In ruling, the district court relied on our decision in Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transportation Insurance Co., which held that under Georgia law intentional conduct premised on erroneous information is not an "accident" for general liability insurance purposes. 209 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000). On appeal, G.M. Sign argues that the district court erred in granting St. Paul summary judgment because under Georgia law the term "accident" covers injuries resulting from negligent acts.
In a dispute over insurance coverage, we first look to the question of insurance coverage generally and then to any applicable exclusions. See Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000). Georgia courts interpret insurance policies according to their plain language and in the light in which a layman would read the policies.
I. Insurers' Position The Insurers rely primarily on Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins., Co., 209 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2000). Mindis Metals is a single paragraph opinion, relying almost entirely on a district court order issued in an unrelated dispute, Macon Iron & Paper Stock Co. Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins., Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (M.D. Ga. 1999).
Red Ball Leasing, 915 F.2d at 311-312 (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). Another case cited with approval by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Everson is Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2000), a case that, coincidentally, also involves the erroneous scrapping of rail cars. In Mindis Metals, the plaintiff was a metal scrapping company that bought railcars from the general manager of Georgia Central Railroad, cut them up and used for scrap. Unbeknownst to the scrapping company, the general manager was stealing the railcars from the railroad and keeping the sales proceeds for himself. After settling with the railroad, the scrap company sued its insurer, arguing that it had a duty to provide coverage under the terms of a commercial general liability insurance policy that provided coverage for property damage caused by an "occurrence," which in turn was defined as an "accident."
The court held that coverage was not required for the conversion because it was an intentional act, and intentional acts are not "accidents" under the terms of the policy. See Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the court held:
For example, while in Tennessee and New Hampshire there is coverage, in Georgia, New York, and Texas there is not.Mindis Metals, Inc., v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
When the insured makes an error in judgment but “at all times acted in a deliberate and purposeful manner,” its conduct does not constitute an accident or occurrence. Id. at 1013 (quoting Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir.2000)). In the underlying case, the Parish alleged that Kiker breached the parties' contract by failing to complete the work properly.
Because the instant appeal turns on the language in the Fireman's Fund and Seven Seas policies, we confine ourselves to the language in those policies to ascertain whether the policies are ambiguous with respect to the existence of ocean marine cargo coverage for the Tall Pony shipment. See Mindis Metals v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("As in any dispute over insurance coverage, the Court begins by examining the source of coverage itself — the general promises of coverage made in the insurance policy."). Section II, Coverage D of the Fireman's Fund insurance policy provides as follows:
B. Additional InsuredTo determine whether Davie Plaza is an additional insured under the National Policy, the Court begins its analysis with an examination of the source of coverage itself —the Endorsement. SeeMindis Metals v. Transp. Ins. Co. , 209 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000) ("As in any dispute over insurance coverage, the Court begins by examining the source of coverage itself—the general promises of coverage made in the insurance policy."). The Endorsement provides as follows:
In the instant case, the Davis Defendants hired Parsons to timber trees, and that is what he did. Roy and Blankenship do not argue that the timbering process was done negligently, just that it was done on the wrong property.CompareMindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1299–300 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no accident under Georgia law where a company bought and scrapped railcars without knowledge that the seller had no authority to sell and did not convey good title), Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 330 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding no accident under Indiana law where a repossession company took trucks it mistakenly believed it had a right to repossess), M. R. Thomason, Contractor v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417, 418–19 (5th Cir. 1957) (finding no accident under Alabama law where bulldozer operator drove onto the wrong lot on a mistaken belief it was part of the lot he was supposed to be dozing), andArgonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1973) (finding no accident where party intentionally trespassed and removed material from property under the mistaken belief they had a right to do so), withYork Indus. Ctr., Inc. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 271 N.C. 158, 155 S.E.2d 501, 505–06 (1967) (finding an intentional acts exclu