Opinion
2023-CA-1345-MR
08-16-2024
MATT E. MINIARD APPELLANT v. FAYETTE COUNTY CONSERVATION DISTRICT APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Matt E. Miniard, pro se Lexington, Kentucky. BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: D. Barry Stilz Lexington, Kentucky.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-01956
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Matt E. Miniard, pro se Lexington, Kentucky.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: D. Barry Stilz Lexington, Kentucky.
BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
OPINION
CETRULO, JUDGE.
Appellant Matt Miniard ("Miniard") appeals a Fayette Circuit Court order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure ("CR") 12.02(f). Finding no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
As this appeal arises from a CR 12.02(f) motion, we take as true the allegations contained in Miniard's (unamended) complaint. See Hardin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 558 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. App. 2018). As such, we will recite the facts, what few we have, through that lens.
Minard, pro se, initiated this action on June 15, 2023, in Fayette Circuit Court with a pleading titled "Injunctive Relief Order/Discovery of Documents" ("Complaint"). In this Complaint, Miniard alleged members of the Appellee Fayette County Conservation District ("FCCD") improperly removed him from his elected position on FCCD's Board of Directors ("board"). According to the Complaint, Miniard received notice of a June 6, 2023 FCCD meeting, but he was not told the subject matter of this meeting in advance. Miniard attended the meeting via videoconferencing, and during the meeting a FCCD member told Miniard he had not properly signed an "election document." As a result, FCCD determined his seat was vacant and appointed someone to fill it. According to Exhibit B attached to his Complaint, Miniard emailed a member of FCCD and requested a copy of this unsigned election document. An FCCD member replied and refused his request because he was no longer a member of FCCD's board. The FCCD member recommended Miniard "send a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act request] to the state soil and water commission so you get the same copy we obtained."
Miniard remained pro se throughout this action, including this appeal.
Relevant here, the Complaint alleged due process violations (no notice of the subject matter of the meeting and the denial of a document request), sought injunctive relief (reinstatement to his seat on FCCD), and demanded damages. On July 7, 2023, FCCD moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to CR 12.02(f). In this motion, FCCD argued the Complaint 1) did not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for a due process violation; 2) did not allege facts sufficient to entitle him to injunctive relief; and, 3) did not state a plausible claim against FCCD for damages.
On July 21, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing. At that time, the court granted Miniard additional time to file a response to FCCD's motion to dismiss. On August 1, Miniard filed a "Motion For Continuance Lack of Understanding" that asserted - due to his pro se status - "the courts are compelled to respond with written order of what is expected from Plaintiff as to applicable laws in violation of or what authorities and procedures in violation of, and rights of appeal." Miniard also argued that the burden was on the court and FCCD to "prove list of facts and authorities that provide entitlement to deem office vacant" and if the court and FCCD failed to do so, the court must "order Plaintiff to be returned to the board." This pleading did not address FCCD's legal arguments relating to the deficiencies within the Complaint.
Three days later, on August 4, Miniard filed a motion for summary judgment. Miniard argued that FCCD's dismissal of him was untimely (more than 30 days after his election) and that the mistake on his election document was not due to his error, but rather, an error by one or more members of FCCD staff and/or board. Again, this pleading did not address FCCD's legal arguments relating to the deficiencies within the Complaint. That same day, at an August 4 hearing, Miniard represented to the court that he intended his filed pleadings as responses to FCCD's motion to dismiss.
On August 22, Miniard filed a combined motion for sanctions against FCCD's counsel (for allegedly failing to mail copies of filings to him and engaging in intimidating tactics) and for a judgment both reinstating him and finding negligence by FCCD members. Again, this pleading did not address FCCD's legal arguments relating to the deficiencies within the Complaint. FCCD and its counsel denied Miniard's sanction allegations.
On August 25, 2023, the circuit court held another hearing. FCCD argued that it was bound by the allegations in the Complaint, and the Complaint was insufficient. The court patiently explained to Miniard that while the court is reading all his filings, it is concerned the main issue is being "lost," and that there might not be a valid claim. The court told Miniard, "I want you to stay focused . . . you're not helping me much in giving me any law to support what you're saying." Then, the court informed Miniard that his Complaint was "not complete enough and I can't help you do it." The court explained to Miniard that while his substantive argument may have merit, he had an obligation to state - in his Complaint and to the court - "what kind of legal claim" upon which he was basing that argument. The court told Miniard that if it had to rule that day, it would be obligated to rule against him. However, instead of making a final determination on the motion to dismiss, the court stated it was granting Miniard additional time to amend his Complaint and, if he so chose, to seek legal advice from a licensed attorney. Miniard asked the court about his substantive arguments, but the court said it could not address those until it ruled there was a valid complaint on which to proceed. The court granted Miniard additional time to file an amended complaint that needed to give the court a legal basis on which to rule. Miniard asked, "So [I'm going to] have thirty days to file an amended complaint?" The court answered in the affirmative and again informed Miniard that he had 30 days to file an amended complaint.
On September 14, 2023, Minard, filed a "Notice" in this action placing the court on "notice" that he had made a criminal complaint against members of FCCD and asked the court "what position [it would] take" on his criminal complaints. FCCD responded and argued that - if Miniard's pleading was attempting to request a stay pending the resolution of his criminal complaint - it would oppose such a stay because, in part, the "Lexington Police Department resolved Miniard's [criminal] complaint as 'unfounded[.]'"
On September 22, 2023, the circuit court held a short hearing and informed Miniard that his criminal complaints are separate and procedurally unrelated to the current civil action. Thus, the court stated, the criminal matter does not impact the current action and the parties needed to proceed as scheduled.
On September 26, 2023, Miniard filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking reinstatement to his seat on FCCD. Miniard did not frame this motion as an amended complaint, but he does mention injunctive relief and due process. He argued vaguely that because he was duly elected to FCCD, only the "Commonwealth Attorney or Attorney General" could legally remove him, and that his removal alone in and of itself was a due process violation. However, Miniard did not link any factual allegations (any alleged improper behavior by FCCD) with the propriety of an order granting injunctive relief or a declaration of due process violations. Stated another way, Miniard argued FCCD should not have removed him, but he does not connect any specific actions of FCCD to any relevant, binding, applicable law. In fact, he argued again that the court had a duty to inform him, as a pro se litigant, of his rights and the applicable laws.
On October 13, 2023, the court held its last hearing in this action. The court stated that it had given Miniard "ample time" to amend his Complaint and/or relevantly supplement the record. The court noted that while Miniard had filed numerous other pleadings, he did not file an amended complaint. Then the court told Miniard, "I'm going to give you another chance to tell me why you think [this action] should not be dismissed based on [FCCD's] motion to dismiss. [FCCD] has made some very strong legal arguments and I need you to respond to those." The court walked through each of FCCD's individual arguments within its motion to dismiss, but on each claim Miniard stated he did not have further oral arguments to present and rested on his written pleadings. The court stated that it had concerns about FCCD's actions leading up to this lawsuit, but it was bound by the law, and it had no choice but to grant FCCD's motion to dismiss. On October 22, 2023, the Fayette Circuit Court entered an order granting FCCD's motion to dismiss and denying Miniard's pending motions for sanctions, summary judgment, and/or injunctive relief. Miniard appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
CR 12.02(f) allows circuit courts to render a judgment in favor of the defendant if the petitioner fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" The purpose behind a CR 12.02(f) motion is to test the sufficiency of the petition, not to adjudicate the merits of the action. Grossl v. Scott Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 566 S.W.3d 221, 222 (Ky. App. 2018) (citing White v. Brock, 487 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Ky. 1972)). Whether a petitioner pled a claim sufficient to survive a CR 12.02 motion to dismiss is a question of law. Campbell v. Ballard, 559 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Ky. App. 2018) (citing Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010)). Because this is purely a legal question, we review the judgment de novo "without deference to the interpretation afforded by the circuit court." Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998) (citation omitted). We, like the circuit court, "must accept as true the [petitioner's] factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor." Hardin, 558 S.W.3d at 5 (citing Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. 1968)). Thus, "the pleadings should be liberally construed in a light most favorable to the [petitioner]." Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Ky. 1960)).
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Miniard's appellant brief contains multiple deficiencies, including the lack of references to the record, a wanting summary of facts, an absent procedural recitation, and the lack of preservation statements, all in violation of the Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure ("RAP") 32(A). Further, Miniard did not identify how he believes the trial court erred in granting FCCD's motion to dismiss. See RAP 22(C)(2). However, as Miniard is a pro se litigant, and we often construe procedural rules liberally in their favor, we exercise our discretion to ignore the deficiencies and review the substantive arguments within his appeal. See RAP 31(H). We note, while we will proceed to the merits, we will only review those arguments presented to this Court within Miniard's appellate briefs.
Miniard's appellant brief refers this Court to his circuit court pleadings for additional arguments and states that his failure to reiterate any claims on appeal does not act as waiver of those arguments. Simply, no. Appellants, even pro se appellants, must include their arguments on appeal within their appeal. Arguments not included in appellate briefs are waived. Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Ky. App. 2005) (citation omitted) ("Our courts have established that an alleged error may be deemed waived where an appellant fails to cite any authority in support of the issues and arguments advanced on appeal.").
On appeal, Miniard's main argument is that FCCD acted outside its statutory authority by dismissing him for failing to properly sign an election document, a document now understood to be his oath of office. Also, Minard alleges individual members of FCCD acted criminally, immaturely, and with "intentional" and "gross" negligence by "tormenting" him and improperly removing him from his seat. As a result, Miniard argues, he is entitled to "civil rights damages," "damages of all types that only jury peers can remedy," and criminal charges against members of FCCD who denied his document request. Further, he alleges that the circuit court ruled against him for "some unknown reason." However, the reasons the court ruled against Miniard are not unknown.
Miniard argues, "Whereof within the 'tier of facts' the Appellant has demonstrated burden of proof in its favor to the level of 'Clear and Convincing' evidence that is highly and substantially more probable to be true than not true as opposed to more likely to be true than not true of that of the Appellee intentionally overlooked at gross negligence lack of signature oath of office."
The Complaint alleged due process violations, sought injunctive relief, and demanded damages, but Miniard did not allege facts or relevant law sufficient to establish grounds for those claims. Miniard alleges due process violations but does not assert how FCCD's actions during the June 6 meeting violated notice requirements. He admits he was given notice of the meeting and did indeed attend, but the Complaint does not point to any law requiring FCCD to give prior notice of the subject matter of the meeting. He argues FCCD acted improperly by denying his discovery request, but the Complaint does not allege FCCD had a duty to disclose that document nor that Miniard moved through the proper channels to request that document. Miniard argued that FCCD acted improperly by dismissing him, but the Complaint did not coherently argue that he electronically signed the election document, that a handwritten signature was or was not required, what the election document in question actually was, how FCCD acted outside its authority by requiring a signature, nor what duty FCCD breached by dismissing him for such a failure. Miniard argues he is entitled to injunctive relief - being returned to his elected position on FCCD - but the tail does not wag that dog.
The Complaint did not allege facts that, if true, would warrant such an action. The Complaint did not allege he signed the election document properly, that signing the election document was necessary, nor that failing to sign the election document should not result in dismissal. The Complaint references one statute but does not allege how FCCD's actions violated that statute or what that statute required. The Complaint does not argue why such an extraordinary remedy as reinstatement is legally proper. Again, we are not adjudicating the merits of Miniard's underlying action; we are merely stating that - even assuming everything in his Complaint was true, accurate, and provable - his (unamended) Complaint did not establish a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Lastly, we note, Miniard's appellate brief accuses the circuit court of error (unrelated to the order on appeal) and impropriety. He asserts the circuit court should have granted summary judgment for a notice failure by FCCD. We note, Miniard did not establish that FCCD erred in delivering notice, and more importantly, that the circuit court erred in failing to grant summary judgment sua sponte on that issue. Even if he had properly argued this procedural issue, such a dismissal would have been procedurally questionable and premature. See Hoard v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 357 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation omitted). ("[W]e find no authority that allows a trial court to circumvent the civil rules and enter summary judgment sua sponte where . . . the legal issues have not been submitted for determination.").
Additionally, Miniard asserts the circuit court was intolerant, vindictive, and/or incompetent. To the contrary, this Court has reviewed the hearings in this action and the circuit court presented a master class on patience and civility. The circuit court granted Miniard leniency and time extensions and offered what limited guidance it was permitted to give. As the circuit court told Miniard on numerous occasions, the burden was on Miniard - not the court itself or the defendant - to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See CR 43.01; see also CR 12.02 and RAP 32(A)(4). He failed to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Fayette Circuit Court did not err in granting FCCD's motion to dismiss. Thus, we AFFIRM the October 22, 2023, order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.