Opinion
No. 10-04-00305-CV
Opinion Delivered and Filed July 20, 2005.
Appeal from the 82nd District Court, Robertson County, Texas, Trial Court No. 97-01-15,275-CV.
Reversed and remanded.
Sam E. Rowland, for appellant.
Bill Youngkin, for appellee.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Milton Baughn sued Curtis Capps for trespass to try title. Baughn alleged that he had title to the disputed land by virtue of a deed and, in the alternative, by adverse possession. The trial court granted a partial summary judgment that the description in Baughn's deed "is insufficient to locate the property on the ground and cannot be used as the means of proving title." The trial court then issued final summary judgment in favor of Capps. Finding that the court erred in granting Capps's summary judgment motion, we will reverse and remand.
We will consider Baughn's third issue first. Baughn argues that the trial court erred in ruling on summary judgment that the description in Baughn's deed is insufficient to locate the property on the ground. We review the decision to grant or deny a summary-judgment motion de novo. See Rucker v. Bank One Texas, N.A., 36 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to the summary judgment as a matter of law. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); Ash v. Hack Branch Distributing Co., 54 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied). The reviewing court must accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985); Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and all doubts resolved in his favor. American Tobacco, 951 S.W.2d at 425; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413.
For a legal description to be sufficient, the writing must furnish within itself or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972). If enough information appears in the description so that a party familiar with the locality can identify the premises with reasonable certainty, the description will be legally sufficient. See Gates v. Asher, 154 Tex. 538, 541, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (1955). Extrinsic evidence can be used to explain the descriptive words and identify the land, where the nucleus of a valid description exists in the instrument itself or in a writing referred to in the deed. See Wilson v. Fisher, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. 1945); Gates, 154 Tex. at 541, 280 S.W.2d at 248-49; Browning v. West, 557 S.W.2d 848, 850-51 (Tex.App.-Tyler, 1977, writ ref. n.r.e.).
Baughn claims that he purchased land including the disputed four acres in 1947 from Stella Smith Davison. The Davison deed describes the property conveyed as:
. . . all those certain tracts or parcels of land situated in Robertson County, Texas, to wit:
Those four certain tracts of land, parts of the A. Manchaca survey, being 131 ½ acres, 41.36 acres, 2.6 acres and 4 acres, more or less, and being a total of 179.46 acres more or less, as described in deed from J.M. Haigler and wife to W.H. Davison, dated November 28, 1913, recorded in vol. 61, page 286 deed records of said County, to which reference is made for a full description.
The Davison deed refers to the Haigler deed, which describes the property, in pertinent part, as:
Lying and being situated in Robertson County, Texas, and being a part of the A. Manchacca six leagues grant, lying in said County, and being that portion of said A. Manchacca survey, which belonged to John Stewart, deceased, at the time of his death, and being described by metes and bounds as follows, to-wit:
. . .
Fourth Tract: Beginning at a stake 30 ft. from the centre of R.R. tract, near the town of Sutton; thence N 62 E 155 vrs, stake for corner; thence N 28 W 145 vrs, stake for corner; thence S 62 W 155 vrs, stake for corner, 30 ft from railroad track; thence with said R.R. track 145 vrs to place of beginning, containing 4 acres.
The Haigler deed refers to the probate minutes of the John Stewart Estate. Stewart purchased the four-acre tract from William Koppe (by the State of Texas). Koppe purchased the land from J.T. Smith, who had purchased it from Samuel Moss. The Smith deed and the Moss deed describe the four acres as:
Four acres of the Antonio Manchaca grant:
BEGINNING at a stake 30 feet from center of the H T.C. Railroad 10 vrs S 78 E from the NE end of the rock culvert near SE and of the switch at Sutton Station in said County of Robertson.
THENCE N 27 ¾ W 150 vrs in the said Railroad and corner a stake within 30 feet of middle of said Railroad.
THENCE 62¼ E 150 vrs and corner a stake from which a PO 12 in dia brs S 38 ¼ E 21 vrs;
THENCE 27 ¾ E 150 vrs corner a stake from which a B.J. 9 in dia brs S 50 W 7 ¼ vrs;
THENCE S 62¼ W 150 vrs to the place of beginning.
Capps argues that the description in the deeds is insufficient to locate the property on the ground because the description does not include an adequate beginning call. Capps attached an affidavit by a surveyor to his motion for summary judgment in which the surveyor claims that the description's beginning call is not specific enough to identify where along the railroad the property lies. However, Baughn attached an affidavit by a different surveyor to his response to Capps's summary judgment motion. In that affidavit, the surveyor states that from the above deeds he was able to locate the property on the ground using the culvert referenced in the Smith and Moss deeds.
The description in Baughn's deed and the writings to which it refers are not insufficient as a matter of law. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the four acres described in Baughn's deed and the deeds to which it refers is the property in dispute. Capps thus did not meet his burden on his summary judgment motion, and the trial court erred in granting that motion.
Baughn's third issue is sustained. Having sustained Baughn's third issue, we do not reach his other issues.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order for partial summary judgment being erroneous, the final summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.