(Punctuation omitted.) Nat. Health Network v. Fulton County, 228 Ga. App. 584, 587 (2) ( 492 SE2d 333) (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 270 Ga. 724 ( 514 SE2d 422) (1999); Mingo v. State, 133 Ga. App. 385, 388 ( 210 SE2d 835) (1974); Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI. See Jones v. Wellon, 237 Ga. App. 62, 65 ( 514 SE2d 880) (1999).
See, e.g., Ingram v. State, supra at (1); Denson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 876 ( 216 S.E.2d 606) (1975), revd. State v. Denson, 236 Ga. 239 ( 223 S.E.2d 640) (1976); Mingo v. State, 133 Ga. App. 385 ( 210 S.E.2d 835) (1974). However, in State v. Denson, supra, the Supreme Court found that this court had misinterpreted and misapplied its decisions in McAuliffe and Cunningham v. State, supra.
See also Cunningham v. State, 232 Ga. 416 ( 207 S.E.2d 48). In doing so, we echo the sentiment expressed in Mingo v. State, 133 Ga. App. 385 ( 210 S.E.2d 835), and in Denson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 876. It is apparent that Blackstone v. State, 131 Ga. App. 666 ( 206 S.E.2d 553), overlooked in McAuliffe and Mingo, is implicitly overruled by McAuliffe. 2. Ingram enumerates eight errors, the fifth of which involves the question of whether the facts were sufficient to allow a charge of conspiracy when Ingram was not indicted or charged with same.
We are thus "powerless to do anything but apply" the existing precedent to the case before us. See Mingo v. State , 133 Ga. App. 385, 391, 210 S.E.2d 835 (1974) (on rehearing). Judgment affirmed.
We are even less inclined to hear an objection (raised for the first time on this appeal) by the defendant's counsel to a waiver which counsel himself made, and which he now seeks to use to further delay the imposition of justice upon his client by obtaining a new trial. Such a tactic smacks of the "calculated ineffectiveness" of counsel about which we expressed apprehension in Mingo v. State, 133 Ga. App. 385, 386. 4. The appellant contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel by her attorney's failure to challenge the claimed introduction of her prior statement to the police, and by his contended unauthorized waiving of her right to jury sentencing.