The court says: "If it had not, when entering the interlocutory decree, required that bond be given, no damages could have been recovered on the dissolution of the injunction." Minneapolis, St. Paul Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company v. Washburn Lignite Coal Company, 254 U.S. 370, 41 S. Ct. 140, 65 L. Ed. 310, deals with an injunction with reference to putting certain schedules into effect. There was no bond imposing any terms or conditions for the security of the carrier.

But it was clear that, upon final hearing, the Railway might prove that it was entitled to a permanent injunction; and the District Court was not obliged to order restitution meanwhile. If it had not, when entering the interlocutory decree, required that bond be given, no damages could have been recovered on the dissolution of the injunction. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437; Minneapolis, St. Paul Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U.S. 370, 374. Although it required the bond, and this Court held that the interlocutory injunction had been improvidently issued, the District Court could, in its discretion, refuse to assess the damages until it should, after the final hearing, have determined whether the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction.

And the prevention of confiscation by ensuring recovery of value or cost was described by the Supreme Court in several decisions using the language of guaranteeing adequate remuneration. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of N.Y. , 259 U.S. 101, 105, 42 S.Ct. 438, 66 L.Ed. 844 (1922) ; Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. , 254 U.S. 370, 370, 372, 41 S.Ct. 140, 65 L.Ed. 310 (1920) ; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota ex rel. McCue , 236 U.S. 585, 602, 605, 35 S.Ct. 429, 59 L.Ed. 735 (1915) ; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. ICC , 206 U.S. 441, 446, 27 S.Ct. 700, 51 L.Ed. 1128 (1907) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. N.C. Corp. , 206 U.S. 1, 19, 25, 27 S.Ct. 585, 51 L.Ed. 933 (1907) ; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning , 186 U.S. 238, 249, 22 S.Ct. 881, 46 L.Ed. 1144 (1902). A tariff was the "classic" method of implementing rate regulation.

But in the context of Russell v. Farley it seems clear that no more was intended than to suggest that such an award was not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Both in Donnelly and in United Motors Service reference is made to Minneapolis, St. P. S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U.S. 370, 41 S.Ct. 140, 65 L.Ed. 310 (1920). United Motors Service, 57 F.2d at 483, refers to Minneapolis, St. P. S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. as holding that in the absence of a bond damage arising from an injunction is damnum absque injuria.

But a person cannot claim reimbursement or restitution where he voluntarily pays out money on his own account in his own interest, without request, authorization, or consent of the party from whom he seeks to recover it. In regard to this question of unjust enrichment, the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Minneapolis, St. Paul Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 40 N.D. 69, 168 N.W. 684, 686, 12 A.L.R. 744, has this to say: "Where there is no contract in fact, either implied or express, the law will not imply one except to support a recovery in favor of a plaintiff on the principle that the defendant has been unjustly enriched at his expense.

It follows from the authorities cited that the district court was correct in holding that the defendants could not recover on any bond an amount in excess of the penalty of the bond nor for any liability except that stipulated in the bond. See and compare Tenth Ward Road District v. Texas Pacific R. Co., 5 Cir., 12 F.2d 245, 45 A.L.R. 1513; Minneapolis, St. Paul S.S.M.R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U.S. 370, 41 S.Ct. 140, 65 L.Ed. 310; United Motor Service, Inc., v. Tropic Aire, Inc., supra. And, since the $2,000 bond given on the temporary restraining order and the $10,000 bond given on the temporary injunction were conditioned only to pay such costs and damages as the defendants sustained by reason of the erroneous or improvident issue of the injunctive orders, the district court was also correct in denying recovery on either of these bonds for expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by the defendants in ridding themselves of the restraints imposed by these orders or by any other injunctive order granted in the action and subsequently denied.

In absence of malicious prosecution, the weight of the Federal authority is clear that no damages can be recovered in an injunction proceeding in absence of a bond. 10th Ward Rd. Dist. v. Texas P. Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 1926, 12 F.2d 245, 45 A.L.R. 1513; Minneapolis, St. P. S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 1920, 254 U.S. 370, 41 S.Ct. 140, 65 L.Ed. 310; United Motor Service v. Tropic-Aire supra; see, also, Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 1929, 278 U.S. 228, 49 S.Ct. 106, 73 L.Ed. 282. While the court in its order of July 18, 1938, in effect continued the restraining order with modifications and required a bond which included provisions with reference to expense and attorneys' fees as damages to be secured by the bond, it is quite apparent that the court intended to do nothing more than to maintain the restraining order in effect during the pendency of the appeal; that is, the defendants had made a motion to dismiss the amended bill and to dissolve the restraining order, and apparently it was assumed by the parties that the restraining order issued on July 5, 1937, was in existence.

The same view of an unmodified injunction as a continuing adjudication was expressed by this court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. 387 Ill. 256, 274, in describing the effect of an earlier decree enjoining interference with railroad rates: "Any attempt to apply that decree to a subsequent change in conditions or to a different service or rates, is governed solely by the rules of law applicable to the doctrine of res judicata." To the same effect is Minneapolis, St. Paul Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N.D. 69, 168 N.W. 684. There the railroad succeeded in securing the modification of an injunction which had restrained the collection of freight rates above those fixed by statute. It then sued the shipper to recover increased compensation for shipments made during the period the injunction was in effect.