Opinion
CV186079834S
10-19-2018
Kim MILLER v. TOWN OF HAMDEN
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Wilson, J.
FACTS
On April 18, 2018, the plaintiff, Kim Miller, filed a four-count complaint alleging the following facts. The plaintiff owns two dogs that are being held in the custody of the defendant town of Hamden. The defendant Curt Leng, the mayor of the town of Hamden, and the defendant Christopher Smith, the town of Hamden’s animal control officer, have direct personal knowledge of, and involvement in, the dogs’ confinement. Although § 22-336-19(a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies requires that impounded dogs must be housed in a facility where the temperature at floor level never falls below 55 degrees Fahrenheit and never exceeds 90 degrees Fahrenheit, the defendants have violated this ministerial duty by allowing temperatures to fall below the minimum and rise above the maximum. Further, although § 22-336-28 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies requires that impounded dogs be provided with medical care, the defendants have violated this ministerial duty by failing to provide essential medical care to the plaintiff’s dogs unless the plaintiff personally pays for it. As a result of the defendants’ violations of their ministerial duties, the plaintiff has suffered damages. On the basis of these allegations, the plaintiff claims judgment against the town of Hamden in count one, Leng in count two, and Smith in count three.
The town of Hamden, Leng, and Smith are hereafter referred to collectively as the defendants.
Count four of the plaintiff’s complaint set forth a cause of action against the defendant Steven Reviczky, but he has since been removed from the case because the plaintiff withdrew that claim.
On May 18, 2018, the defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, along with a memorandum of law and various exhibits in support. They argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims because the plaintiff does not have standing to bring them and because they are moot. The plaintiff subsequently filed a brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court heard oral argument on the motion on July 2, 2018.
DISCUSSION
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014). "[B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). "A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court ... and mootness implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction." (Citation omitted.) We the People of Connecticut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn.App. 576, 581-82 n.3, 92 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100 A.3d 850 (2014).
In their motion and supporting memorandum, the defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims because the plaintiff does not have standing to bring them and because they are moot, which the plaintiff disputes. The court will address each of the defendants’ arguments in turn.
I
STANDING
According to the defendants, the plaintiff lacks standing because disposal orders issued pursuant to General Statutes § 22-358 have been placed on the dogs, which have been affirmed by the Connecticut Department of Agriculture and in state and federal court, and thus, the plaintiff no longer has any legal interest in the dogs. In response, the plaintiff argues that she has standing because the disposal orders did not alter her ownership of the dogs.
General Statutes § 22-358(c) provides in relevant part: "If such officer finds that the complainant has been bitten or attacked by such dog, cat or other animal when the complainant was not upon the premises of the owner or keeper of such dog, cat or other animal the officer shall quarantine such dog, cat or other animal in a public pound or order the owner or keeper to quarantine it in a veterinary hospital, kennel or other building or enclosure approved by the commissioner for such purpose. When any dog, cat or other animal has bitten a person on the premises of the owner or keeper of such dog, cat or other animal, the Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control officer, any municipal animal control officer or any regional animal control officer may quarantine such dog, cat or other animal on the premises of the owner or keeper of such dog, cat or other animal. The commissioner, the Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control officer, any municipal animal control officer or any regional animal control officer may make any order concerning the restraint or disposal of any biting dog, cat or other animal as the commissioner or such officer deems necessary. Notice of any such order shall be given to the person bitten by such dog, cat or other animal within twenty-four hours. The owner of such animal shall pay all fees as set forth in section 22-333. On the fourteenth day of such quarantine the dog, cat or other animal shall be examined by the commissioner or someone designated by the commissioner to determine whether such quarantine shall be continued or removed. Whenever any quarantine is ordered under the provisions of this section, notice thereof shall be given to the commissioner and to the person bitten or attacked by such dog, cat or other animal within twenty-four hours. Any owner or keeper of such dog, cat or other animal who fails to comply with such order shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor. If an owner or keeper fails to comply with a quarantine or restraining order made pursuant to this subsection, the Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control officer, any municipal animal control officer or any regional animal control officer may seize the dog, cat or other animal to ensure such compliance and the owner or keeper shall be responsible for any expenses resulting from such seizure. Any person aggrieved by an order of any municipal animal control officer, the Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control officer or any regional animal control officer may request a hearing before the commissioner within fourteen days of the issuance of such order. Any order issued pursuant to this section that requires the restraint of an animal shall be effective upon its issuance and shall remain in effect during any appeal of such order to the commissioner. After such hearing, the commissioner may affirm, modify or revoke such order as the commissioner deems proper."
"The issue of standing implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction ..." Channing Real Estate, LLC v. Gates, 326 Conn. 123, 137, 161 A.3d 1227 (2017). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... [Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time ... Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent ... Standing [however] is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented ... Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory ... [T]he fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 511, 518-19, 970 A.2d 583 (2009).
"[T]he actual owner of personal property is a proper plaintiff in an action for damage to or loss of such personal property ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Germain v. LaBrie, 108 Conn.App. 587, 594, 949 A.2d 518 (2008). In St. Germain, the plaintiff brought an action against his former roommates, in which he alleged that he had purchased a twenty-room house and subsequently sold it, although he continued to reside in the house. Id., 590. The plaintiff further claimed that, as a result of becoming involved in a physical altercation with another resident of the house, a protective order was issued against him prohibiting him from returning to the house for eight years. Id. In his complaint, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, to enjoin the defendants from damaging his personal property located at the house. Id. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. Id.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the granting of the motions to dismiss. Id.
Our Appellate Court held that the portion of the plaintiff’s complaint seeking to enjoin the defendants from damaging his personal property was improperly dismissed because there was nothing in the record indicating that the court lacked the authority to hear that type of legal controversy, and thus, the plaintiff had standing with respect to that portion of his complaint. Id., 593. In his complaint, the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendants from damaging his personal property, which was located at the house. Id. Construing such allegations in the light most favorable to the pleader, the court held that the plaintiff had met both prongs for showing classical aggrievement, as "he ha[d] alleged facts sufficient to support a finding that he ha[d] a specific, personal and legal interest in his personal property and also ha[d] alleged that his specific personal and legal interest in his property specifically and injuriously ha[d] been affected by the challenged action." Id., 594.
Likewise, in the present matter, the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint concern the protection of her personal property from the mistreatment of the defendants while it is in their custody, and thus, she has standing to pursue such claims. See General Statutes § 22-350 ("[a]ll dogs are deemed to be personal property"); Angrave v. Oates, 90 Conn.App. 427, 430 n.3, 876 A.2d 1287 (2005) (holding that dogs are chattels). The plaintiff has alleged that she is the owner of the dogs that are being held by the defendants, and there is nothing in the exhibits submitted by the defendants in support of their motion to dismiss demonstrating that the disposal orders affected or removed the plaintiff’s ownership. Further, at oral argument, the defendants did not dispute that they had billed the plaintiff for at least some costs associated with the dogs’ medical care, which demonstrates the defendants’ acknowledgment of the plaintiff’s ownership of the dogs. Moreover, General Statutes § 22-358, the statute under which the disposal orders were issued, does not purport to remove animal owners’ title to their animals, but instead acknowledges such ownership by setting forth various rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of animal owners should their animals attack or bite another person. See footnote 3, supra . Thus, the plaintiff has alleged facts, which have not been contradicted by the defendants’ submissions, sufficient to support a finding that she has a specific, personal, and legal interest in her personal property, and that such interest is specifically and injuriously being affected by the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiff has met both prongs for showing classical aggrievement.
Although there was some dispute regarding which medical care the plaintiff was billed for, the defendants did not dispute that they had billed the plaintiff for at least some of the dogs’ medical care.
II
MOOTNESS
The defendants further assert that the plaintiff’s claims are moot because, in light of the disposal orders placed on the dogs, the court cannot grant any meaningful, practical, or effective relief to the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff argues that, notwithstanding the disposal orders, the dogs are still alive and are being held under inhumane conditions, and thus, the court can grant meaningful relief and her claims are not moot.
"Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction ... Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable ... Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant ... A case is considered moot if [the trial] court cannot grant ... any practical relief through its disposition of the merits ..." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 540-41, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010). "The test for determining mootness is whether a judgment, if rendered, would have any practical legal effect upon an existing controversy. Thus, the central question in a mootness problem is whether a change in the circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation has forestalled the prospect for meaningful, practical, or effective relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1, 13, 917 A.2d 966 (2007).
In the present matter, practical relief remains available to the plaintiff, and thus, her claims are not moot. "[T]he test for determining mootness is not [w]hether the [plaintiff] would ultimately be granted relief ... The test, instead, is whether there is any practical relief [the] court can grant the [plaintiff]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeremy M., 100 Conn.App. 436, 441-42, 918 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 927, 926 A.2d 666 (2007). In the plaintiff’s complaint, she alleges that her dogs are being treated inhumanely by the defendants, which has caused her damages. If she should prove these claims, the court can grant the plaintiff damages as practical relief. Contrary to the defendants’ argument, this is true regardless of the disposal orders, or whether the dogs are eventually euthanized.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.