Miller v. Swift

41 Citing cases

  1. Morris v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-441-JBT (E.D. Ky. Jan. 22, 2007)

    FN4. Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002). FN5. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001). FN6. Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005).

  2. Schulze v. Hinton

    Nos. 2010-CA-000121-MR, 2010-CA-000151-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011)

    Our standard of review from the denial of a motion for a new trial "is limited to whether the trial court's denial of [the] motion was clearly erroneous[.]" Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001). The first issue Schulze raises is whether the jury's decision not to award any damages for pain and suffering was made in disregard of the evidence or as a result of passion or prejudice, and is therefore improper.

  3. Edwards v. Target Corp.

    941 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    This is not the law, however. See Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky.2001) (“The law in Kentucky ... does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses.”). Based on the law that the Court should have applied, the jury's task was complete when it returned the initial verdict of $0 for Mary's pain and suffering. The heart of the Court's error in instructing the jury to further consider Mary's pain and suffering damages lies in the distinction between “inadequate” and “incomplete” verdicts.

  4. Bayless v. Boyer

    180 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2005)   Cited 51 times
    In Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the determination of antagonism is to be based upon pre-trial positions or actual trial proceedings.

    In addition, we recently rejected the notion that a jury verdict of zero for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law in cases where a jury also awards damages for medical expenses. In Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001), we held, "[t]he law in Kentucky . . . does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses." Id. at 601.

  5. Allen v. Wheeler

    NO. 2018-CA-1830-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2021)

    Thus, cases holding that a zero-dollar pain and suffering verdict is permissible if a jury awarded medical expenses are distinguishable. See, e.g., Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001) ("The law in Kentucky, however, does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses."). The parties have not cited, nor have we independently located, a case where a jury was only asked to award damages for pain and suffering and chose to make no award despite finding a defendant partially at fault.

  6. Elam v. Smith

    NO. 2012-CA-000402-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2013)

    We review the trial court's denial of Elam's new trial motion for clear error. Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005); Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 600-01 (Ky. 2001). Questions of witness credibility and evidentiary weight are within the unique province of the jury.

  7. Dennis v. Fulkerson

    343 S.W.3d 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that a CR 59.05 motion to reduce a damages award should have been granted

    Our review of this question is limited to whether the trial court's denial of his motion was clearly erroneous. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001); Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005). We also consider the allegation in Fulkerson's cross-appeal that the trial court erred by denying her CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment.

  8. Cornett v. Bright

    No. 2009-CA-001186-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010)

    The standard of appellate review from the denial of a motion for a new trial is limited to whether the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001) (citing Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1991)). An award of zero damages for pain and suffering is not per se inadequate as a matter of law.

  9. Bledsaw v. Dennis

    197 S.W.3d 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming denial of new trial where jury awarded medical expenses but no damages for pain and suffering

    Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001).Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005).

  10. Curtis v. Pretorius

    Civil No. 3:15-cv-00070-GFVT (E.D. Ky. Jul. 26, 2018)

    In Kentucky, a jury is not mandated to award pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses. See Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2005); Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001). Here, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the Jury's award of $0 in pain and suffering was inadequate as a matter of law. "A jury is not bound to believe a plaintiff or her doctors."