Opinion
E051624 Super.Ct.No. RIC458189
08-03-2011
DONALD MINUT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CELEBRATIONS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Respondent.
Richard V. McMillan for Plaintiff and Appellant. Kulik, Gottesman, Mouton & Siegel, Thomas M. Ware II and Francesca Dioguardi for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard V. McMillan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kulik, Gottesman, Mouton & Siegel, Thomas M. Ware II and Francesca Dioguardi for Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal is about whether the trial court properly interpreted and enforced the parties' settlement agreement.
Plaintiff Donald Minut purchased a home, allegedly unaware that it was subject to conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&R's) administered by defendant Celebrations Homeowners Association (the Association). Section 7.7.2 of the CC&R's prohibits parking trailers anywhere but in an enclosed garage. Minut claims he is a "serious" race car driver, and he needs to keep his race car in a trailer parked in his side yard.
Minut sued the seller and others, alleging that they failed to disclose the existence of the CC&R's. He also sued the Association, alleging that he had asked it to have its members vote on amending section 7.7.2, but it had refused.
Minut and the Association entered into a settlement agreement, which was read into the record. It required the Association to hold a vote on amending section 7.7.2. Based on the settlement agreement, the trial court dismissed the complaint as against the Association.
Thereafter, however, the parties could not agree on how to word the proposed amendment. Minut filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6); in it, he asked the trial court to order the Association to use his proposed wording. The trial court denied the motion.
Minut appeals. Although his contentions are none too clearly articulated, the main one is that the trial court "did not consider the declarations of [Minut] and his counsel." The record, however, fails to support this contention. Under the applicable standard of review, the trial court did not have to believe everything in the declarations — particularly if they were inconsistent with the terms of the settlement agreement, as read into the record. Hence, we will affirm.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Minut filed this action against the Association and other defendants. The Association was named in only a single cause of action, for declaratory relief. In it, Minut alleged that section 7.7.2 was unreasonable and unenforceable. He also alleged that, as a member of the Association, he was entitled to ask to have all of the members of the Association vote on an amendment to section 7.7.2, but the Association had refused to hold such a vote.
During a mandatory settlement conference, Minut and the Association entered into an oral settlement agreement, which was then read into the record. It called for Minut to dismiss the complaint as against the Association with prejudice. The crucial provision was as follows:
"[COUNSEL FOR THE ASSOCIATION]: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [P]laintiff will deliver proposed language for a proposed amendment of the CC&Rs of Article 7, Section 7.7.2 to restrict enforcement of this section to members only
Although the italicized language is somewhat ambiguous, both sides understand it to mean that section 7.7.2 could be enforced only by a member of the Association — i.e., it could not be enforced by the Association itself.
"THE COURT: If there's any disagreement as to those issues, who is going to make decisions? I am going to retain jurisdiction on that matter?
"[COUNSEL FOR THE ASSOCIATION]: Yes. I was going to say that.
"[COUNSEL FOR MINUT]: Yes.
"[COUNSEL FOR THE ASSOCIATION]: The parties will meet and confer after receipt of the proposed language, the agreed-upon language to be submitted to the members for a vote. The Association will conduct a vote on the proposed amendment pursuant to Civil Code Section 1363.03 and Article 14 of the CC&Rs, and the parties stipulate that the Court may retain jurisdiction to enforce this settlement pursuant to C.C.P. Section 664.6." (Italics added.)
About two months later, the Association filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. It claimed that Minut was trying to change the terms of the settlement and had refused to dismiss the complaint. It asked the trial court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
In his opposition, Minut claimed there was a dispute over the mechanics of how the vote on the proposed amendment was to be conducted. He asked the trial court either (1) to "find that there was no [s]ettlement due to the failure of a material term," or (2) to "assist . . . in resolving the mechanics of the voting issue."
The trial court granted the motion. It therefore entered a judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. To resolve the mechanics issue, the judgment also stated: "In accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Association will conduct a vote on the proposed amendments to the CC&Rs pursuant to Civil Code Section 1363.03, the Association's Bylaws, and CC&Rs."
Counsel for Minut sent a proposed amendment to counsel for the Association. It provided that section 7.2.2 could be enforced only "by an adjacent property owner . . . ." (Italics added.) It also provided that otherwise prohibited vehicles could be parked "behind solid fencing . . . ." The Association rejected the proposed amendment; it took the position that it was inconsistent with the settlement agreement, because it did more than just restrict enforcement to members generally.
Counsel for the Association sent a different proposed amendment to counsel for Minut. Counsel for Minut rejected it, asserting that "pursuant to the [s]ettlement my [c]lient has the right to determine what language he wishes to place before the [m]embers for the vote."
Minut filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. In it, he asked the trial court to compel the Association to hold a vote, using his version of the proposed amendment. According to his attorney's declaration, "[t]he Settlement was . . . that Mr. Minut would provide the language which would be used in the proposed change being voted on by the members . . . ." "It was never my intention to allow the . . . Association to dictate the terms of the proposed modification, and in my discussions with my [c]lient, that concept was never discussed." Similarly, in his own declaration, Minut stated that, in the settlement, "I agreed that I would decide what language would be used in the proposed change being voted on by the members . . . ." "[T]o allow the Association to dictate the language . . . [is] not what I agreed to . . . ." The trial court denied the motion.
II
DISCUSSION
Precisely how the trial court supposedly erred, according to Minut, is not entirely clear. He has not assisted us by providing headings that summarize his contentions, as California Rules of Court, rule 8.204 (a)(1)(B) would require. As best we can tell, however, his contentions are as follows.
First, Minut indicates at several points that he is challenging the judgment of dismissal. He also contends that there was no settlement, because the parties failed to agree on all of the material terms. However, he did not file any timely appeal from that judgment. "If an order is appealable, . . . and no timely appeal is taken therefrom, the issues determined by the order are res judicata. [Citation.]" (In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393.) It is simply too late to challenge either the judgment or the related determination that there was an enforceable settlement.
Second, Minut also argues (at some length) that, in ruling on the Association's motion to enforce the settlement, the trial court erred by not spelling out the mechanics of how the vote should be taken. Once again, however, he did not appeal from that order. He cannot challenge it in this appeal.
Third, Minut contends that the trial court somehow either failed "to take evidence" or failed to consider all of the evidence. The trial court, however, did take evidence. Both sides submitted declarations. They did not ask to present any oral testimony. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b).) A trial court has discretion to rule on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement based on declarations alone. (Smith v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a).)
Moreover, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the trial court failed to consider any evidence. "[T]he decision under review is presumed correct on matters where the record is silent. [Citations.]" (Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1362.) The trial court was not required to affirmatively state that it had considered all the evidence. (See In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1093.)
Minut asserts — more than once — that the trial court erred by ruling that the terms of the settlement agreement were limited to those that were read into the record. The trial court, however, made no such ruling. Minut therefore argues that it is inferable that it did so because, if it had considered the additional evidence that he was offering, in his declarations, it would have come to a different conclusion. This is, in essence, a claim that the order is not supported by substantial evidence.
"'[T]he trial court's factual findings on a motion to enforce settlement pursuant to section 664.6 are subject to limited appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.] 'Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, . . . " . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .' [Citation.]" (Steinman v. Malamed (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1556.) "Even though contrary findings could have been made, an appellate court should defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court when the evidence is in conflict. This is true whether the trial court's ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations." (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479, fn. omitted.)
According to Minut's declarations, it was agreed that he could dictate the language of the proposed amendment. According to the settlement agreement, as read into the record, however, the amendment was only supposed "to restrict enforcement of [section 7.7.2] to members . . . ." Moreover, the parties were to "meet and confer" regarding Minut's proposed language, and the "the agreed-upon language" was to be submitted to the members for a vote. To the extent that Minut's declarations conflicted with the version of the settlement agreement that was read into the record, the trial court could reasonably disbelieve the declarations. Minut implicitly (but necessarily) concedes that the trial court's ruling was supported by the version of the settlement agreement that was read into the record. He has forfeited any contrary argument.
It could be argued that the parol evidence rule should apply to an oral settlement agreement that has been placed on the record. The trial court, however, did not rely on the parol evidence rule, and the parties have not discussed it in their briefs. We therefore express no opinion on this question.
Minut asserts that "if the evidence viewed in his favor could support his position[,] he is entitled to a reversal and rehearing." This turns the standard of review on its head. Actually, he must demonstrate that the evidence, even when viewed in favor of the challenged order, fails to support that order. He has not even attempted to do so.
We therefore conclude that Minut has not shown any error.
III
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed. The Association is awarded costs on appeal against Minut.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur: HOLLENHORST
Acting P.J.
MILLER
J.