The petitioner next claims that the habeas court improperly applied a double standard in determining whether the respondent had cause to amend his return. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the habeas court violated his federal and state due process rights by permitting the respondent to amend his return, in accordance with the Appellate Court's decision in Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734, 779 A.2d 156 (2001), to clarify the procedural default defense, while simultaneously concluding that the petitioner did not have cause for failing to raise his state constitutional claim at trial or on direct appeal. The respondent contends that the habeas court properly concluded that the amendment of pleadings, and the avoidance of procedural default constitute two different issues; the court, therefore, did not apply an improper double standard in its respective determinations of cause. We conclude that the habeas court did not apply an improper double standard, and that it properly allowed the respondent to amend his return.
Furthermore, the state, by its acquiescence, has waived any claim that the motion was not within the purview of § 54-94a. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734, 779 A.2d 156 (2001). To help us resolve the issue of the applicability of the statute, we asked the parties to file supplemental briefs as to these matters: (1) did the trial court correctly determine that its ruling on the motion to suppress was dispositive of the case; (2) should that determination be reviewed by this court; and (3) if the determination should be reviewed, what is the standard of review?
The petitioner has not provided a separate analysis of his state constitutional claims and we, therefore, deem them abandoned. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 735 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); see also Ghant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 255 Conn. 17-18. General Statutes § 54-95 (a) provides in relevant part: "Any defendant in a criminal prosecution, aggrieved by any decision of the Superior Court, upon the trial thereof, or by any error apparent upon the record of such prosecution, may be relieved by appeal . . . in the same manner and with the same effect as in civil actions. . . ."
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 731, 779 A.2d 156 (2001). Although "the petitioner has the burden of proving cause and prejudice . . . that burden does not arise until after the respondent raises the claim of procedural default in its return."
The plaintiff's failure to adequately brief its constitutional claim compels the conclusion that he has abandoned it. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 735 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, 53 Conn. App. 808, 818, 733 A.2d 287 (1999). NATURE OF REMAND
Under these circumstances, the court finds that the plaintiff has abandoned the claim by failing to brief it properly. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 739 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, supra, 53 Conn. App. 818. CONCLUSION
This approach demeans our constitution by suggesting that it prohibits government action based merely on a litigants's say so. The plaintiff's failure adequately to brief its constitutional claim compels the conclusion that the plaintiff has abandoned it. See Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 739 n. 7, 779 A.2d 156 (2001); Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, 53 Conn. App. 808, 818, 733 A.2d 787 (1999). III
Once the respondent has raised the defense of procedural default in the return, the burden is on the petitioner to prove cause and prejudice. See, e.g., Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734, 779 A.2d 156 (2001). "[When] no evidence [of cause and prejudice] has been provided [to the habeas court], [the reviewing] court can independently conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice test."
The respondent did not plead procedural default or successive petition with regard to any of the petitioner's claims. See Practice Book §§ 23–29 and 23–30 (b) ; see also Zollo v. Commissioner of Correction , 133 Conn. App. 266, 277–80, 35 A.3d 337 (discussing and applying successive petition doctrine), cert. granted, 304 Conn. 910, 39 A.3d 1120 (2012) (appeal dismissed May 1, 2013); Milner v. Commissioner of Correction , 63 Conn. App. 726, 731–34, 779 A.2d 156 (2001) (discussing procedural default). We, therefore, decide this appeal on the merits of the petitioner's claims.
“Whether the petitioner's right to due process of law was violated by the nonproduction of possibly exculpatory material, however, is a mixed question of law and fact that warrants plenary review.” Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn.App. 726, 736, 779 A.2d 156 (2001).I