Opinion
3:23-cv-01008-SB
01-19-2024
AARON JACOB MINDIOLA, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ARIZONA et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
BECKERMAN, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Aaron Jacob Mindiola (“Mindiola”), a self-represented litigant, filed this action against various defendants alleging claims of negligence and violations of the United States Constitution. Now before the Court is Maricopa County's and Jennifer Pokorski's (together “the County Defendants”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18.)
Mindiola failed to name Jennifer Pokorski in the caption of his complaint, in violation of Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that Mindiola intended to name both Maricopa County and Jennifer Pokorski as separate defendants, the Court considers both as parties to the instant motion.
The parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the district judge grant the County Defendants' motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Mindiola filed this action against various defendants, including Maricopa County and Jennifer Pokorski, as well as the Arizona Department of Economic Security, Division of Child Support Services (“DCSS”). (Compl. at 1-3, ECF No. 1.) The alleged events relate to a family law case litigated in the State of Arizona from approximately 2018 to 2022. (Id. at 7.)
Starting around 2017, Mindiola, his wife at the time, and his children lived in Oregon. (Id.) Mindiola worked temporarily in Arizona and, while there, his then-wife served him with a petition for dissolution of marriage. (Id.) Mindiola attended a court hearing, and an Arizona state court assumed jurisdiction over the case. (Id.) The court required Mindiola's daughter to move to Arizona, where she lived with Mindiola. (Id.) After a change in employment, Mindiola and his daughter moved back to Oregon “despite Arizona Court Orders.” (Id.)
The Arizona court entered a decree of dissolution and an income withholding order on March 31, 2021. (Id.) The court also entered an order of assistance, requiring Mindiola's daughter's return to Arizona. (Id.) The court faulted Mindiola for moving his daughter to Oregon against court order and for not providing the court with his military mental health records. (Id.) On August 10, 2022, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's orders. (Id.) The Arizona Supreme Court declined review. (Id.)
Mindiola asserts that, subsequently, over $100,000 “show[ed] up on his credit report in back child support.” (Id.) According to Mindiola, DCSS failed to provide “any form of financial statements illustrating where and how the distribution of funds are being allocated” from his income withholdings. (Id. at 5.) DCSS also “demand[ed Mindiola's] financial records before considering providing relief from suspending [his] Drivers Licenses or Passport.” (Id.)
On July 10, 2023, Mindiola filed this case alleging constitutional violations against various defendants and a claim for “[n]egligence in training and oversight over [DCSS] practices and policies” against the County Defendants. (Id. at 5.) Mindiola asserts that he suffered mental anguish and humiliation and, as a result, needed to attend counseling and sought medical treatment for irregular heart rhythms. (Id. at 8.) He seeks $500,000 in damages and “any other available remedy for tort damages incurred.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
The County Defendants move for dismissal, arguing that the Court should dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The County Defendants raise a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.' Mot.”) at 4, ECF No. 18.) The Court does not agree that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Mindiola's negligence claim against the County Defendants.
A. Legal Standards
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). A federal action constitutes a de facto appeal where claims raised in the federal court are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). An issue is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the federal claim can succeed only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it, or if the relief requested would effectively reverse or void the state court decision. See Fontana Empire Cir., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting, inter alia, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
The doctrine bars a suit from going forward if:
(a) the plaintiff in the federal suit lost in the state court proceeding;
(b) the state court determination is at the core of the federal lawsuit; (c) the federal lawsuit seeks review and rejection of the state court verdict; and (d) the state court judgment was entered before commencement of the federal action.Pierce v. Heiple, No. 3:17-cv-570-SI, 2017 WL 1439669, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2017) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
The Court finds that the second and third factors of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are not satisfied here.
The first and fourth factors are satisfied: Mindiola lost in the state court proceeding and the state court judgment preceded this action. (See Compl. at 7.)
Applying the second factor, although the basis for Mindiola's negligence claim against the County Defendants is unclear, it does not appear that the state court's ruling is at the core of Mindiola's claim. Mindiola appears to allege that the County Defendants were negligent in their training and oversight over DCSS's child support collection practices and policies which resulted in a harmful credit report. (Compl. at 5.) Mindiola alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment against DCSS based on its demanding of his “financial records before considering providing relief from suspending Plaintiffs Drivers [sic] Licenses or Passport” and failing to provide Mindiola “with any form of financial statements illustrating where and how the distribution of funds are being allocated from Plaintiff's [Income Withholding Order].” (Id.) Although Mindiola's grievances are related to the state court's underlying child support order, his negligence claim against the County Defendants appears to relate only to the collection of his child support payments. In other words, the Court does not understand Mindiola to challenge the state court order itself, but rather child support collection procedures and a resulting credit report that arose subsequent to the Arizona state court decisions. As far as the Court can decipher from the instant complaint and the underlying family court case records, Mindiola's negligence claim is independent of the Arizona state courts' decisions. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an ‘independent claim' that, though similar or even identical to issues aired in state court, was not the subject of a previous judgment by the state court.” (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011))); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The doctrine applies when the federal plaintiff's claim arises from the state court judgment, not simply when a party fails to obtain relief in state court.” (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164-65)).
The Court takes judicial notice of relevant court documents from the underlying family law litigation, including the Decree of Dissolution, Mindiola's Opening Brief in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the memorandum decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. See United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, which may include court records[.]”) (citations omitted); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that courts “may take judicial notice of court filings”). The underlying court dockets are Mindiola v. Mindiola, No. FC 2018-055324, and Mindiola v. Mindiola, No. 1 CA-CV-21-0271 FC. (See Exs. 1-3, Decl. Bruce Smith Supp. State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 21.)
In the same vein, applying the third factor, Mindiola's negligence claim does not require this Court to review and reject the state court verdict. For Mindiola to prevail, as far as the Court interprets Mindiola's negligence claim as discussed above, the Court would not need to determine that the Arizona courts wrongly decided the underlying family law case.
For these reasons, the Court does not recommend dismissal of Mindiola's negligence claim against the County Defendants based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The [plaintiffs'] claims are not a de facto appeal from the juvenile court Orders. Instead, they allege that the misrepresentations by [the defendants] and further inaction by those social workers and other County employees resulted in violations of [the plaintiffs'] constitutional rights.”); Anglin v. Merchants Credit Corp., No. 18-cv-507-BJR, 2020 WL 4000966, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 15, 2020) (rejecting the defendants' Rooker-Feldman argument where “the garnishment-based claims in this lawsuit, while related in subject matter to the claims underlying the [state court] lawsuit, are otherwise independent of those claims”) (simplified), aff'd, No. 20-35820, 2022 WL 964216 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2022); Reyna v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 19-cv-00248-LEK-RT, 2020 WL 2309248, at *5 (D. Haw. May 8, 2020) (“The remaining claims, however, do not directly challenge the Foreclosure Judgment and, although related to, they are not ‘inextricably intertwined' with the issues in the Foreclosure Action, and therefore they do not trigger preclusion under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”).
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The County Defendants also move for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over the County Defendants. (Defs.' Mot. at 5.) The Court agrees that Mindiola has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the County Defendants.
A. Legal Standards
The County Defendants' motion to dismiss is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing. As a result, Mindiola bears the burden of making only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. See Glob. Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[W]here . . . the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.”) (simplified); LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2022) (“If the court determines that it will receive only affidavits[,] . . . a plaintiff bears the burden of making only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts[.]”) (simplified). “In this posture, [a court] take[s] as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve[s] all genuine factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor.” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1106 (citation omitted).
“An exercise of personal jurisdiction in federal court must comport with both the applicable state's long-arm statute and the federal Due Process Clause.” Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 140405 (9th Cir. 1994)). Oregon's long-arm statute “authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing OR. R. CIV. P. 4(L)). Accordingly, the Court must inquire whether its exercise of jurisdiction over the County Defendants would comport with the limits imposed by federal due process. See id. (“We therefore inquire whether the District of Oregon's exercise of jurisdiction over [the defendant] comports with the limits imposed by federal due process.”) (simplified).
“Federal due process permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that defendant has ‘at least minimum contacts with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1106 (simplified). The Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong “test to analyze whether a party's minimum contacts meet the due process standard for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction[.]” LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 859 (simplified); Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 87 F.4th 404, 411 (9th Cir. 2023) (“For specific jurisdiction to exist over a non-resident defendant, three conditions must be met.”); see also Freestream Aircraft (Berm.) Ltd. v. AeroLaw Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the three-prong inquiry is “commonly referred to as the minimum contacts test”).
Although there are two bases for personal jurisdiction (i.e., specific and general jurisdiction), the Court need engage only in a specific jurisdiction analysis here because Mindiola does not assert that the County Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in Oregon. (Pl.'s Resp. at 10, ECF No. 19); cf. Burri, 35 F.4th at 1213 n.4 (“Personal jurisdiction may be specific or general....[The plaintiff] does not contend that the [d]efendants are subject to general personal jurisdiction in [the forum state], so we do not address the analytical framework applicable to general personal jurisdiction cases.”).
“First, ‘[t]he non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1107 (alteration in original) (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)). Second, the plaintiff's “claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant's forum-related activities.” id. (citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). Third, the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant must be reasonable. id.
“All three prongs must be satisfied [for a court] to assert personal jurisdiction[.]” LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 859. “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1107 (simplified).
B. Analysis
Taking the uncontroverted allegations in Mindiola's complaint as true and resolving all genuine factual disputes in Mindiola's favor, the Court concludes that Mindiola has not satisfied his burden of making a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. See generally id. at 1106 (explaining that where, as here, a motion is based on written material rather than an evidentiary hearing, a court “take[s] as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve[s] all genuine factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor”) (citation omitted).
Under the first prong, Mindiola must establish that the County Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Oregon, purposefully directed their activities toward Oregon, or “some combination thereof.” Davis v. Cranfield Aerospace Sols.,Ltd., 71 F.4th 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Courts “evaluate purposeful direction under the Calder effects test[.]” Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 87 F.4th 404, 412 (9th Cir. 2023). Generally, though, the Calder effects test “applies only to intentional torts, not to . . . breach of contract and negligence claims[.]” Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)); see also Calder, 465 U.S. at 789 (distinguishing between intentional actions and “mere untargeted negligence”).
Mindiola alleges in his claim against the County Defendants only negligence in training and oversight over DCSS's practices and policies (Compl. at 5), and therefore the Court applies the purposeful availment analysis. See Jenkins v. Shelton, No. 3:15-cv-558-SI, 2018 WL 1528753, at *12 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2018) (“A purposeful availment analysis is proper for a claim of negligence.” (citing Holland Am. Line Inc., 485 F.3d at 460)), aff'd, 765 Fed.Appx. 156 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Burton v. Air France - KLM, No. 3:20-cv-01085-IM, 2020 WL 7212566, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2020) (“Because this dispute does not concern intentional tortious conduct, this Court will apply the purposeful availment analysis in this case.”) (citation omitted); Ortega v. Pomerantz, No. 3:18-cv-00451-HZ, 2018 WL 3364670, at *6 (D. Or. July 6, 2018) (“[C]ourts in the Ninth Circuit apply the purposeful availment test to negligence claims.”) (citations omitted).
The purposeful availment test “is satisfied when ‘the defendant has taken deliberate action within the forum state or . . . has created continuing obligations to forum residents.'” Impossible Foods Inc. v. Impossible X LLC, 80 F.4th 1079, 1088 (9th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the purposeful availment analysis asks “whether a defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”) (simplified). The “[p]urposeful availment analysis examines whether the defendant's contacts with the forum are attributable to his own actions or are solely the actions of the plaintiff.” Sinatra v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing, inter alia, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987)); see also Davis, 71 F.4th at 1163 (“The ‘unilateral activity' of another party does not meet [the purposeful availment] standard.” (citing Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 503 (9th Cir. 2023))). “In order to have purposefully availed oneself of conducting activities in the forum, the defendant must have performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business with the forum state.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1195 (citation omitted).
Here, Mindiola has not alleged any facts demonstrating that the County Defendants performed any affirmative conduct availing themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Oregon. All of the alleged wrongful conduct occurred in Arizona. (See Compl. at 5, 7.) There is no indication that the allegedly negligent training and oversight occurred in Oregon nor that the underlying actions of DCSS related to the suspension of Mindiola's driver's license or passport occurred in Oregon. Any contact with Oregon is solely attributable to Mindiola's actions. (Id. at 7, describing Mindiola's decision to move back to Oregon.) Accordingly, Mindiola has not adduced sufficient evidence that the County Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Oregon. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant's conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.” (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) and Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., City and Cnty. of S.F., 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978)); see also Miller v. San Mateo Cnty., No. 6:18-cv-00884-JR, 2018 WL 5269842, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 18, 2018) (dismissing Defendants San Mateo County and San Mateo County Department of Child Support Services for lack of personal jurisdiction and explaining that “the only communication defendants had with the forum is contacting plaintiff regarding missed child support payments”; “[t]he act of providing court notices is not the type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within Oregon”; and “[i]n other words, plaintiff's residence in Oregon is immaterial and incidental to the services provided by defendants in California”) (citations omitted), findings and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5270320 (D. Or. Oct. 22, 2018); Taylor v. Hennepin Cnty. Child Support, No. 06-cv-5473 FDB, 2006 WL 2781333, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2006) (concluding that the county defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of Washington when they had not “purposefully directed their activities or consummated a transaction with Washington residents” and any alleged wrongful conduct “necessarily occurred in Minnesota where [the] application for child support benefits was received and processed”); Eaton v. Davis, No. 3:01-cv-00854-AS, 2002 WL 31441217, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2002) (concluding that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction where “the sole contact defendants had with the State of Oregon was to forward the California Order [to pay child support] for registration, which, in turn, apparently placed a lien on Plaintiff's tax refunds” and “[t]his contact was initiated only after Plaintiff elected to make the State of Oregon his residence” and “[a]ll previous interactions between the Orange County Defendants and Plaintiff . . . have occurred in the State of California”) (footnotes omitted).
Because Mindiola has not met his burden of establishing the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test, the Court does not address the other two prongs. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f the plaintiff fails at the first step, the jurisdictional inquiry ends and the case must be dismissed.” (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006))); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Apex Directional Drilling, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-00470-HA, 2014 WL 6473554, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 2014) (“Given that [the defendant] cannot establish that [a third-party defendant] purposefully availed itself of the Oregon forum, this court need not proceed to the remaining inquiries under the Ninth Circuit's specific jurisdiction test.” (citing Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016)).
Mindiola has not made a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over the County Defendants, and the Court recommends that the district judge grant the County Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismiss Mindiola's claim against the County Defendants without prejudice to pursuing the claim in a different jurisdiction. See Harper v. Amur Equip. Fin., Inc., No. 3:22-cv-01723-YY, 2023 WL 2761365, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 3, 2023) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice), findings and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2756185 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2023); Raze v. Walbridge, No. 3:20-cv-00957-AR, 2022 WL 2670149, at *9 (D. Or. June 23, 2022) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice), findings and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2667014 (D. Or. July 11, 2022); see also Pac. Vibrations, LLC v. Slow Gold Ltd., No. 22-cv-1118-LL-DDL, 2023 WL 4375633, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2023) (“[T]he Court's Order granting dismissal in this case is without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing its claims . . . in a jurisdiction where Defendants . . . are subject to personal jurisdiction[.]”).
Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the County Defendants and recommends dismissal on that ground, the Court does not address the County Defendants' alternative argument that Mindiola has failed to state a claim. (Defs.' Mot. at 17-18.)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT the County Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) and dismiss Mindiola's claims without prejudice to pursuing his claims in a jurisdiction where the County Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.