reviewing the draft jury charge and special verdict form. These documents do not suggest that a failure to find the defendants liable for the use of excessive force obviated the need to address the questions of deliberate indifference, no such reasoning was argued to the jury by counsel, and the Court does not accept it now. Logic compels this conclusion, since the jury could have determined, for example, that the level of force used by the defendants was justified, while at the same time finding the plaintiff to have been seriously injured such that his medical needs should have been addressed. They could, alternatively, have determined that someone was to blame for the assaults against the plaintiff, without believing that a preponderance of evidence established that the defendants were liable for it.
Lastly, the defendants appear to misunderstand the threshold standard for "serious medical needs" as it has been established in the Second Circuit. The defendants' argument that the plaintiff failed to submit to the jury sufficient allegations of serious medical need is based upon an apparent misreading of an oft-cited quote in this circuit. Under Second Circuit law, the requirement of sufficiently serious medical needs has been referred to as contemplating "`a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.'" Hemmings v. Gorczyk, 134 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998), Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994), quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1990)(Pratt, J. dissenting). These words of Judge Pratt have been applied numerous times to § 1983 cases like the one at bar. As an examination of the case law makes clear, this standard does not require that the medical need be of such gravity that failure to address it will result in death or a condition that approaches it.
As the Second Circuit wrote in Chance, "we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that "[i]t is a far easier task to identify a few exemplar of conditions so plainly trivial and insignificant as to be outside the domain of Eighth Amendment concern than it is to articulate a workable standard for determining "seriousness" at the pleading stage.'" 143 F.3d at 702-703. This task is no less difficult after the issue has been decided by a jury. The court of appeals in Chance went on to note that some factors are "highly relevant" to the inquiry into whether a serious medical need existed. Id. at 703. These factors include "`the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.'" Id. at 702, quoting McGucklin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). The Chance court went on to hold that a sufficient allegation of serious medical needs existed where the plaintiff alleged extreme pain caused by the failure of prison officials to properly treat his dental concerns. 143 F.3d at 703.
In Hemmings the court of appeals reversed and remanded a decision by the district court that no claim of serious medical needs could be established pursuant to § 1983, where the plaintiff alleged that he experienced pain sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim as a result of a ruptured achilles heel from a basketball injury. Id. at 106. Like the plaintiff in Chance, and the plaintiff at bar, the plaintiffs account in Hemmings was based in significant measure upon self-described pain, though medical evidence existed as well. In a recent case, this Court refused to grant the defendants a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the inmate plaintiff alleged deliberate indifference to his chronic back pain. As Judge Sweet aptly put it, "a chronic back injury may not be as dramatic as some other conditions found to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard . . . but it is not therefore insufficient as a matter of law." Cole, 2000 WL 760749, at * 5. Cole, in addition to the cases mentioned above, reminds that the law does not require the plaintiff to establish that he was ignored while writhing in pain on his deathbed, so long as the plaintiff can marshal evidence sufficient to show that his pain constituted a serious medical need.
Where the plaintiff presents to the jury "facts that could potentially show that his condition was sufficiently painful to satisfy the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test under the Eighth Amendment," the jury is at liberty to determine that serious medical needs existed. Irby v. Frisnia, 119 F. Supp.2d 130, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding sufficient allegations of serious medical needs for purposes of a Rule 56 motion where plaintiffs basketball injury to his right heel was misdiagnosed, but granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on other grounds). The defendants do not persuade the Court that a jury could not have found plaintiffs injuries to be significant enough that a "reasonable doctor or patient would find [them] important and worthy of comment or treatment."McGucklin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60.
In view of the fact that the plaintiffs testimony and medical evidence, discussed supra, are clearly sufficient under law to defeat a defense motion to dismiss his allegations of serious medical needs, the Court does not find that the jury's determination of the matter was the result of "sheer surmise and conjecture." DiSanto, 220 F.3d at 64.
C.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff failed to establish, under the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test, that either Robles or Amoia "knew of and disregarded the plaintiff's serious medical needs." Chance, 143 F.3d at 703.
1. Defendant Robles
It is argued by Robles that the judgment against him must be vacated as a matter of law for the following reasons: (1) there was no personal involvement between the plaintiff and Robles sufficient to justify a finding of deliberate indifference; and (2) Robles was found liable for punitive damages because the jury mistakenly relied on Robles' supervisory status as a Sergeant, as evidenced by the purportedly inconsistent verdict rendered.
The argument that there was a lack of "personal involvement" by Robles, Defendants' Memorandum at 13, does not persuade. Robles contends that because he was not assigned to the HBC area and not involved in the transfer of the plaintiff downstate, he was not sufficiently involved to be found liable. The plaintiff testified at trial, however, that Robles, with others, escorted the plaintiff to the infirmary area after the altercation with Deming and Januchowski. Transcript at 13. The plaintiff testified that Robles was among those who assaulted him in the infirmary area (the "second assault"). Transcript at 14. The plaintiff later testified that Robles also assaulted him inside the HBC area (the "third assault"). This testimony alleges sufficient personal involvement" to allow a jury to believe that Robles was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious medical need. Where Robles was assigned to work and whether he also was part of the transport team is irrelevant.
Robles (as well as Amoia) also argues that the judgment of liability against him was based upon a misapplication of law by the jury, which does not allow for supervisory officials to be held liable solely for the acts of others. See, e.g., Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)("a defendant in a § 1983 action may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because he held a high position of authority"); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830 (2d Cir. 1977)("the doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable as a basis for imposing liability under § 1983; there must be some showing of personal responsibility"). The plaintiff does not challenge the principle of law, but contends that the jury did not find liability on that basis. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 13.
At 10:45 a.m. on October 30, 2000, the jury submitted a note to the Court during its deliberations. I read the note into the record as follows:
It says, "Re: Questions 1, 6, 11, 21, 31. Does "acts of the defendant" include acts of omission as well as commission?" And then there are two notations that are a little hard for me to read, but I think it's an i.e. At least it would make sense if it was an i.e., that is "failure to supervise or indifference to the plaintiffs plight."
And if I'm right about that i.e., then what the note says is this, and I will read it again, with respect to the questions that have been referenced, "Does "acts of the defendant" include acts of omission as well as commission, that is, "failure to supervise or indifference to the plaintiffs plight?"
The jury made this inquiry specifically with regard to questions 1, 6, ii, 21 and 31. These questions on the special verdict form asked whether the plaintiff had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, with respect to each of the five defendants, "that he was a victim of excessive and unnecessary force while he was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility as a result of the acts" of the defendant at issue. As noted in text, the jury ultimately decided "No" with respect to all of those claims.
After consulting with counsel for both parties, the Court instructed the jury as follows:
My answer to you is that in this context, in the context of a claim for the deprivation of a constitutional right, the right to be free from the use of excessive and unnecessary force, the phrase "the acts of the defendant" refers only to the acts of commission of what that defendant did — — the acts of commission, what that defendant himself or herself actually did. It does not include, in the context of this particular claim, a consideration such as a failure to supervise or indifference or a failure to prevent someone else from doing something.
Transcript at 484. The jury then resumed deliberation at 11:20 a.m. and reached its verdict at 12:30 p.m. Transcript at 485.
According to the defendants, "clearly the jury ignored that instruction" because there is no other explanation for the verdict rendered, and no "reasonable persons" could have reached the conclusion reached by the jury. Defendants' Memorandum at 14-15. As evidence of the alleged misapplication of law by the jury, Robles points to the "inconsistency" between the judgment against Robles on the claim of deliberate indifference, and the judgment for Deaderick on the same claim. According to Robles, this is unreasonable because of the "plaintiff's specific testimony that these same officers committed the same exact acts against him." Defendants' Memorandum at 14-15. Plaintiff's testimony is not entirely clear, but an examination of all relevant testimony and argument on the point is of some assistance.
The plaintiff testified about the involvement of both Deaderick and Robles. He testified that Robles was one of the officers who escorted him to the Sing Sing infirmary area. Transcript at 13. He also testified that both Robles and Deaderick assaulted him during the second assault in the infirmary area, with Deaderick arriving after the plaintiff was escorted by Robles and others but before he was examined. Transcript at 14. The remainder of the plaintiff's direct testimony with respect to these two defendants was as follows:
COUNSEL: After you had your pictures taken in the infirmary area at Sing Sing on December 21, 1993, what happened next?
PLAINTIFF: I was escorted back to the NBC area. Upon entering the NBC area I was hit on the right side of my leg with a baton which knocked me to the ground. I was assaulted again, this time my head was cracked open. I was placed, afterwards, back in my cell and left there without any further medical attention.
COUNSEL: Which corrections officers assaulted you at that point in time?
PLAINTIFF: Deaderick, Seaton, Robles, and several other officers that was just waiting there for me to get back.
COUNSEL: Who was it that hit you in the legs?
PLAINTIFF: I believe it was Deaderick.
***********
COUNSEL: What efforts, if any, did Corrections Officer Robles make to protect you?
PLAINTIFF: None.
COUNSEL: What efforts, if any, did Corrections Officer Deaderick make to protect you?
PLAINTIFF: None.
Transcript at 20-21. The plaintiff then testified, without mention of either defendant, that after he "was placed in a cell, [he] attempted to get medical attention, it was denied." Transcript at 21.
In addition to the plaintiff, both Robles and Deaderick testified on their own behalf. Robles testified that on December 21, 1993 he reported to the "hospital area, " where he "supervised the photographing of [the plaintiff]." Transcript at 208. In response to a question from his attorney, Robles agreed that no physical action was taken by him or other officers at any point against the plaintiff. Transcript at 210. Robles was then asked whether after the plaintiff was "escorted back to the area, to the NBC SHU area, " Robles saw him again that day, or the next day, or for any other purpose. Transcript at 213. To each such query, Robles answered "No." Transcript at 213. No further inquiry was made of Robles on the question.
Deaderick then testified as to his involvement. He testified that he became involved with the plaintiff for the purpose of taking photographs of the plaintiff in the Sing Sing infirmary area. Transcript at 229. After those photographs were taken, Deaderick testified that he was involved in the escort to the SHU that followed. Transcript at 233. He had responsibility to "clear the hallway area." Transcript at 234. Then Deaderick testified on direct examination as follows:
COUNSEL: After arriving at the gate of SHU, what happened next?
DEADERICK: We basically ring the bell, and then the officers assigned to the special housing unit, they will open the door and they will take control of that inmate.
COUNSEL: Did you enter SHU on that day?
DEADERICK: No, I didn't.
***********
COUNSEL: And after you rang the bell and the officers arrived, what did you do next?
DEADERICK: I went back to the hospital and finished, you know, documenting the photographs. ..
Transcript at 236-237.
As pointed out supra, to the extent that inconceivable inconsistencies exist in a jury's verdicts, the proper remedy is a new trial, not a JMOL in favor of the losing party. In any event, no such inconsistency appears on the issue of Robles' participation in the conduct charged. One may note a pertinent distinction between the accounts of Robles and Januchowski. Specifically, Deaderick testified that while he escorted the plaintiff to the SHU gate, he returned to the infirmary area after the officers on the other side of the gate arrived. Transcript at 237. This testimony was elicited on direct examination. No such inquiry was made of Robles by defense counsel during its direct examination of him. It remains unclear whether Robles escorted the plaintiff only to the gate area, or all the way to the cell. The plaintiff testified that both Robles and Deaderick entered the gate area and participated in the third assault against him. Transcript at 20-21. Deaderick specifically denied entering that area; Robles made no such denial. This is not to suggest that the only inference to draw from such testimony is that Robles did in fact enter the gate area where an assault occurred, only that such an inference is not unreasonable.
The jury might have doubted Robles's credibility as the result of a discrepancy between his deposition and trial testimony, as revealed during cross-examination by plaintiffs counsel. Robles had testified at his deposition Januchowski was among the officers he observed escorting plaintiff to the infirmary. At trial Robles denied seeing Januchowski at that time, and characterized his prior deposition testimony on the point as in error. Transcript at 217-18.
Finally, the jury might have believed Deaderick's testimony, previously noted, that after escorting plaintiff back to the gate of the HBC area SHU he did not enter that area. That would explain why Deaderick did not observe, as he testified, the third assault plaintiff described, which occurred inside the gate area. On that particular point the jury clearly credited Deaderick rather than plaintiff, who testified that Deaderick was among the officers who assaulted him "upon entering the HBC area." Transcript at 20. But plaintiff also testified that "several other officers that was just waiting for me to get back" joined in that assault, id. Plaintiff testified that during that third assault he suffered a head injury that left him bleeding, Transcript at 51, and the Downstate facility medical records would support a jury finding that additional injuries were inflicted upon plaintiff after he returned to the housing area from the infirmary.
The pertinence of this evidence to plaintiffs case against Robles is that the jury could have found that Robles, concededly being inside the gate area, had knowledge of plaintiff's head injury, even if he did not participate in the assault which caused it, and by doing nothing about that injury demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiffs medical needs. It follows that the jury did not have to rely upon an inappropriate theory of supervisory liability to arrive at its verdict against Robles.
In their briefs arguing for a JMOL under Rule 50(b), the moving defendants stress perceived inconsistencies between the jury's verdicts exonerating all defendants on the excessive force claims while holding Robles and Amoia liable for deliberate indifference to medical needs. That argument is properly made in support of defendants' alternative motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a), and so I will discuss it under Part II infra. See Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 74 ("The correct course, if the answers [to the jury's special verdict form] were ineluctably inconsistent, would not be to enter judgment as a matter of law but rather to order a new trial.").
I would take a different view of the jury's verdict on the deliberate indifferent claim against Robles (and against Amoia as well) if the only assaults to which plaintiff claims he was subjected had occurred prior to his examination at the Sing Sing infirmary. Had that been the totality of plaintiffs proof, the officers' infliction of injuries upon plaintiff would have immediately preceded his evaluation and treatment by presumably competent medical staff. Whether that evaluation and treatment were proper or not, it is difficult to imagine a legally viable claim that a prison officer was deliberately indifferent to an inmate's medical needs which medical professionals had just finished treating.
However, these concerns do not arise because, as noted, plaintiff also claimed that prison officers had assaulted him after his return from the infirmary to his housing area. Indeed, the main thrust of his deliberate indifference claims relates to the injuries he testified he suffered during that third assault, during which "[m]y head was cracked, my legs was like swollen up." Transcript at 21. Plaintiff further testified that the abrasion on the back of his head, noted in the Downstate medical records on December 22, 1993, had not existed when the medical staff at Sing Sing examined him on December 21. Transcript at 24. A legally viable claim for deliberate indifference on the part of Robles (and Amoia) existed with respect to these subsequently inflicted injuries, and the jury's verdict reflects that plaintiff sustained his burden of proof with respect to them.
The motion of defendant Robles for JMOL is denied.
2. Defendant Amoia
The analysis in the concluding paragraphs of the discussion of Robles's JMOL motion in Part I.A. applies equally to that of Amoia, and will not be restated. It is necessary only to add that plaintiffs claim against Amoia for deliberate indifference turns upon the jury's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility, which Rule 50(b) does not permit this Court to reassess.
Thus plaintiff testified that after he was beaten the third time and returned to his cell
I attempted to get medical attention, it was denied. I tried to call Sergeant Amoia when she went by my cell, she ignored me. I stopped a superintendent when he walked by, and she informed him that I already was seen by the nurse.
Transcript at 21. In her testimony, Amoia unequivocally denied that any of these events or conversations occurred. Accordingly the jury had to decide which witness to believe. Its verdict makes it plain that the jury credited plaintiffs testimony on these points and rejected that of Amoia.
The jury's credibility assessment entitled it in law to conclude that Amoia "kn[ew] of and disregar[ded] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Z 511 U.S. at 837. Accordingly, the jury's verdict was not an unwarranted determination of liability against Amoia. Viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that there was only a single verdict to be reached," Morales v. City of New York, 99 Civ. 10004, 2001 WL 8594 at * 6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001), or that it was a product of "sheer surmise and conjecture," made in the "complete absence of evidence" supporting it.. DiSanto, 220 F.3d at 64.
The argument to vacate the judgment against Amoia on the grounds that the jury must have reached its verdict under the theory of respondeat superior was rejected with respect to the conduct of Robles in Part I.C.1. That analysis applies equally to Amoia. The argument that, even accepting plaintiff's testimony that he asked Amoia for assistance, there was no serious medical need to which Amoia could be held deliberately indifferent, is also unpersuasive for the reasons stated in Part I.A.
The motion of defendant Amoia for JMOL is denied.
II. Punitive Damages and Remittitur
Defendants Robles and Amoia include in their Rule 50(b) motion for JMOL a request that the Court vacate the jury's award of punitive damages against them on the ground that "the evidence did not support a finding of egregious conduct." Defendants' Memorandum at 18. Alternatively, defendants ask the Court for a remittitur to lower amounts.
A threshold question arises as to whether defendants have waived the point. Second Circuit cases make it clear that "although a motion for JMOL may be renewed after the jury returns its verdict, it may be renewed only on grounds that were specifically articulated before submission of the case to the jury. As to any issue on which no proper Rule 50(b) motion was made, JMOL may not properly be granted by the district court, or upheld on appeal, or ordered by the appellate court unless that action is required in order to prevent manifest injustice." Kirach v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations, quotation marks and alterations omitted) (emphasis added). In Tolbert, 242 F.3d 58, a discrimination case, the Second Circuit held that defendants' Rule 50 (a) motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of discrimination did not preserve for appeal (or for a renewed Rule 50(b) motion) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence justifying the jury's award of punitive damages. The Second Circuit regarded that latter issue as "not properly before us because defendants did not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support punitive damages in their Rule 50 (a) motion for JMOL, " 242 F.3d at 76, going on to say:
In the present case, defendants' Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL did not challenge the sufficiency of Tolbert's evidence with respect to punitive damages. Rather, as described in Part I.D. above, defendants moved for JMOL solely on the ground that Tolbert had failed to prove that the discrimination was based on race. There was no mention whatever in that motion of punitive damages; nor did defendants suggest that there was insufficient proof that they had a mental state that could justify an award of such damages.Id. at 77.
This procedural requirement resonates in the case at bar because when defendants' counsel moved under Rule 50(a)(1) for JMOL at the end of plaintiffs case, the only grounds stated were that plaintiff had failed to prove against any defendant the use of excessive force or deliberate indifference. There was no mention whatever of punitive damages. See Transcript at 110-118. However, Rule 50(a)(2) permits the making of a JMOL motion "at any time before submission of the case to the jury"; and, following the charge conference but before summations, counsel for defendants adverted to a point "similar to what I previously indicated in our trial conference, which I will indicate again for the record here. Again, I don't deem that this is a case where punitive damages should go to the jury. I don't think there is a record which indicates that." Transcript at 351. While the record is not entirely clear, I deem this an adequate claim that plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to sustain a claim for punitive damages against either Robles or Amoia. Accordingly the claim is preserved for post-verdict renewal under Rule 50(b).
Even if the record does not allow that reading, a court, trial or appellate, may excuse a movant's procedural waiver and consider the claim on the merits if "that action is required in order to prevent manifest injustice," Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 164, a concept echoed in Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 77 ("Accordingly, defendants did not preserve for appellate review their present challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a punitive damages award; and in light of defendants' own arguments at trial, we cannot conclude that excusing that defect is needed in order to prevent injustice.").
Typically, whether excusing the procedural defect is needed to prevent injustice turns upon the rationale for the procedural requirement, namely, "the motion must be sufficient to inform the opposing party of the precise issue as to which more evidence is needed in order to warrant its submission to the jury." Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 76-77. Thus in Kirsch the waiver was not excused because had defendants based their JMOL motion upon a lack of proof as to wilfulness (they were silent on that issue), "it may be that Kirsch would have been able to present additional evidence to show that defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded the matter of whether, their conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 148 F.3d at 165. In Tolbert, certain ill-advisedly arguments of defendants' counsel "in support of his contention that there was no evidence of discrimination on the basis of race raised the specter of at least a reckless or callous indifference to Tolbert's rights, " arguments which "plainly could not have alerted Tolbert to any defense contention [subsequently made under Rule 50(b)] that he had failed to produce evidence from which a reckless or callous indifference to his rights could be inferred." 242 F.3d at 77.
In the case at bar, even if one assumes that defendants' motion did not give plaintiff adequate and timely notice of the purportedly insufficient proof on punitive damages, it is difficult to imagine what additional evidence plaintiff could have adduced on the issue. The parties gave diametrically opposing accounts of what happened, and the jury, having decided who to believe, made awards of punitive damages which reflected its evaluations of credibility.
In those circumstances, I would consider whether these punitive damages awards constituted manifest injustice, even if defendants' Rule 50 practice had waived the issue. But I do not find a waiver here, and so turn to the merits of defendants' claim, which is, to reiterate, that the punitive damages awards should be vacated or remitted.
The first argument in support of this position can easily be disposed of. The defendants mistakenly claim that because the jury awarded only nominal damages to the plaintiff, the injuries could not have been considered "bad enough" to rise to a level that would "warrant punitive damages." Defendants' Memorandum at 19. However, the law is clear in this Circuit that "punitive damages can be awarded in § 1983 cases absent a finding of compensatory damages." Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp.2d 170, 182 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 1998); LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 431 (2d Cir. 1995). The jury's award of punitive damages will not be vacated or modified based upon the jury's assessment of nominal damages.
The defendants also contend that the evidence presented to the jury did not warrant a finding of punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded "to punish [defendants] for [their] outrageous conduct and to deter [them] and others like [them] from similar conduct in the future."Beckford, 49 F. Supp.2d at 185 (changes to plural in original), quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (with citation to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(l)(1997)). The Court in Smith held that "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." 461 U.S. at 56.
The defendants essentially rearticulate their position with respect to the motion for judgment as a matter of law, namely, that "there was no evidence of recklessness or actual malice" shown by the defendants, nor any evidence that either defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's serious medical needs. Defendants' Memorandum at 18. As discussed above, sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to conclude that the defendants acted recklessly and with deliberate indifference toward the plaintiff, so as to deprive him of a federally protected right. The jury was entitled to find that the defendants' conduct "involve[d] reckless or callous indifference" and the Court will not disturb that finding by vacating the jury's determination that punitive damages are warranted.Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
The defendants ask that the Court consider a remittitur as an alternative to vacating the award of punitive damages. Remittitur is the process "by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between a reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial." Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). A "verdict may be excessive where an identifiable error caused the jury to include a particular amount that it should have excluded, or where the award is "intrinsically excessive in the sense of being greater than the amount a reasonable jury could have awarded, although the surplus cannot be ascribed to a particular, quantifiable error.'" Morales v. City of New York, 2001 WL 8594, at *3, quoting Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d at 165. An award of punitive damages should be reversed only if it is "`so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice."' Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992); Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 967 (1988), quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1978).
Though the United States Constitution "imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards," Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994) (citations omitted); Blackledge v. Carlone, 126 F. Supp.2d 224, 228 (D.Conn. 2001), only when such an award "can fairly be categorized as `grossly excessive' . . . does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates [due process]." BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996). The Supreme Court has identified three "`guideposts'" that "bear on the reasonableness of punitive damages awards, at least the outer limits imposed by the Due Process Clause." Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1997), quoting Gore, 116 S.Ct. at 1598-99. These guideposts are: "the degree of reprehensibility" of the tortious conduct, (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and (3) the "difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Id.
With an eye toward these guideposts, I conclude a remittitur is not appropriate in this case. The degree of "reprehensibility" appropriately determined by the jury in this case is fairly reflected by the punitive damages awarded. As the court in Beckford held in refusing to apply remittitur in a similar § 1983 case, "the jury has already determined the degree of reprehensibility for defendants' conduct by awarding plaintiff punitive damages" and "[b]y finding that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs." 49 F. Supp.2d at 186. Though only nominal compensatory damages were awarded in this case, thus making the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages quite high, an examination of similar cases convinces the Court that these awards do not come close to shocking the judicial conscience.
In Beckford, the jury awarded zero dollars in compensatory damages, and zero dollars in nominal damages, but awarded the plaintiff, cumulatively, $25,000 against two defendants for punitive damages after a finding that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs (most specifically by denying him access to a wheelchair). The defendants moved, inter alia, for a remitittur. The court rejected that motion on the grounds that the $25,000 award was "clearly not excessive" in view of other § 1983 cases. Id. at 186. The awards are $5,000 against Robles and $10,000 against Amoia, both less than that inBeckford. Though recognizing that the plaintiffs injuries in our case are not the most severe and differ from those in other cases, even a cursory review of the many punitive damage awards in our Circuit involving § 1983 claims shows that the $15,000 awarded in the case at bar is considerably below the average. See, e.g., Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) (reducing $200,000 punitive damages award to $75,000 in a § 1983 malicious prosecution case); O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding $185,000 in punitive damages against two officers found to have assaulted plaintiff and left him bleeding in cell). The Court could find no § 1983 case (nor any other case involving punitive damages for that matter) where a punitive damage award of anything approaching $15,000 was reduced as excessive. See, e.g., Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding "it is not even necessary to go beyond our § 1983 cases to determine that the $150,000 [punitive] award in the instant case is within reasonable range"). Tellingly, counsel provides no case to the contrary. For these reasons, I decline to impose a remittitur.
Consideration of the financial situation of the defendants also does not undermine the Court's conclusion that the punitive damage awards should remain undisturbed. An award "should not be so high as to result in the financial ruin of the defendant" nor should it constitute a "disproportionately large percentage of a defendant's net worth."Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992) (reducing punitive damage awards where such awards constituted twice the annual income of one defendant, and 30% of the net worth of another). The Court simply does not agree with the defendants, for reasons discussed above, that the award "provides a windfall to the plaintiff," because only nominal damages were awarded or because of the "erroneous" imposition of "supervisory liability." Defendants' Memorandum at 20. The award of $10,000 against Amoia amounts to less than 20% of her annual income; the award of $5,000 against Robles amounts to less than 10% of his annual income. Though not insubstantial amounts of money for these two defendants, in view of their income and assets, the award is not disproportionate with respect to either the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation, as determined by the jury, nor relative to other § 1983 cases.
Amoia testified that her annual gross income is $56,000. Transcript at 495. Robles testified that his annual gross income is $50,883. Transcript at 216.
For these reasons, the request to vacate the judgment of punitive damages is denied. The request to resort, in the alternative, to a remittitur, is also denied.
III. Motion for a New Trial
Under Rule 59(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.: "A new trial may be granted . . . for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States."
A "motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999); Adkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1998), quoting Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Cow., 110 F.3d 898, 911 (2d Cir. l997) (omitting internal notations and quotations). A new trial may be granted "when the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence." DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 1998).
A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 is governed by standards which differ from those governing a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. Unlike a Rule 50 motion, the Court may independently "weigh the evidence" without favor to the non-movant. Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992); Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 950 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Nevertheless, as this Court discussed at length in Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 70 F. Supp.2d 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the extent to which Rules 50 and 59 require distinct treatment of a jury verdict by a district court judge is complicated by a "maze of conflicting principles and less than precise appellate directions." Id. at 308.
The following guidelines clarify this maze. A "trial judge should be least inclined to disturb a jury's verdict, based entirely or primarily upon witness credibility, where the conflicting accounts of the witnesses are equally plausible (or implausible), and there is no independent evidence in the trial record" requiring belief in one witness and not the other. Id. at 308. "Conversely" a jury verdict is more appropriately disturbed where one "conflicting account is so inherently implausible as to tax credulity, or there is independent evidence in the trial record" such that finding for one party, instead of another, would "lead to a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 308. These principles conform to the longstanding doctrine that "[i]t is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body." Tennant v. Peoria P.U.R.Y. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944); Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department, 971 F.2d 864, 875 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing the district court's decision to grant a new trial on grounds that "the trial court overstepped its bounds and usurped the jury's function of judging credibility"); McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F. Supp.2d 205, 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (a judge may not "freely substitute his or her assessment of the credibility of witnesses") (internal citations omitted).
In the case at bar, a determination of witness credibility was central to the jury's verdict. As discussed above, with respect to both Amoia and Robles, the jury was confronted with directly contradictory testimony about the alleged assaults and requests for medical attention. I accord the traditional degree of deference to this jury's evaluation of credibility. Moreover, "a decent respect for the collective wisdom of the jury, and for the function entrusted to it in our system, certainly suggests that in most cases the judge should accept the findings of the jury, regardless of his own doubts in the matter." 303 West 42nd St. Enterprises. Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 93-4483, 2000 WL 666339 at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2000), quoting Ricciuti, 70 F. Supp.2d at 308.
The only other issue raised by defendants warranting discussion is their contention that the jury's responses to the special verdict form were fatally inconsistent. Defendants argue in their Reply Memorandum at 4 that "the inconsistency concerning the verdict is primarily based upon the jury finding no liability for CO. Deaderick and liability for Sgt. Robles for the deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim where plaintiff testified that both defendants committed the same acts under the same circumstances."
In Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 74, the Second Circuit said that
where the special verdict answers appear to be inconsistent but there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent, they must be resolved that way. In seeking consistency, we bear in mind that the jury was entitled to believe some parts and disbelieve other parts of the testimony of any given witness.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
See also Turley v. Police Department of the City of New York, 167 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999)
When confronted with a potentially inconsistent jury verdict, the court must adopt a view of the case, if there is one, that resolves any seeming inconsistency. Before a court may set aside a special verdict as inconsistent and remand the case for a new trial, it must make every attempt to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary.
Reconciling the jury's findings in the case at bar is easy enough. The jury could have found that (I) Deaderick left plaintiff and the other escorting officers at the gate to the housing facility (as Deaderick testified); (2) inside the housing area plaintiff was assaulted by a group of officers including some unknown to him (as plaintiff testified); and (3) Robles was present inside the area (as he did not specifically deny), where Robles could have observed plaintiffs additional injuries even if he did not participate in inflicting them (contrary to plaintiffs testimony); (4) Amoia was specifically asked by the plaintiff to give medical attention and she chose to ignore him. This analysis reconciles any potential inconsistency between the exoneration of Deaderick and the verdict against Robles for deliberate indifference, as well as that between the exoneration of Robles for excessive force and the verdict against him for deliberate indifference.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the post-verdict motions of defendants Robles and Amoia are denied in their entirety.
It is SO ORDERED.