Opinion
Nos. CV-074029199, CV-074030204, CV-084037292
June 3, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before this court are three appeals filed by the appellant-respondent, Attorney Francis Miniter, challenging the decisions of the statewide grievance committee issued in the matters of grievance complaints numbers 06-0323 (Superior Court, Docket No. CV 07 4029199), 06-0577 (Superior Court, Docket No. CV 07 4030204) and 07-0484 (Superior Court, Docket No. CV 08 4037292). The court heard argument for each of these appeals on February 26, 2009. The court has also reviewed the briefs and the record filed by the parties. The court further notes that, having conceded that transcripts have been produced as part of the record in each of these files, the appellant has withdrawn his claim that the matters should be heard as trial de novo.
"Upon appeal, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the committee unless the court finds that substantial rights of the respondent have been prejudiced because the committee's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, rescind the action of the statewide grievance committee or take such other action as may be necessary. For purposes of further appeal, the action taken by the [S]uperior [C]ourt hereunder is a final judgment." Practice Book § 2-38(f).
The Appellate Court in Brunswick v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 103 Conn.App. 601, 610-13, 931 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 929, 934 A.2d 244 (2007), engaged in extensive analysis regarding the standard of review articulated in Practice Book § 2-38(f). The Brunswick court held that the "clearly erroneous standard" is the preferable standard of review in attorney grievance appeals. Id., 613. As such, this court reviews the decisions of the statewide grievance committee considering whether it is "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . ." Practice Book § 2-38(f)(5). See also Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 226-27, 890 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S.Ct. 157, 166 L.Ed.2d 39 (2006).
"[I]n reviewing a decision of the statewide grievance committee . . . neither the trial court nor [the Appellate Court] takes on the function of a fact finder. Rather, our role is limited to reviewing the record to determine if the facts as found are supported by the evidence contained within the record and whether the conclusions that follow are legally and logically correct . . . Additionally, in a grievance proceeding, the standard of proof applicable in determining whether an attorney has violated the [Rules] of Professional [Conduct] is clear and convincing evidence . . . The burden is on the statewide grievance committee to establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear and convincing proof . . .
"[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ansell v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 87 Conn.App. 376, 382-83, 865 A.2d 1215 (2005).
Docket No. CV 07 4029199
The basis of this appeal is the reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee (reviewing committee's decision) on January 5, 2007, reprimanding the appellant for violating Rules 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "(a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules; (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
Rule 1.5(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: "The scope of the representation, the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible, shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client in writing before the fees or expenses to be billed at higher rates are actually incurred . . ."
In a hearing conducted on November 1, 2006, where the appellant failed to appear, the reviewing committee found by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant entered into an agreement with the complainant to represent her in a matter before the commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO). In that matter, the reviewing committee found that the appellant failed to provide the complainant with a written fee agreement despite accepting $1,500 to represent her, failed to file an appearance on her behalf and failed to return her phone calls after the CHRO dismissed her complaint. As a result of these findings, the reviewing committee reprimanded the appellant.
On January 30, 2007, the appellant filed a "Request for Review of Reviewing Committee's Decision," pursuant to Practice Book § 2-35(g), asserting a violation of his due process rights. Specifically, the appellant argued that the reviewing committee failed to grant him a continuance to appear at his hearing, even though he had a conflicting obligation to appear in an administrative appeal before the New Britain Superior Court, Levine, J. He also claims that he asked Disciplinary Bar Counsel Mark A. Dubois (Attorney Dubois) to have the case called later on in the morning, so that he could appear after his administrative appeal was concluded, but that the reviewing committee refused to do so.
Practice Book § 2-35(g) provides in relevant part: "(g) Within thirty days of the issuance to the parties of the final decision by the reviewing committee, the respondent may submit to the statewide grievance committee a request for review of the decision. Any request for review submitted under this section must specify the basis for the request including, but not limited to, a claim or claims that the reviewing committee's findings, inferences, conclusions or decision is or are: (1) in violation of constitutional, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the reviewing committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion and the specific basis for such claim or claims . . ."
In its consideration of the request to review, the statewide grievance committee rejected the appellant's due process claims and affirmed the decision of the reviewing committee. It noted that Rule 7B of the Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Procedure provides in relevant part: "Continuances may be granted to . . . the [r]espondent in the discretion of the reviewing committee and only for good cause shown. Motions for continuance must be submitted on JD-GC-17 and filed with the office of the Statewide Bar Counsel with a copy to all counsel and pro se parties of record no later than seven calendar days prior to the date of the hearing, absent exigent circumstances. A party requesting a continuance must indicate whether the opposing party consents to the request . . ."
The statewide grievance committee also noted that the JD-GC-17 form itself requires that "if the basis of the motion is a court conflict, the [r]espondent must first seek to resolve the conflict with the Court, and include the case name, docket number, name of the presiding judge or caseflow officer with whom he spoke, when the conversation took place, and when he became aware of the conflict."
Notwithstanding these requirements, the statewide grievance committee found that the appellant failed not only to file a JD-GC-17 form, but filed his motion for continuance the day before the hearing, and failed to assert exigent circumstances for filing his request for continuance late. Moreover, the statewide grievance committee found that the appellant's motion did not indicate whether the opposing party consented to his request, did not indicate whether he attempted to resolve his conflict with the court and failed to indicate when he became aware of the conflict. Based on the appellant's failure to comply with the rules surrounding continuances, the statewide grievance committee found no due process violation and affirmed the reviewing committee's reprimand.
In reviewing the record for purposes of the present appeal, the court notes that the reviewing committee had before it the motion for continuance which, while dated October 23, 2006, was actually fax-filed from the appellant on October 31, 2006, and date-stamped as received by the reviewing committee on October 31, 2006, one day prior to the grievance hearing. In his motion, the appellant noted that in addition to his scheduling conflict, his obligations in these pending administrative agency appeals would render him unable to prepare adequately for the grievance hearing. The record, however, reflects that the appellant was assigned the court date for the administrative appeal on September 29, 2006, and in a letter dated October 5, 2006, was assigned the date for the grievance hearing. In the notice scheduling the grievance hearing, the appellant was specifically advised that "[a] motion for an alternative date or time will only be considered if filed in compliance with the Statewide Grievance Committee rule of procedure set forth in the Grievance Hearing enclosure."
In the hearing before the reviewing committee, Attorney Dubois noted the absence of the appellant and provided documentation of his communications with the appellant in the prior weeks regarding the scheduling of the hearing. Apparently prompted by the appellant's request for a continuance in the same matter the last time it was assigned for hearing, Attorney Dubois sent the appellant a letter, certified with return receipt requested, dated October 18, 2006, reminding him of the hearing date in this matter; the return indicates that the appellant's office received the correspondence on October 20, 2006. Following voicemail communications and discussions with the appellant's office seeking a continuance due to a trial conflict, Attorney Dubois responded by letter dated October 23, 2006. Attorney Dubois informed the appellant that he was aware of when the appellant had been assigned the November 1, 2006 date for both the hearing on the motion for his administrative appeal and the grievance matter and that the appellant had done nothing in the weeks subsequent to this notice, despite the apparent conflict. In that letter, Attorney Dubois also noted that his office did not reschedule hearings. Furthermore, he reminded the appellant twice and in some detail that if he was seeking a continuance, he needed to file a motion on the appropriate grievance committee form in a timely manner, and that he must consult with the complainant as well as make attempts to reschedule his court appearance, all of which must be reported to the grievance committee.
Notwithstanding these notices, the appellant filed his motion the day before the hearing with no representation that he had made attempts to resolve his conflict or that he consulted with the complainant or that exigent circumstances excused his late filing. When the appellant failed to appear at the hearing, Attorney Dubois represented to the reviewing committee that the appellant left him another voicemail the day before in which the appellant informed him that he was going to handle the administrative appeal motion and that he thought he could be at the grievance hearing by noon or one o'clock.
In his request for review and as the basis of his appeal before this court, the appellant cites Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 60 Conn.App. 698, 760 A.2d 1027 (2000). In that case, the Appellate Court reversed the statewide grievance committee's reprimand of an attorney, holding that the attorney suffered a due process violation because she did not have a fair and adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against her during the hearing before the reviewing committee. Id., 707.
Like the appellant in this case, the attorney in Burton had failed to file a written motion for continuance, instead leaving a voicemail with the reviewing committee one week before the hearing indicating that she had a jury trial on February 7. Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 60 Conn.App. 701-02. In response, counsel for the statewide grievance committee left a voicemail message indicating that her hearing was on February 5, and not February 7 and having heard nothing further from the attorney, assumed there was no conflict. Id., 702. On the date of the hearing, when the attorney failed to appear, one of the complainants, who were superior court judges, informed the reviewing committee that, in fact, the attorney was engaged in closing argument in a civil jury case. Id. Notwithstanding this information, the reviewing committee proceeded with the hearing. Id. Following the statewide grievance committee's issuance of a reprimand and their denial of the attorney's request to reopen the record, the attorney appealed the reprimand, asserting that her due process rights were violated. Id., 703. The trial court dismissed the appeal and upon review, the Appellate Court found, "under the particular facts of this case, once the reviewing committee became aware of the [attorney's] predicament prior to the commencement of the hearing it should have postponed the hearing so that a proper hearing could be conducted." Id., 707.
The appellant argues that his case is virtually identical to Burton, and further argues that his circumstances are more compelling to the extent that he claims to have asked merely that his matter be passed and upon his arrival at 11:30 a.m., the reviewing committee refused to allow him to present evidence.
In fact, the record only indicates, as represented by Attorney Dubois, that the appellant intended to be present when he was available, either by noon or 1 p.m. As such, it reflects the appellant's presumption that the matter would commence as much as three and one-half hours after the hearing was scheduled and that the committee, the complainant, her witnesses and counsel should wait until he was available. Furthermore, contrary to the appellant's assertion, the reviewing committee and, ultimately, the statewide grievance committee were deciding a motion for continuance that was both filed and denied the day before the hearing, not a request that the appellant's matter be passed. The appellant represented in the motion that in addition to his scheduling conflict, the press of business would make preparations for his hearing "impossible and completely unfair."
"Because a license to practice law is a vested property interest, an attorney subject to discipline is entitled to due process . . . Accordingly, [b]efore discipline may be imposed, an attorney is entitled to notice of the charges, a fair hearing and an appeal to court for a determination of whether he or she has been deprived of these rights in some substantial manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 60 Conn.App. 704. Furthermore, "[i]n Connecticut, the right of a party to be present during the proceedings related to the trial has long been recognized." Id. As such, our courts have held that an attorney has a right to be present in disciplinary hearings.
In the context of this motion, both with respect to its content and its timing, as well as the record of correspondence between Attorney Dubois and the appellant, this court finds that the particular facts and circumstances of this case distinguish it from Burton. In Burton, the court's decision suggested that under the facts and circumstances of that case, the plaintiff's failure to file the appropriate motion for continuance in a timely manner was de minimis, in light of definitive evidence offered by a superior court judge that the plaintiff was not only in the middle of a jury trial but was engaged in closing argument. Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 60 Conn.App. 705. Given these particular circumstances, the Burton court held that it was unreasonable for the reviewing committee to conclude that the plaintiff did not want to participate in the proceedings. Id., 706.
Here the plaintiff, who had already previously been granted a continuance in the same matter, not only received notice of the hearing, which articulated the procedure for seeking a continuance, but was reminded of this hearing by letter, sent by certified mail, with a return receipt signed by his office ten days prior to the hearing. As previously noted, the respondent was specifically advised in his notice of hearing letter dated October 6, 2006, that "a motion for an alternative date or time will only be considered if filed in compliance with the Statewide Grievance Committee rule of procedure set forth in the Grievance Hearing enclosure." In subsequent communications with disciplinary bar counsel regarding his conflict, the plaintiff was not only advised that bar counsel does not assign grievance hearings or reschedules them, but was reminded by letter in detail what steps he must take in order to move for a continuance.
In his brief filed with this court, the appellant represents that he sought his motion for continuance on October 23, 2006. The record, however, plainly shows that the appellant's motion was fax-filed on October 31, 2006, and date-stamped received by the statewide grievance committee on that same date. Although he was on notice that he had a conflict nearly one month before the hearing, the appellant in his brief does not address his failure to file a timely motion. The appellant fails to address why he filed his motion the day before the hearing, whether there were exigent circumstances for his late filing and why he failed to make any efforts to resolve his court conflict or contact the complainant. Instead, his motion mentions not only his conflict but that he was not prepared to go forward due to the press of business.
"Requests for continuances invoke the discretionary authority of the adjudicating tribunal. [O]n review every reasonable presumption in favor of the [tribunal's] ruling will be made . . . The [tribunal's] decision will be reversed only if it represents a gross abuse of discretion . . . In deciding whether the denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process, we have not resorted to mechanical tests but have instead examined closely the particular facts of each individual case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Concerned Citizens of Sterling, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 215 Conn. 474, 485, 576 A.2d 510 (1990). "In assessing whether the denial of a continuance amounts to an abuse of discretion, courts have considered a number of factors, including the legitimacy of the reason for the delay, likely length of the delay, prior continuances, the requesting party's responsibility for the timing of the continuance and any prejudice or substantial impairment that a denial of the continuance would have on the requesting party's rights." O'Donnell v. Waterbury, 111 Conn.App. 1, 10, 958 A.2d 163, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 959, 961 A.2d 422 (2008).
While it is clear that the appellant has a vested property interest entitling him to due process, this court's difficulty with the appellant's claim of prejudice is the extent to which it was self-imposed. More troubling still is the fact that the underlying allegations before the grievance committee related to his client's claims that he failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in his dealings with her, in violation of Rule 1.3, and her claims that he failed to communicate with her, in violation of Rule 1.4. In this context, his failure to file a timely motion for continuance and to comply with reasonable requests for information so that the grievance committee can fairly assess his request for continuance is not de minimis. The appellant's very right to practice law was contingent on his ability to address issues relating to his diligence and prompt communication. Yet, even with reminders of the hearing and explicit direction as to the steps he should take in order to seek a continuance, the appellant failed to comply with reasonable rules promulgated by the grievance committee. This is not a situation where the appellant represented that he made attempts to resolve his conflict and was denied, nor is this a situation where he asserts that there were exigent circumstances that the statewide grievance committee failed to take into account. Indeed, the appellant makes no claim that the statewide grievance committee refused to apply the rules or applied them unfairly; rather, his argument amounts to a claim that the rules should not apply to him. The statewide grievance committee, however, is statutorily authorized to make rules of procedure. This court cannot find that its decision to deny the continuance was an abuse of discretion and so arbitrary that it violated the appellant's due process rights. To sustain the appeal under these facts is tantamount to rendering the grievance procedure rules essentially unreasonable, meaningless and unenforceable. The court declines to do so and affirms the decision of the statewide grievance committee.
General Statutes § 51-90a provides in relevant part, "the State-Wide Grievance Committee shall have the power and duty to: (1) Adopt rules for procedure not inconsistent with the general statutes or rules of court . . ."
Docket No. CV 07 4030204
In this second appeal, the reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee issued its decision of February 16, 2007, reprimanding the appellant following a hearing conducted on December 7, 2006. As a result of that hearing, the committee found by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant violated rule 8.1(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book § 2-32(a)(1). Rule 8.1(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part that a lawyer "shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority . . ." Practice Book § 2-32(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "The respondent shall respond within thirty days of the date notification is mailed to the respondent unless for good cause shown such time is extended by the grievance panel . . ."
In this matter, Bank of America notified the statewide grievance committee of an overdraft in the appellant's clients' funds account. Although the appellant responded initially to inquiries by the statewide grievance committee concerning the overdraft, he failed to respond to follow-up inquiries and requests for documentation on February 10, 2006. As a result, on March 16, 2006, the statewide grievance committee referred his failure to document adequately his explanation for the overdraft to the grievance panel for investigation. By letter on March 27, 2006, the panel gave the appellant thirty days to respond to the initial request for documentation. Again, the appellant failed to respond to this letter and as a result, a grievance complaint was filed on June 21, 2006.
Along with a copy of the grievance complaint, the statewide grievance committee also advised by letter dated June 23, 2006, that pursuant to Practice Book § 2-32(a)(1), the appellant was required to file a response to the complaint within thirty days. By July 28, 2006, having received no response from the appellant, counsel for the grievance panel sent him a letter reminding him of his duty to submit a written response. Again, the appellant failed to respond.
The appellant claimed that he was engaged in an extensive trial when he failed to respond to the initial request for documentation made in February 2006, and when he realized he had missed the deadline, his request to file a late response was denied. Although he received the earlier letter in March 2006, advising him that this matter had been referred to the grievance panel for investigation, the appellant claimed that he never received the March 27, 2006 letter requesting documentation. Finally, as to the July 28, 2006 letter advising him of his responsibility to respond to the grievance complaint, the appellant had no reason for failing to file a response. According to the reviewing committee, there was no evidence that any of the correspondence was sent to an incorrect address.
With no support for his position as to the February 10, 2006 request for documentation, the appellant asserts that it was not a lawful demand because it was "beyond the scope of reasonable inquiry." Given the absence of authority for this argument, this court rejects this claim.
As to the subsequent failures to respond, the appellant relies on Daniels v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 72 Conn.App. 203, 804 A.2d 1027 (2002), apparently arguing that the evidence did not show that the letter was mailed and, thus, the reviewing committee was not entitled to make the presumption, as it did in Daniels, that the appellant had notice.
In Daniels, however, the court held that "the mailing of a properly addressed letter creates a presumption of timely notice unless contrary evidence is presented . . . In attempting to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff offered no evidence to support his allegation that he did not receive a copy of the complaint except his own testimony that he was having trouble getting mail delivered and the absence of a copy of the certified mail receipt in the record." (Citations omitted.) Id., 211-12. As such, the court held that the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that the notice was mailed on time. Id., 212.
Like the plaintiff in Daniels, the appellant has failed to offer adequate evidence rebutting the presumption of timely notice. The appellant claims that there was no record of a certified mail receipt for the delivery of this correspondence and offers merely his own testimony that he did not receive the correspondence. It is clear from Daniels that these self-serving assertions are simply not enough to overcome the presumption that he received this correspondence. As such, the reviewing committee's conclusion that he violated rule 8.1(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book § 2-32(a)(1) by failing to respond to a grievance complaint or to respond to lawful demands for information from a disciplinary authority is not clearly erroneous. This court affirms the decision of the reviewing committee in this matter.
Docket No. CV 084037292
Following a hearing on December 6, 2007, the reviewing committee of the statewide grievance committee issued a reprimand to the appellant, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The reviewing committee found the following facts. The appellant had accepted $3,000 of a $5,000 retainer agreement signed on October 7, 2006, which provided in relevant part that "[i]f [the client] direct[s] us to terminate the litigation, we will be entitled to payment of attorneys fees from [the client] on the basis of the reasonable time expended by us to that point." In February 2007, the complainant decided against pursuing his legal claim and wrote to the appellant terminating his representation and requesting a refund of the $3,000. The committee further found that the appellant failed to respond to written communications and numerous telephone calls. After a grievance complaint was filed in May of 2007, the appellant submitted a letter dated June 21, 2007 in which he documented his return of $1,230 to the complainant with an accounting of his work.
The reviewing committee found that the respondent acknowledged that he failed to communicate to this client by either U.S. mail or email, claiming only that he believed his office called the complainant in March or April to discuss the issue of fees. The complainant disputed this claim, asserting that he received no telephone communications from the appellant. The appellant further attributed his lack of communication to computer issues to the extent that he was unable to generate a final accounting of services rendered.
In his request to review the reviewing committee's decision, the appellant claimed that his due process rights were violated because the reviewing committee took into account other proceedings against the appellant, that the reviewing committee had no basis for making their findings by clear and convincing evidence due to its failure to credit certain evidence propounded by the appellant, and finally, that the appellant was denied an opportunity to present his secretary as a witness at the hearing. In its review of the reviewing committee's decision, the statewide grievance committee affirmed the decision reprimanding the appellant.
With respect to his first claim on appeal, the appellant asserts that the prosecuting attorney improperly referenced the appellant's record of grievances. The record indicates that in fact, Attorney Dubois noted the record of grievances to notify the reviewing committee that another reprimand would trigger a presentment under Practice Book § 2-47(d). Under that provision, if a respondent has been disciplined at least three times pursuant to complaints filed within five years of the filing of the complaint currently before it, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee "shall direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court." Practice Book § 2-47(d)(1). Given this authority, which the appellant fails to address, this court is not persuaded by claims that record of his grievances were improperly before the committee.
In his brief, the appellant refers to Attorney John J. Quinn as the prosecuting attorney. The record indicates that the comments at issue were made by Attorney Mark A. Dubois.
The appellant also claims he was denied an opportunity to present his secretary as a witness. The record, however, does not support this claim. Instead, the record indicates that the appellant had rested without suggesting that he had witnesses beside himself. In fact, the reviewing committee expressed a possible interest in hearing from the appellant's secretary, and indicated that they would review the record to determine if they believed there was a need for additional testimony. The reviewing committee asked the appellant and the complainant whether they had any objection to her possible return as a witness, but nowhere in the record does the appellant request an opportunity to present his secretary. Moreover, the reviewing committee also indicated that the appellant could subsequently submit documentation of his secretary's communications if available. The record indicates no effort on the part of the appellant to present testimonial or documentary evidence relating to his secretary's alleged communications on his behalf. Thus, the court rejects this claim.
Finally, the appellant claims that the reviewing committee refused to credit evidence he offered in his defense. As noted supra, this court's role is limited to reviewing the record to determine if the facts are supported by the evidence and whether the conclusions found are legally and logically correct. Ansell v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 87 Conn.App. 382-83. It does not sit as a fact finder nor may it substitute its judgment for the committee. Id. The court rejects this claim and affirms the decision of the reviewing committee in this case as well.
The appeals of Docket No. CV 07 4029199, Docket No. CV 07 4030204 and Docket No. CV 08 4037292 are all dismissed.