Opinion
November 24, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Geiler, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
An easement of way confers the lawful right to use the surface of property owned by another for unobstructed passage, with the right to enter upon said property and prepare it for that purpose, together with such other incidental rights as are necessary to the enjoyment of the right of passage (see, Herman v Roberts, 119 N.Y. 37, 42). Where the grantor expressly states that the creation of an easement is to provide a right-of-way for ingress to and egress from the grantee's property, then the grantee may only use the easement in such manner as is reasonably necessary and convenient for that purpose (see, Dalton v Levy, 258 N.Y. 161, 167; Grafton v Moir, 130 N.Y. 465, 470-471).
In this case, the trial court properly concluded that the easement contained in the plaintiffs' deed, providing for "ingress and egress over a 30-foot right of way" over a portion of the defendant's property should be limited to the 12-foot paved roadway, since the plaintiffs failed to establish that roadway was inadequate for the expressly stated purpose intended by the grantee in creating the easement (see, Dalton v Levy, supra; Grafton v Moir, supra, at pp 470-471; Fairfield Props. v Pepe, 56 A.D.2d 883, lv denied 42 N.Y.2d 805). The only obstruction to free access into and out of the plaintiffs' property was a fence erected by the defendant, which the trial court ordered removed, and which apparently has been removed.
We further agree with the trial court that nothing in the language of the grant suggests that the plaintiffs had a broad right to use the entire 30-foot parcel for another purpose such as landscaping the strips of grass surrounding the roadway on either side (see, Le Sawyer v Squillace, 14 A.D.2d 961, lv denied 11 N.Y.2d 648; cf. Missionary Socy. v Evrotas, 256 N.Y. 86). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.