Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-04368-TMC-JDA
01-05-2021
James Millholland, Plaintiff, v. Abbeville County, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
James Millholland ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is currently incarcerated at the Allendale Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02, D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Upon review, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint and the attachments filed with the Complaint. Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his First Amendment rights to exercise free speech, petition the government, and access the courts, and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff contends that county officials conspired to prevent him from accessing the courts by denying him leave to proceed in forma pauperis in his state court action seeking declaratory relief that he filed in Abbeville County. [Id. at 4-5.]
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, on September 20, 2019, he mailed a summons, complaint, and motion to proceed in forma pauperis to the Abbeville County court. [Doc. 1-2 at 1.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant responded on January 14, 2020, notifying him that his motion to proceed in forma pauperis had been denied. [Id.] Plaintiff contends Defendant denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in retaliation for having asserted his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to seek declaratory relief. [Id.]
The undersigned takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's state court action in the Abbeville County Court of Common Pleas at case number 2019CP0100300. See Abbeville County Eighth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Abbeville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2019cp0100300) (last visited Jan. 4, 2021); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'"). The undersigned notes that an order denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was entered in that action on January 9, 2020.
For his injuries, Plaintiff asserts he has suffered mental and emotional injuries. [Doc. 1 at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. [Doc. 1-2 at 2.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under the less stringent standard applicable to pro se pleadings, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion"). Thus, although a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because his claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Defendant is not a person subject to suit and/or is entitled to immunity from money damages. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As noted, Plaintiff alleges that his request to proceed in forma pauperis was denied in his action filed in the Abbeville County court. However, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
"Longstanding precedents preclude the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina from reviewing the findings or rulings made by state courts." McRae v. Evans, No. 2:06-cv-3075-CWH, 2006 WL 3327639, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2006). "This prohibition on review of state court proceedings or judgments by federal district courts is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . [which] precludes review of adjudications of the state's highest court [and] also the decisions of its lower courts." Hollander v. Early, No. 1:11-cv-2620-TLW-JRM, 2011 WL 9918820, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 227768 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). For the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to apply, divesting a federal court of jurisdiction, the following four elements must be met: "(1) the federal court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of 'injuries caused by state-court judgments;' (3) the state court judgment became final before the proceedings in federal court commenced; and (4) the federal plaintiff 'invit[es] district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Willner v. Frey, 243 F. App'x 744, 746 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). The prohibition extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are "inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court." Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A federal claim is 'inextricably intertwined' with a state court decision if 'success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.'" Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857-58 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Here, all four elements are met. First, Plaintiff apparently lost in the state court. As noted, Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was denied by the state court. Second, Plaintiff seeks to appeal the ruling regarding his motion. Although Plaintiff couches his claim as one for a violation of his First Amendment rights by denying him access to the courts, the crux of his claim is that he should have been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the state court. As such, his claim appears to be an appeal from the state court's ruling on his motion. Third, the state court judgment became final before the proceedings in federal court commenced. Finally, Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to review and reject the state court judgment. Specifically, to award Plaintiff damages in this case, this Court must find the state court's ruling was error and violated his rights. In sum, each of the four elements of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is met, and this Court cannot sit in judgment of the state court decision. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the state court rulings or enforce such rulings, his remedy lies in the state appellate courts and not in this federal court. See Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15-cv-515, 2016 WL 775783, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016) (explaining that the plaintiff was "the sort of 'state court loser' whom Rooker-Feldman says must travel through the state appellate courts, rather than jumping into a federal court"). Thus, Plaintiff should have appealed the issue in the state courts rather than bringing it to this federal court. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed as the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. See Cooper v. Youngblood, 842 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting "United States district courts and appellate courts have no jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions" under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, including requests to review a state court order denying a plaintiff's in forma pauperis request); Glazebrook v. Supreme Court Justices of Va., No. 86-0153-L, 1987 WL 89232, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 20, 1987) (holding the court lacked jurisdiction to review a state court order denying motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a state court appeal).
Defendant is entitled to dismissal
Additionally, even if the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, this action nevertheless would be subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to name a Defendant subject to suit under § 1983. Plaintiff sues a single Defendant in this action, Abbeville County. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his rights under the United States Constitution. However, Abbeville County is subject to summary dismissal as it is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The law is well settled that "[a] defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a 'person.'" Rutland v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:09-cv-274-SB, 2009 WL 1704331, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17, 2009). "A county . . . may be considered a person under § 1983 if its alleged unconstitutional act is undertaken pursuant to a custom or official policy and the county is not considered a part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Louis v. Spotsylvania Cty., No. 1:17-cv-1215-LMB-JFA, 2017 WL 8786969, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2017), aff'd 719 F. App'x 283 (4th Cir. 2018). "A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs the tort-feasor; rather, a plaintiff must identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury." Gambrell v. Metts, No. 2:10-cv-1969-CMC-RSC, 2010 WL 3463917, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3463900 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2010). Here, Plaintiff has not identified a policy or custom of Abbeville County that deprived him of a constitutional right. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Abbeville County and it should be dismissed as a party from this action.
Further, the crux of Plaintiff's claim is that his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed in the state court was wrongly denied. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is actually against the state court judge that denied his motion. However, to the extent Plaintiff's action is properly brought against a judge in Abbeville County, any such judge is entitled to immunity. Judges have absolute immunity from claims for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they have acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that, even if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that an Abbeville County judge denied his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is complaining about the judge's alleged erroneous judicial actions and he does not mention any pertinent nonjudicial actions. Thus, because all of the alleged misconduct arose out of a judicial action, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against any state judge. See Bey v. Jefferson, No. 2:17-cv-1007-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 9250348, at *8 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2017) (recommending summary dismissal of case against a judge, who was entitled to immunity, with prejudice as frivolous), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1956979 (D.S.C. May 11, 2017).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be DISMISSED without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording him an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile for the reasons stated above. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend pursuant to Goode because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge January 5, 2021
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).