Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-11331-DPW
September 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff William H. Miller filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), seeking monetary damages for alleged denial of certain pretrial detention credits pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 129B (confinement while awaiting trial; reduction of sentence). The Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
I. Standard of Review
When confronted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must view the facts as presented in the pleadings, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.3d 1050, 1055 (1st Cir. 1995). A dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only if it appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory. Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1992). The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. See Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1994); Day v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D.Mass. 1996).
Ordinarily, if a court takes any documents into consideration beyond the pleadings, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be converted into one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). However, exceptions are made "for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to the plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). Here, both parties have submitted documents, without opposition, that appear to fall within the above exceptions. Accordingly, as will be evident in the discussion, I have considered certain of those documents without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.
II. Background
The following background is taken directly from plaintiff's complaint and, for purposes here, is assumed to be true. See Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 105 F.3d 734, 735 (1st Cir. 1997). On June 6, 2001, Judge Hanlon of the Dorchester District Court sentenced plaintiff in case number 9907-CR-2390 to a term of 90 days at the Suffolk County House of Correction. See Complaint ("Compl."), ¶ 4. This sentence included six days credit for pretrial detention of plaintiff from September 27, 2000, through October 2, 2000, in case number 9907-CR-2390. Id. Once at the Suffolk County House of Correction, plaintiff was granted three additional days credit for his pretrial detention in case number 9907-CR-2390 from July 28, 2000, through July 31, 2000. Id.
Prior to his sentencing on June 6, 2001, plaintiff was taken into custody and arraigned at the Boston Municipal Court on January 5, 2001. Id. at ¶ 5. The Judge in the Boston Municipal Court case entered a bail amount of one thousand ($1,000) dollars cash bail. The BMC Judge also entered a bail amount of five hundred ($500) dollars on the Dorchester District Court charge (9907-CR-2390) and entered a bail amount of five hundred ($500) dollars on an outstanding charge from Roxbury District Court. Id.
On June 13, 2001, defendant Tina Donovan of Inmate Legal Services wrote a memo to plaintiff informing him that his sentence would not be credited for the pre-trial detention that began on January 5, 2001. Id. at ¶¶ 6 — 7; see Plaintiff's Exhibit A, p. 1 (indicating that plaintiff would not be credited for his pretrial detention from January to May because plaintiff's Boston Municipal Court case was pending). At an unspecified date, plaintiff was interviewed by Clara (a.k.a. Jane Doe) regarding his request for jail credits, and "she left and never returned." Id. at ¶ 10(a).
On June 28, 2002, plaintiff filed a legal request form with Suffolk County Inmate Legal Services, see Exhibit A, p. 2 (indicating that plaintiff sought to appeal decision not to credit plaintiff for his pretrial detention from January to May), and Joanne Lynds, an employee of the Suffolk County records department, failed to respond to plaintiff's appeal. Id. at ¶ 10(c).
On July 9, 2001, Deputy Superintendent Gerard Horgan wrote plaintiff a memorandum informing plaintiff that because his Boston Municipal Case was still open and pending, he could not receive jail credit for his pretrial detention from January through May 2001. Id. at ¶ 10(d); see Exhibit A, p. 4.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 23, 2001, seeking monetary damages and naming as defendants the Suffolk County House of Correction; Richard Rouse, Suffolk County Sheriff; Joanne Lynds; Tina Donovan; Larry Ransford, Suffolk County House of Correction Inmate Grievance Coordinator; Clara a.k.a. Jane Doe, Suffolk County House of Correction Inmate Legal Services employee; and John Doe, Suffolk County House of Correction Department of Releases employee.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff contends (A) the decision to deny him jail credits deprived him of a liberty interest without due process of law; (B) the decision to deny him jail credits deprived him of equal protection of the law; and (C) that the defendants conspired to violate his civil rights.
In his opposition to the defendants' motion, plaintiff sets forth a new allegation: that "he was coerced into pleading guilty on September 27, 2001, and received a concurrent 8 month BMC sentence." See Pl. Mem., p. 3, § 2. I decline to consider that allegation for the purpose of this motion. See Schneider v. California Dept of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (court may not look to additional facts alleged in opposition to motion to dismiss when deciding 12(b)(6) motion); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff may not present new allegations in response to dispositive motion); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp.2d 836, 851 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (parties are not entitled to assert new facts in submissions on a motion to dismiss); Davis v. Cole, 999 F. Supp. 809, 813 (E.D.Va. 1998) (court may not rely on additional allegations in response to motion to dismiss); In re Colonial Ltd. P'ship Litig., 854 F. Supp. 64, 79 (D.Conn. 1994) (plaintiff may not rely on new allegations introduced in response to motion to dismiss).
More fundamentally, this new claim appears to raise an issue that must be presented through a habeas corpus petition rather than a civil rights law suit. I note that to the extent plaintiff seeks to challenge through a damages action the failure to credit him with time spent in custody there is considerable question whether such a challenge is cognizable at this time in this proceeding. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (prisoner challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and seeking determination that he is entitled to immediate release or speedier release from such imprisonment must proceed under habeas corpus); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994) (where prisoner sought damages, not speedier release, for allegedly unconstitutional conviction, prisoner had no cause of action under § 1983 in absence of independent invalidation of conviction because success of suit would effectively invalidate his underlying conviction and sentence); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-648 (1997) (prisoner's claims about alleged procedural defect at disciplinary hearing resulting in deprivation of good-time credits were not cognizable, in absence of independent invalidation of credit computation, under § 1983 because suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of good-time credits). Although plaintiff could presumably seek relief directly from the sentencing court, he cannot now challenge his confinement or its term through this civil action.
A. Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to Allege Deprivation of a Liberty Interest Without Due Process of Law
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Liberty interests may arise from the constitution itself, statutes, judicial decrees or regulations. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).Plaintiff complains that defendants violated his liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to credit him with time he spent in custody awaiting trial, before posting bail, for both the Dorchester District Court and subsequent Boston Municipal Court matters. Plaintiff seeks to challenge the practice of awarding sentence deductions, absent court order, only when all cases a prisoner was held on at that time are closed.
Two provisions of the Massachusetts General Laws govern the provision of such deductions to convicted prisoners for time spent in custody awaiting trial. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 129B; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 33A. Section 129B mandates the awarding of such deductions by the facility where the sentence is being served "unless the court, in imposing such sentence had already deducted therefrom the time during which such prisoner had been confined while awaiting trial." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 129B. Similarly, Section 33A directs the sentencing court to award deductions for "the number of days spent by the prisoner in confinement prior to such sentence awaiting and during trial." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 33A.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 129B, states:
The sentence of any prisoner in any correctional institution of the commonwealth or in any house of correction or jail, who was held in custody awaiting trial shall be reduced by the number of days spent by him in confinement prior to such sentence and while awaiting trial, unless the court in imposing such sentence had already deducted therefrom the time during which such prisoner had been confined while awaiting trial.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 33A, states:
The court on imposing a sentence of commitment to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, a house of correction, or a jail, shall order that the prisoner be deemed to have served a portion of said sentence, such portion to be the number of days spent by the prisoner in confinement prior to such sentence awaiting and during trial.
The plaintiff's claim that defendants violated his rights by failing to credit him with time he spent in custody awaiting trial for both the Dorchester District Court and subsequent Boston Municipal Court matters is plainly ambitious. But I find it has no basis in this proceeding. The sentence on the Dorchester District Court matter by Judge Hanlon provided plaintiff six days credit for pretrial confinement. Under state law, because Judge Hanlon "had already deducted" time for pretrial confinement from plaintiff's sentence, the defendants were not obligated to reduce plaintiff's sentence further. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 129B; see also Commonwealth v. Barriere, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 290-291, 705 N.E.2d 635 (1999) (noting that "determining whether a credit is due [in a large number of cases] involves an act of adjudication rather than a clerical correction").
Defendants appear to be correct in noting that plaintiff seeks jail credit that exceeds the sentence imposed and, if awarded, would require plaintiff's immediate release in spite of the sentence.
Although the sentencing statutes should be interpreted "against the backdrop of fair treatment for the prisoner," Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 515-516, 729 N.E.2d 252 (2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Grant, 366 Mass. 272, 275, 317 N.E.2d 484 (1974)), time spent in custody awaiting trial for one crime generally may not be credited against a sentence for an unrelated crime. Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 23-24, 690 N.E.2d 1232, 1236-1237 (1998) (citing Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 353 Mass. 472, 475, 233 N.E.2d 200 (1968); Petition of Needel, 344 Mass. 260, 262, 182 N.E.2d 125 (1962); Commonwealth v. Carter, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 620 n. 4, 411 N.E.2d 184 (1980)).
Here, plaintiff was not in danger of serving "dead time" because he was informed that, once he was sentenced on the Boston Municipal Court matter, he would receive the credits in question. See Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 23-24, 690 N.E.2d 1232 (1998) (fairness governs award of jail credits, and in some circumstances, award of jail credits is permissible to avoid time in confinement for which no day-to-day credit is given against any sentence (i.e. "dead time")). Accordingly, plaintiff's rights were not violated by defendants' practice of not awarding a deduction unless all of the cases the prisoner was held on at that time were closed.
Even if, contrary to the facts in this case, plaintiff could establish that the defendants should have credited his Dorchester sentence with time served awaiting trial for both the Dorchester and BMC charges, he would still fail to identify the deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law cognizable under the federal constitution. See Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 1993) (allegations concerning erroneous interpretation of state jail time crediting laws stated violation of state statutory or decisional law but did not state a claim for substantive due process violation).
To the extent plaintiff complains that defendants violated state law, "[m]ere violations of state law do not, of course, create constitutional claims." Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1522-1523 (1st Cir. 1983). Moreover, "violations of state law — even where arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith — do not, without more, give rise to a denial of substantive due process under the U.S. Constitution." Barrington Cove, LP v. R.I. Hous. Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992). That is all that is alleged here and that is not enough to support plaintiff's due process claim.
B. Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Section 1983 Claim Based on the Equal Protection Clause
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). The standard for a violation of equal protection is that (1) the plaintiff, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1995).
Here, plaintiff has failed to allege any basis for an equal protection claim. He has failed to sufficiently allege any facts demonstrating that he was selectively treated — for impermissible reasons — compared with others similarly situated.
C. Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Conspiracy Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Plaintiff's general assertion of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is without basis. Subsection 1985(1) inapposite; it prohibits conspiracies to prevent others from accepting or holding public offices. And subsection 1985(2) is similarly inapposite; it prohibits conspiracies to tamper with jurors and witnesses. In order to bring a claim under subsection 1985(3), plaintiff must allege that the defendants have acted and conspired with "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993). Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that the acts complained of were the result of discriminatory animus.
D. Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Bivens Claim
Plaintiff's assertion of a claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) is without merit. A Bivens action is unavailable against state officials. The Supreme Court in Bivens established a cause of action enabling plaintiffs to seek judicial relief against federal officers and employees for alleged violations of constitutional rights. Because plaintiff does not bring this action against any federal defendants, his Bivens claim is subject to dismissal.
E. The Suffolk County House of Correction is Not an Entity Subject to Suit
Plaintiff's complaint includes the Suffolk County House of Correction as a defendant. Under Rule 17(b), the capacity of a non-individual defendant to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). For purposes of litigation, the Suffolk County House of Correction is neither a governmental entity, a legal subdivision of Suffolk County, nor a public body politic. See generally Kargman v. Boston Water and Sewer Comm'n, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 51, 55, 463 N.E.2d 350 (1984) (setting out a two-part test for determining whether an entity is an "independent body politic and corporate" within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258); see also Lafayette Place Assoc. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 694 N.E.2d 820 (1998) (applying Kargman analysis). Therefore, plaintiff's claims against the Suffolk County House of Correction are subject to dismissal.
F. The Individual Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Even assuming plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, qualified immunity provides a basis for dismissing plaintiff's complaint as to the individual defendants. Qualified immunity shields "government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); accord Gardner v. Vespia, 252 F.3d 500, 502 (1st Cir. 2001). To the extent plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the Massachusetts sentencing statutes, it is clear that "a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed at the time of his allegedly unlawful conduct." Singer v. Maine, 49 F.3d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). All of the relevant state case law, see § III.A above, indicates that plaintiff was not entitled to the jail credit in question, and in any event, his entitlement was not clearly established. Therefore, the individual defendants are protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Even after liberally construing plaintiff's complaint and response to defendants' motion to dismiss, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), I find no cognizable legal claim. Accordingly, for the reasons stated for fully above, defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 12) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety as to all defendants.