Milner v. Commr. of Correction

54 Citing cases

  1. Correia v. Rowland

    263 Conn. 453 (Conn. 2003)   Cited 43 times
    In Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453, 820 A.2d 1009 (2003), this court also recognized the United States Supreme Court's holding in the context of procedural default that, "where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable... procedures."

    The petitioner next claims that the habeas court improperly applied a double standard in determining whether the respondent had cause to amend his return. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the habeas court violated his federal and state due process rights by permitting the respondent to amend his return, in accordance with the Appellate Court's decision in Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734, 779 A.2d 156 (2001), to clarify the procedural default defense, while simultaneously concluding that the petitioner did not have cause for failing to raise his state constitutional claim at trial or on direct appeal. The respondent contends that the habeas court properly concluded that the amendment of pleadings, and the avoidance of procedural default constitute two different issues; the court, therefore, did not apply an improper double standard in its respective determinations of cause. We conclude that the habeas court did not apply an improper double standard, and that it properly allowed the respondent to amend his return.

  2. State v. Munoz

    104 Conn. App. 85 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 7 times
    Ruling on whether motion being appealed was dispositive is not waivable

    Furthermore, the state, by its acquiescence, has waived any claim that the motion was not within the purview of § 54-94a. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734, 779 A.2d 156 (2001). To help us resolve the issue of the applicability of the statute, we asked the parties to file supplemental briefs as to these matters: (1) did the trial court correctly determine that its ruling on the motion to suppress was dispositive of the case; (2) should that determination be reviewed by this court; and (3) if the determination should be reviewed, what is the standard of review?

  3. Duperry v. Kirk

    877 A.2d 928 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 16 times

    The petitioner has not provided a separate analysis of his state constitutional claims and we, therefore, deem them abandoned. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 735 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); see also Ghant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 255 Conn. 17-18. General Statutes § 54-95 (a) provides in relevant part: "Any defendant in a criminal prosecution, aggrieved by any decision of the Superior Court, upon the trial thereof, or by any error apparent upon the record of such prosecution, may be relieved by appeal . . . in the same manner and with the same effect as in civil actions. . . ."

  4. Wilson v. Office of Adult Probation

    786 A.2d 1120 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 731, 779 A.2d 156 (2001). Although "the petitioner has the burden of proving cause and prejudice . . . that burden does not arise until after the respondent raises the claim of procedural default in its return."

  5. Ryan v. Department of Public Health

    2004 Ct. Sup. 9372 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    The plaintiff's failure to adequately brief its constitutional claim compels the conclusion that he has abandoned it. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 735 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, 53 Conn. App. 808, 818, 733 A.2d 287 (1999). NATURE OF REMAND

  6. Guarco v. State D.P.H.

    2002 Ct. Sup. 2127 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    Under these circumstances, the court finds that the plaintiff has abandoned the claim by failing to brief it properly. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 739 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, supra, 53 Conn. App. 818. CONCLUSION

  7. Na-Mor, Inc. v. Connecticut DPH

    2002 Ct. Sup. 1133 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    This approach demeans our constitution by suggesting that it prohibits government action based merely on a litigants's say so. The plaintiff's failure adequately to brief its constitutional claim compels the conclusion that the plaintiff has abandoned it. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 739 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, 53 Conn. App. 808, 818, 733 A.2d 787 (1999). III

  8. Council v. Commissioner of Correction

    286 Conn. 477 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 48 times
    In Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 477, 486–88, 944 A.2d 340 (2008), our Supreme Court considered this exact issue, namely, whether the fact that the petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge stemming from a subsequent arrest rendered moot his claim that the court should have allowed him to contest the validity of that arrest before finding that he violated the Garvin agreement.

    Once the respondent has raised the defense of procedural default in the return, the burden is on the petitioner to prove cause and prejudice. See, e.g., Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734, 779 A.2d 156 (2001). "[When] no evidence [of cause and prejudice] has been provided [to the habeas court], [the reviewing] court can independently conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice test."

  9. Gomez v. Comm'r of Corr.

    178 Conn. App. 519 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a § 31-51m whistle-blower claim predicated on a constructive discharge, where the plaintiff alleged a loss of several work responsibilities as retaliation

    The respondent did not plead procedural default or successive petition with regard to any of the petitioner's claims. See Practice Book §§ 23–29 and 23–30 (b) ; see also Zollo v. Commissioner of Correction , 133 Conn. App. 266, 277–80, 35 A.3d 337 (discussing and applying successive petition doctrine), cert. granted, 304 Conn. 910, 39 A.3d 1120 (2012) (appeal dismissed May 1, 2013); Milner v. Commissioner of Correction , 63 Conn. App. 726, 731–34, 779 A.2d 156 (2001) (discussing procedural default). We, therefore, decide this appeal on the merits of the petitioner's claims.

  10. Hines v. Comm'r of Corr.

    164 Conn. App. 712 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that state did not suppress evidence in violation of Brady on basis of court’s factual finding that petitioner’s counsel was informed of that 536Immaterial evidence prior to trial

    “Whether the petitioner's right to due process of law was violated by the nonproduction of possibly exculpatory material, however, is a mixed question of law and fact that warrants plenary review.” Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn.App. 726, 736, 779 A.2d 156 (2001).I