Opinion
Civil Action No. 3: 04-CV-0936-B.
June 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 22), filed January 21, 2005 as a Joint Motion Submission, seeking confirmation of an arbitration award. After review of the pleadings and evidence, the Court agrees that the arbitration award should be confirmed, but because the award is ambiguous as to the amount of damages, the Court cannot enforce the award at this time. Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion. The Court REMANDS this case to arbitration for a determination of "the benefits to which [Mills] is entitled under the Plan" and STAYS this litigation until that determination is made.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court takes its facts from the Arbitrator's Opinion and Interim Award. (App. pp. 7-20) While JHS does not agree with all of the Arbitrator's findings, it had not challenged the factual findings for purposes of this case.
Plaintiff Mark Mills ("Mills") and his wife Mara Mills ("Mrs. Mills") were over-the-road team drivers for Defendant James Helwig Son, Inc. ("JHS"). (App. p. 8) On October 23, 2001, Mills was helping unload his trailer when the load began to slide. ( Id.) Mills pushed against the load and felt his neck pop. ( Id.) Mills did not report the incident at that time, because he believed he had not injured himself. ( Id. at pp. 8-9) Further, Mrs. Mills, a licensed vocational nurse, could not detect any visible signs of injury. ( Id. at p. 9)
Over the next few days, however, Mills's shoulder began to worsen and cause him pain, so Mills then reported his injury to JHS. ( Id. at pp. 9-11) Mills was a participant in JHS's Occupational Injury Benefit Plan (the "Plan"). ( Id. at p. 8) JHS, however, denied him benefits under the Plan because the Plan required the employee to "immediately" report anything the employee believed to be an injury. ( Id. at pp. 10-11, 46) Mills appealed the denial of benefits to the Plan Review Committee, which upheld the decision to deny benefits to Mills. ( Id. at pp. 12-13) Mills underwent several medical procedures and was unable to return to work until July 2002. ( Id. at p. 12) JHS terminated Mills's employment in May 2002, because Mills had exhausted his leave. ( Id.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because participation in the Plan required that Mills sign an Arbitration Agreement, Mills filed for arbitration after being denied the benefits he requested. The case was arbitrated on April 8, 2003, and the arbitrator issued his Opinion and Interim Award on May 8, 2003. (App. pp. 7-20) In it, the arbitrator found that Mills had properly reported his injury and that JHS was liable for benefits under the Plan. ( Id. at pp. 20) The arbitrator's specific award required JHS to pay Mills "the benefits to which he is entitled under the Plan." ( Id. at p. 19) The arbitrator, however, made no numeric calculation of those benefits, nor does it appear he was asked to do so by the parties.
The arbitrator also awarded certain costs and expenses of the arbitration to Mills which are not at issue in this suit.
Mills filed this action on May 3, 2004, seeking confirmation and enforcement of the arbitrator's award. Mills then filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on January 21, 2005. In his Motion, Mills asked the Court to confirm the arbitration award and require JHS to pay him the benefits he was due, although Mills did not specify the exact benefits he was seeking or provide evidence of a monetary amount. (Pl. Br. p. 6) In response, JHS did not dispute the validity of the arbitration award, but stated that it had already paid the benefits due to Mills and produced evidence of $15,435.10 paid to Mills for his medical expenses. (Def. Br. pp. 5-6; App. pp. 62-67) Mills replied by claiming that the $15,435.10 did not encompass all of the benefits he was due. (Pl. Reply Br. pp. 2-3) With this background, the Court now turns to the merits of the parties' arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The burden is on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). To determine whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the Court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. See Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2002). Because Mills bears the burden of proof at trial, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of his claim before summary judgment can be awarded in his favor. Martin v. Alamo Cmty. College Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003).
A. Confirmation of the Arbitrator's Award
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Mills seeks confirmation of the arbitration award granting him the benefits to which he was entitled under the Plan. The Court initially notes that an arbitration award may only be vacated in specific, limited circumstances described in the Federal Arbitration Act:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1999 Supp. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has also held that a district court may vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator manifestly disregards the law. Brabham v. A.G. Edwards Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2004).
The Court, however, need not make a determination as to whether the arbitration award should be vacated because JHS makes no argument that the arbitrator's award is unenforceable or should be vacated for any reason. Instead, JHS concentrates the entirety of its briefing on its claim that it has already paid what was ordered by the arbitrator. (Def. Br. pp. 5-6) Without any reason to vacate or modify the award, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent Plaintiff seeks confirmation of the arbitrator's award that he is due the benefits to which he is entitled under the Plan. The Court now turns to the issue of enforcement of the award.
B. Enforcement of the Arbitrator's Award
Mills also requests that the Court issue an order requiring JHS to pay over $26,000 in compliance with the arbitrator's award. Based on the briefing of the parties, the issue at this stage is exactly what amount of money makes up "the benefits to which [Mills] is entitled under the Plan." A determination of this question would require the Court to consider facts, evidence, and arguments that were not presented to the arbitrator, but appear to be covered by the arbitration agreement. (App. p. 32)
A court may only enforce an arbitration award as written by the arbitrator; thus, if the arbitration award is ambiguous, the court cannot enforce it. . Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 2003). Further, a court may not interpret an award in order to resolve the ambiguity and then implement the award. Id. Rather, the court must remand the award to the arbitrator with instructions to clarify the ambiguities in the award. Brown, 340 F.3d at 216; see also San Antonio Newspaper Guild Local No. 25 v. San Antonio Light Div., 481 F.2d 821, 825 (5th Cir. 1973). Here, the award of "benefits to which [Mills] is entitled under the Plan" is unclear as to the amount of benefits due. The parties clearly do not agree on the interpretation of this award, and the Court finds it to be ambiguous as well. See San Antonio Newspaper, 481 F.2d at 824-25 (finding arbitrator's award to "make whole for any loss of earnings" was ambiguous). Therefore, the Court cannot enforce the award by setting forth a specific monetary amount due to Mills. Instead, the Court must remand the case to the arbitrator for a determination or clarification of exactly what benefits are due to Mills under the Plan.
Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent Mills seeks to have the Court award him a specific amount of money. The Court REMANDS this case to the arbitrator for a determination of the amount of benefits that are due to Mills under the arbitration award.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The arbitrator's award for "the benefits to which [Mills] is entitled under the Plan" is confirmed; however, the Court cannot enforce the arbitrator's award by ordering JHS to pay Mills a specific amount of money, because the arbitrator's award is ambiguous in that respect. Thus, the Court REMANDS this case to the arbitrator for a determination of exactly what amount of benefits are due to Mills under the arbitrator's award. The Court will STAY litigation of this matter pending the resolution of the arbitration proceedings, which must be initiated within sixty (60) days of this Order. Within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the arbitration, the Court ORDERS that Mills inform the Court in writing of the status of this litigation.SO ORDERED.