FN4. Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002). FN5. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001). FN6. Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005).
Our standard of review from the denial of a motion for a new trial "is limited to whether the trial court's denial of [the] motion was clearly erroneous[.]" Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001). The first issue Schulze raises is whether the jury's decision not to award any damages for pain and suffering was made in disregard of the evidence or as a result of passion or prejudice, and is therefore improper.
This is not the law, however. See Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky.2001) (“The law in Kentucky ... does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses.”). Based on the law that the Court should have applied, the jury's task was complete when it returned the initial verdict of $0 for Mary's pain and suffering. The heart of the Court's error in instructing the jury to further consider Mary's pain and suffering damages lies in the distinction between “inadequate” and “incomplete” verdicts.
In addition, we recently rejected the notion that a jury verdict of zero for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law in cases where a jury also awards damages for medical expenses. In Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001), we held, "[t]he law in Kentucky . . . does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses." Id. at 601.
Thus, cases holding that a zero-dollar pain and suffering verdict is permissible if a jury awarded medical expenses are distinguishable. See, e.g., Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001) ("The law in Kentucky, however, does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses."). The parties have not cited, nor have we independently located, a case where a jury was only asked to award damages for pain and suffering and chose to make no award despite finding a defendant partially at fault.
We review the trial court's denial of Elam's new trial motion for clear error. Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005); Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 600-01 (Ky. 2001). Questions of witness credibility and evidentiary weight are within the unique province of the jury.
Our review of this question is limited to whether the trial court's denial of his motion was clearly erroneous. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001); Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005). We also consider the allegation in Fulkerson's cross-appeal that the trial court erred by denying her CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment.
The standard of appellate review from the denial of a motion for a new trial is limited to whether the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001) (citing Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1991)). An award of zero damages for pain and suffering is not per se inadequate as a matter of law.
Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001).Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005).
In Kentucky, a jury is not mandated to award pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses. See Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2005); Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001). Here, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the Jury's award of $0 in pain and suffering was inadequate as a matter of law. "A jury is not bound to believe a plaintiff or her doctors."