Appellant additionally argues that its prior knowledge of the zoning restrictions is not a bar to appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment. Appellant contends that the present case is distinguishable from Mintz v. Pepper Pike (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 185, 11 O.O.3d 180, 386 N.E.2d 849, in which this court held: "A purchaser who acquires real property for a purpose not permissible under current zoning restrictions cannot argue persuasively against the constitutionality of the ordinance based on his loss of profit due to his failure to obtain a change in zoning."
Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff may have paid more than the land was worth under existing zoning in the hope of securing a zoning change is generally not a factor to be considered in the plaintiff's favor in analyzing a taking claim. E.g., Westbrook v. Board of Adjustment, 245 Ga. 15, 262 S.E.2d 785 (1980); Mintz v. Village of Pepper Pike, 57 Ohio App.2d 185, 386 N.E.2d 849 (1978) (noting that the plaintiffs' claim of financial loss was more accurately described as denial of a windfall). See generally 1 A. Rathkopf D. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 6.07 (1988).
"A purchaser who acquires real property for a purpose not permissible under current zoning restrictions cannot argue persuasively against the constitutionality of the ordinance based on his loss of profit due to his failure to obtain a change in zoning." Mintz v. Pepper Pike (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 185. The logic espoused in Mintz applies equally to the case at bar.
{¶ 18} Zoning regulations must bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, whether they are enacted through a legislative body or through a referendum of voters. Mintz v. Pepper Pike (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 185, 190. A zoning regulation is unconstitutional if it is "'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare[.]
]'" Goldberg, 81 Ohio St.3d at 213, quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365, 395, 71 L.Ed. 303. Zoning regulations must bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare whether legislation is enacted by a legislative body or through a referendum of voters. Mintz v. Pepper Pike (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 185, 190. "When the challenge involves a factual determination [as to whether the ordinance meets the standard as set forth in the Euclid case], the trial court is in a better position to evaluate the testimony of witnesses and the evidence presented." Mays v. Miami Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2nd Dist. No. 18997, 2002-Ohio-3303, at ¶ 11.
Second, Ohio courts, as well as the courts of numerous other states, agree that one who purchases property in the hopes of gambling on securing a zoning modification has no right to complain when the legislative body declines to rezone for the benefit of the gambling buyer. Tempe v. Rasor (1975), 24 Ariz. App. 118, 122, 536 P.2d 239, 243, citing Phoenix v. Beall (1974), 22 Ariz. App. 141, 145, 524 P.2d 1314, 1318; Mintz v. Pepper Pike (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 185, 11 O.O.3d 180, 386 N.E.2d 849. Third, most states agree that claimed economic loss alone does not justify rezoning.