[3] The old standard of wanton and willful misconduct must be abandoned as to licensees, yet we do not choose to adopt the exception enunciated in Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., supra. In Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967), we were confronted with a "condition of the premises" case, and avoided the harsh standard of wanton misconduct by classifying the plaintiff as a business-invitee. However, we noted that it was not necessary to rest our determination on the invitee-licensee distinction alone.
The plaintiff also argues that "[t]he land owner has a duty to provide and maintain safe riding stables [ sic] premises." She cites in support thereof Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 (1965);Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wn.2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975) and Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). It is true that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 (1965) is the law of this state, having been adopted in Miniken and Memel.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965).Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 327, 428 P.2d 716 (1967); Jurgens v. American Legion, 1 Wn. App. 39, 41-42, 459 P.2d 79 (1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 328, 428 P.2d 716 (1967)
See, e.g., Memel v. Reimer, supra (adoption of section 342 regarding duty owed licensees); McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n, 68 Wn.2d 644, 414 P.2d 773 (1966) (adoption of section 332 defining invitees). See also Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 328-29, 428 P.2d 716 (1967) (cited section 342 with approval); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wn.2d 777, 784, 384 P.2d 825 (1963) (reliance on section 341). The Restatement continues to distinguish between invitees and licensees.
Fowler also analogizes this case to Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). There, the client of an attorney fell down stairs to a basement when she thought she was opening the door to the bathroom because the doors to each were adjacent and unmarked.
Fowler also analogizes this case to Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). There, the client of an attorney fell down stairs to a basement when she thought she was opening the door to the bathroom because the doors to each were adjacent and unmarked.
A land possessor owes a business invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care for the invitee's safety by keeping the premises reasonably safe for his or her anticipated use. Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 327-28, 428 P.2d 716 (1967);
Winter, 68 Wn.2d at 945.Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 328, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). Botka testified that both Hoerr and Walsworth knew that Botka was uncomfortable ascending the exterior stairs to the third floor, and that they had given her express permission to enter the home at the second floor.
at 613; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343, cmt. b.Tincani, 124 Wn.2d at 139; Wiltse v. Albertson's Inc., 116 Wn.2d 452, 461, 805 P.2d 793 (1991); Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 329, 428 P.2d 716 (1967); 6 WASH. PRAC. § 120.06.02 (cmt.) at 613.
An owner or occupier of land has the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the protection of an invitee; he must further make any limitation on the scope of the invitation apparent to a reasonable invitee. Mesa v. Spokane World Exposition, 18 Wn. App. 609, 570 P.2d 157 (1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 61 (4th ed. 1971); cf. Miniken v. Carr, 71 Wn.2d 325, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). As stated in W. Prosser, supra at 391-92: