Miniken v. Carr

11 Citing cases

  1. Memel v. Reimer

    85 Wn. 2d 685 (Wash. 1975)   Cited 40 times
    Adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 as the standard of care owed licensees

    [3] The old standard of wanton and willful misconduct must be abandoned as to licensees, yet we do not choose to adopt the exception enunciated in Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., supra. In Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967), we were confronted with a "condition of the premises" case, and avoided the harsh standard of wanton misconduct by classifying the plaintiff as a business-invitee. However, we noted that it was not necessary to rest our determination on the invitee-licensee distinction alone.

  2. Hojem v. Kelly

    21 Wn. App. 200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 7 times
    In Hojem v. Kelly, supra, 21 Wash.App. at 200, 584 P.2d 451, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the proprietors of a riding stable that had rented her a horse.

    The plaintiff also argues that "[t]he land owner has a duty to provide and maintain safe riding stables [ sic] premises." She cites in support thereof Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 (1965);Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wn.2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975) and Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). It is true that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 (1965) is the law of this state, having been adopted in Miniken and Memel.

  3. Bayman v. Clearwater Power Co.

    15 Wn. App. 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 5 times

    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965).Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 327, 428 P.2d 716 (1967); Jurgens v. American Legion, 1 Wn. App. 39, 41-42, 459 P.2d 79 (1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 328, 428 P.2d 716 (1967)

  4. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain

    93 Wn. 2d 127 (Wash. 1980)   Cited 93 times
    In Egede-Nissen we acknowledged past questioning of the common law classification scheme, see Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wn.2d 655, 660, 359 P.2d 143 (1961) ("timeworn distinctions"); Mills v. Orcas Power Light Co., 56 Wn.2d 807, 820, 355 P.2d 781 (1960) ("ancient categories"), but decided that we were not ready then to totally abandon the traditional categories and adopt a unified standard.

    See, e.g., Memel v. Reimer, supra (adoption of section 342 regarding duty owed licensees); McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n, 68 Wn.2d 644, 414 P.2d 773 (1966) (adoption of section 332 defining invitees). See also Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 328-29, 428 P.2d 716 (1967) (cited section 342 with approval); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wn.2d 777, 784, 384 P.2d 825 (1963) (reliance on section 341). The Restatement continues to distinguish between invitees and licensees.

  5. Fowler v. Swift

    No. 51366-8-II (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2019)

    Fowler also analogizes this case to Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). There, the client of an attorney fell down stairs to a basement when she thought she was opening the door to the bathroom because the doors to each were adjacent and unmarked.

  6. Fowler v. Swift

    No. 51366-8-II (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019)

    Fowler also analogizes this case to Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). There, the client of an attorney fell down stairs to a basement when she thought she was opening the door to the bathroom because the doors to each were adjacent and unmarked.

  7. Biorn v. Kennewick Sch. Dist. No. 17

    No. 30887-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013)

    A land possessor owes a business invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care for the invitee's safety by keeping the premises reasonably safe for his or her anticipated use. Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 327-28, 428 P.2d 716 (1967);

  8. Botka v. Estate of Hoerr

    105 Wn. App. 974 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 15 times
    Noting that invitee status “can be implied from the prior conduct and statements of the property possessors or their agents”

    Winter, 68 Wn.2d at 945.Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 328, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). Botka testified that both Hoerr and Walsworth knew that Botka was uncomfortable ascending the exterior stairs to the third floor, and that they had given her express permission to enter the home at the second floor.

  9. Nivens v. 7-11

    83 Wn. App. 33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 16 times
    Finding no evidence of foreseeability where group of loitering teens assaulted patron outside convenience store despite the fact that the teens often gathered at the store and had fought among themselves before, because they had never previously engaged in or threatened violence towards the store's patrons

    at 613; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343, cmt. b.Tincani, 124 Wn.2d at 139; Wiltse v. Albertson's Inc., 116 Wn.2d 452, 461, 805 P.2d 793 (1991); Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 329, 428 P.2d 716 (1967); 6 WASH. PRAC. § 120.06.02 (cmt.) at 613.

  10. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain

    21 Wn. App. 130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 6 times

    An owner or occupier of land has the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the protection of an invitee; he must further make any limitation on the scope of the invitation apparent to a reasonable invitee. Mesa v. Spokane World Exposition, 18 Wn. App. 609, 570 P.2d 157 (1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 61 (4th ed. 1971); cf. Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). As stated in W. Prosser, supra at 391-92: