Opinion
00 Civ. 7481 (HB)
April 22, 2002
OPINION ORDER
Defendants Charles A. Gargano ("Gargano") and The Village of Port Chester ("the Village") move for attorneys fees' and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The defendants prevailed in a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by condemnees William V. Minnich, William J. Minnich, Minic Custom Woodwork, Inc., (collectively "Minnich") and William Brody ("Brody") challenging the constitutionality of New York's eminent domain procedure. On January 18, 2001, this Court granted preliminary injunctive relief as to Brody and denied it to Minnich. The Village appealed the decision with respect to Brody, and the Second Circuit vacated and remanded. Both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment and I granted the defendants' motion on September 20, 2001. For the following reasons, the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been stated and restated in this Court's two prior opinions and one from the Circuit. For purposes here, I recite only a brief summary.
In May, 1999, Minnich and Brody each faced condemnation of their respective real properties under New York State's power of eminent domain. Specifically, in May 1999, the Empire State Development Corporation ("ESDC"), of which Gargano is chairman and president, initiated proceedings under the New York Eminent Domain Proceeding Law ("EDPL") to condemn Minnich's real property in the Bronx on which he owned and operated a woodworking shop. Around the same period, the Village initiated similar proceedings to take Brody's real property in Port Chester where he owned two small buildings that he rented out to several businesses. The plaintiffs brought suit claiming that sections of the EDPL were unconstitutional in that the law failed to provide for adequate notice to condemnees of their procedural rights or an adversarial proceeding in which to challenge a condemnation.
The EDPL provides certain procedures under which the state may exercise its eminent domain powers. These procedures include notice by publication of a hearing and a second notice by publication upon the issuance of the determination of the EDPL. The statute does not require the government to provide notice of the 30-day right to appeal.
Below, I separately set forth the facts as to Minnich and Brody.
A. Minnich
On May 26, 1999, the ESDC — a state public benefit corporation imbued by the New York legislature with eminent domain power pursuant to the EDPL — mailed notice to Minnich of a public hearing scheduled for June 23, 1999, although the statute does not require personal service of notice of the hearing. The hearing was to be on the ESDC's proposed development project and the possible condemnation of Minnich's property. Minnich attended the hearing, spoke and submitted a written statement in opposition to the project. The ESDC subsequently approved the condemnation and published its findings on September 20 and 21, 1999. The ESDC, although again not required to do so, mailed copies of the determination to Minnich on two separate occasions. The ESDC did not, however, inform Minnich as to the appeals process.
Failing to timely appeal the ESDC's determination, Minnich brought an Article 78 proceeding in New York State Supreme Court on November 8, 1999. For jurisdictional reasons, the Supreme Court transferred the case, sua sponte, to the Appellate Division, which dismissed the matter as time barred. Minnich then came before me by Order to Show Cause to seek preliminary injunctive relief. In particular, Minnich sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the EDPL had violated his due process rights for its failure to require actual notice of the public hearing, the subsequent determination and findings, and the 30-day period of appeal, and its failure to provide an adversarial proceeding in which to oppose condemnation. On January 11, 2000, I denied injunctive relief to Minnich on the ground that he failed to satisfy the "imminent harm" prong required to obtain such relief Minnich and the defendants then filed cross summary judgment motions and I granted summary judgment against Minnich.
B. William Brody
Brody, located in Port Chester, faced similar concerns as Minnich. On May 22, 1999, the Village published notice of its upcoming hearing with respect to its condemnation project, which included Brody's property. Brody, although not personally served with such notice, learned of the hearing, attended and spoke. The Village, however, realized that it had failed to provide sufficient publication notice as required under the EDPL and held a second hearing in July, 1999, and this time published notice for the proper length of time. Brody claimed that he never learned of the second hearing and therefore failed to attend. Following the hearing, the Village published its determination approving the condemnation. Brody failed to appeal within the requisite 30-days. In April, 2000, the Village initiated proceedings under EDPL § 402 in New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County, to acquire title to Brody's property. Initially, the Supreme Court denied the Village's petition on the grounds that the Village had failed to offer compensation to Brody. After reargument, however, the court reversed and granted the Village's petition on the condition that Brody receive an offer for compensation within 60 days. Brody thereafter joined Minnich in this federal action to seek preliminary injunctive relief by Order to Show Cause. With respect to Brody, however, I granted a preliminary injunction that barred the Village from taking further steps to acquire his property pending a hearing on the permanent injunction. The Village appealed and the Circuit reversed on the grounds that Brody lacked standing and that this Court had not adequately considered the significant public interest concerns of the Village's project. Both sides subsequently filed motions for summary judgment and I granted the Village's motion.
The defendants Gargano and the Village now seek attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
II. DISCUSSION
Any motion for attorneys' fees should be prefaced by the well-established caveat that, absent legislation to the contrary, litigants in the United States are generally required to pay their own attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 249 (1975). Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [section 1983] . . . the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b). Where the prevailing party is a defendant, as here, that party bears an additional burden to show that the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). This heavier burden is placed upon defendants to ensure that the policies in favor of encouraging private citizens to vindicate constitutional rights are balanced with those aimed at deterring frivolous or vexatious lawsuits. See id.
The above recitation of the factual and procedural history of this case, which passed through several courtrooms, received two contrary adjudications by the Supreme Court in Westchester County, a preliminary injunction as to Brody in federal court and a reversal by the Circuit, reveals a course of litigation that was not especially clear-cut, with underlying claims that were compelling. As I emphasized in my twelve-page opinion that granted the defendants' summary judgment on procedural grounds — standing and res judicata with respect to Minnich and res judicata as to Brody — the procedural bars had "no bearing on the very serious underlying issue of what constitutes adequate notice under New York State's condemnation proceedings." Minnich. et al., v. Gargano, et al. 2001 WL 1111513, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) (Baer, J.,).
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' brought their actions in bad faith and were motivated by intentions to tie up the condemnation proceedings in litigation rather than a desire to vindicate their civil rights. To say, in essence, that the plaintiffs brought suit to halt the taking of their property hardly convinces me that their intentions were misplaced. Specifically, the defendants claim that while the plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the procedural bars to their lawsuits, they nevertheless decided to proceed. However, while the plaintiffs' actions were properly dismissed on procedural grounds, I can not unequivocally find that their efforts should have never been born. As the Supreme Court observed, "[t]he fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees." Huges v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). Further, while the benefit of hindsight can occasionally dim the prospects of some legal arguments that were once creatively pursued, the statute must not and was never meant to be used to chill similar future endeavors. The Supreme Court has stated more than once that, "even if the law and the facts are somewhat questionable or unfavorable at the outset of litigation, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit." Huges, 449 U.S. at 15; Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
While Minnich clearly lacked standing with respect to portions of his constitutional claim, I have previously said that his standing to challenge the 30-day time limitation under the EDPL was "less clear," as it hinged on whether Minnich's counsel's knowledge could be imputed to him for standing purposes. Minnich, 2001 WL 1111513, at *3
Similarly, the res judicata issue with respect to Minnich, although ultimately decided against him, was not without its twist. Minnich had argued that he was unable to assert some of his constitutional claims in the state Supreme Court because an Article 78 proceeding conferred limited jurisdiction to hear such claims. See Hachamovitch v. DeBuono, 159 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 1998) ("It is well settled that res judicata does not apply to bar a § 1983 action where a plaintiff has previously brought an Article 78 proceeding."). Minnich ultimately lost this argument when the Court found that Minnich could in fact have brought his constitutional claims at the state level because the Supreme Court had transferred Minnich's case, sua sponte, to the Appellate Division and effectively converted it into a section 207 appeal under the EDPL. See Minnich, 2001 WL 1111513, at *5.
While the res judicata issue with respect to Brody may have been more easily resolved, it is interesting to note that the Village itself failed to raise this ground in its papers in opposition to the preliminary injunction. Brody's res judicata issues originated with respect to whether he could have raised his constitutional claims during the state proceeding brought by the Village under EDPL § 402. While, as the plaintiffs note, there is authority to suggest that the New York courts prevent condemnees from raising condemnation objections in certain EDPL § 402 proceedings, see, e.g., In Re Acquisition of Land for Farmington Access Road, 156 A.D.2d 936, 936 (N.Y.App.Div. 1989), I had a different view of the matter. See Minnich, 2001 WL 1111513, at *6. In any event, there is sufficient authority to conclude that the plaintiffs had a basis on which to pursue their claims. In light of the above, and from my extended experience with this litigation, I do not find that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless. They are therefore not required to pay attorneys' fees or costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
III CONCLUSION
For the foregoing fees is DENIED.