Opinion
23A-CR-2633
08-14-2024
Gary Edward Miller, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Zachary J. Stock Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, P.C. Carmel, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court The Honorable Stephenie Lemay-Luke, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32D05-2208-F1-8
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Zachary J. Stock Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, P.C. Carmel, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WEISSMANN, JUDGE.
[¶1] While fleeing from police after a domestic dispute, Gary Miller crashed his truck into a police vehicle with an officer inside. For this, a jury found him guilty of Level 1 attempted murder. Miller appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove that he had the specific intent to kill, an essential element of attempted murder. Finding sufficient evidence to support Miller's conviction, we affirm.
Facts
[¶2] The morning at issue started around 5:30 a.m. with Miller choking his girlfriend and threatening to kill her for trying to shower before him. When Miller calmed down and left the house, his girlfriend called 911 to report the domestic disturbance. Police soon arrived at the house and saw that Miller had returned and was grabbing something from the garage. Apparently not noticing the officers, Miller then drove away in his Ford F-150 truck with its headlights turned off. As Miller headed towards the neighborhood's only exit, Deputy Alex Haak and two other police officers positioned their marked police vehicles at the exit with their emergency lights and headlights activated.
[¶3] The decision was made to place "stop sticks" on the ground at the exit to stop Miller's vehicle if he tried to flee. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 16. Deputy Haak exited his vehicle to do so but had only been outside for about two seconds when he spotted Miller rapidly driving towards him. Deputy Haak rushed back into his vehicle to pursue Miller, if necessary. About ten seconds later, Miller's truck struck Deputy Haak's driver-side door. The collision propelled both vehicles into a nearby ditch, and crash data later revealed that Miller was traveling 43 miles per hour at the time of impact. After the collision, Miller exited his truck and said something akin to "come on" or "let's go." Tr. Vol. IV, p. 60. He then gestured towards the remaining police officers in a manner "as if he had a firearm" (Miller was actually holding a set of keys) and fled into the nearby trees. Id. at 61.
[¶4] Deputy Haak blacked out from the collision. He awoke in intense pain, with significant bruising around the left side of his body. The force of the impact caused one of Deputy Haak's teeth to puncture his lower lip. He was taken to the hospital for stiches and to get an MRI to check for a possible concussion. Deputy Haak ended up only requiring several stiches to his face and lip.
[¶5] The State charged Miller with attempted murder, resisting law enforcement, and domestic battery. It also alleged that Miller was a habitual offender. At Miller's first trial, the jury found him guilty of resisting law enforcement and domestic battery, but it was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge. The State therefore retried Miller for attempted murder.
[¶6] At Miller's second trial, the State again argued that Miller had intentionally crashed into Deputy Haak's vehicle in an attempt to kill him. In support of this theory, the State presented the data from Miller's truck showing it was traveling 43 miles per hour with the accelerator fully engaged until just before impact. And moments before the impact, Deputy Haak had dived into the driver's side door, which was precisely where Miller had aimed his truck-an act the State argued could only be viewed as deliberate. The State also presented photographic evidence indicating that Miller had ample room to avoid the collision if that had been his intent. Multiple officers also testified about the events, including Deputy Haak, who gave his personal account of his injuries and the moments leading up to the crash. Additionally, the State played dash cam and body cam footage showing different angles of the collision and its aftermath.
[¶7] In his defense, Miller mainly offered alternative interpretations of the evidence. While acknowledging that he was fleeing from the police, Miller argued this did not equate to an intent to kill. He further highlighted that just before impact, the truck's acceleration data showed Miller had eased off the accelerator slightly. The defense contended this suggested Miller was trying to navigate a turn at high speed to evade police, not crash into their vehicles. The defense also emphasized that Miller fled on foot after the collision, arguing this showed his continued intent was to escape rather than harm officers. Additionally, Miller questioned the reliability of the vehicle data and argued that a full accident reconstruction, which was not done, could have revealed other factors at play. Miller later suggested that the State had not ruled out a vehicle malfunction or the simple loss of control.
[¶8] Ultimately, after hearing all the evidence and arguments, the jury found Miller guilty of attempted murder. The trial court sentenced him to 41 years imprisonment, including a 10-year habitual offender enhancement. Miller appeals only his conviction.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] Miller argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of Level 1 felony attempted murder. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences arising from such evidence. Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[¶10] "A person commits the offense of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony, when he or she, acting with the requisite culpability 'engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward' the 'intentional killing of another human being.'" Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 265 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1(a); -42-1-1(1)). The mental state for attempted murder is the "specific intent to kill," which our Supreme Court has often noted is a "heightened mens rea" intended to "single[] out attempted murder for special treatment." Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 12 (Ind. 2015). This special treatment flows from "the stringent penalties for attempted murder and the ambiguity often involved in its proof." Id. (quoting Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2001)).
[¶11] Miller argues that he did not possess the proper mens rea to commit attempted murder. He contends that driving a vehicle into a stopped car does not by itself allow a reasonable jury to conclude that there was specific intent to kill. But Miller ignores the rest of the evidence from which the jury could have inferred the requisite mental state.
[¶12] As a starting point, the intent to kill may be inferred by the defendant's use of a deadly weapon. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). A "deadly weapon" includes equipment that is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury in the manner it is used, could ordinarily be used, or is intended to be used. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-86(a)(2). It is well-settled that vehicles can be deadly weapons. See, e.g., DeWhitt v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1055, 1064-65 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005).
[¶13] The jury could reasonably infer that Miller knew Deputy Haak was in the vehicle. Here, Miller intentionally crashed his car into the part of Haak's car where he was sitting. Dashcam footage-viewed by the jury-showed Deputy Haak outside his police vehicle before rushing back inside as Miller's truck approached. Combined with the data, the footage also showed Miller crashing into Deputy Haak's driver's side door at over 40 miles per hour. Miller asks us to reinterpret this video evidence to reach a different conclusion than that reached by the jury. We cannot do so. Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005.
[¶14] Miller also relies on two Indiana Supreme Court decisions in which the Court found the defendant lacked a specific intent to kill. We find neither case compels a similar result here.
[¶15] In Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind. 2002), our Supreme Court found there was no evidence of an intent to commit murder when the defendant fired his gun near a minor walking down the road outside his residence. The Court considered that: (1) the defendant had no motive; (2) his conduct was inconsistent with the intent to kill-he had been standing in a well-lit area with four witnesses and had four rounds remaining in his gun; and (3) it was apparent that the defendant had merely intended to scare the minor as after the shooting he stated, "That kid must be scared now," and then casually walked back to his home. Id.
[¶16] Likewise, in Henley v. State, our Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for the attempted murder of a police officer. 881 N.E.2d at 652. There, the defendant was holed up inside a van, following a robbery, when a police dog entered the van. Despite the defendant shooting only the police dog, the State charged him for the attempted murder of the human police officer, who had been holding the dog's leash and had not entered the van. In reversing the conviction, the Court emphasized that there was simply no evidence the defendant knew of the presence of a police officer when he fired at the dog and that he therefore lacked a specific intent to kill the human officer. Id.
[¶17] The facts here present stronger evidence of a specific intent to kill than either Kiefer or Henley. Unlike the evidence of the defendant's intent to scare in Kiefer, and unlike the defendant's ignorance of the police officer's presence in Henley, here, the record reasonably supports the view that Miller deliberately drove his truck at high speed directly into an occupied police vehicle. The jury reasonably concluded that Miller knew the vehicle was occupied. And Miller's actions leading up to the collision-fleeing from police, driving without lights, and refusing to stop or change course despite ample opportunity-also suggest a deliberate and sustained intent.
[¶18] We find this more similar to this Court's decision in Solomon v. State, 570 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1991). In Solomon, the defendant twice drove his vehicle at a police officer, who was able to dodge it. On appeal, this Court found sufficient evidence of the defendant's intent to kill because the reasonable inference from the evidence was that the defendant knew "that the natural and probable consequences of his driving would be the death" of the officer. Id. at 1295. Just as in Solomon, Miller used his vehicle as a weapon against law enforcement officers attempting to apprehend him. The deliberate nature of the act, the use of a vehicle as a deadly weapon, and the context of attempting to evade arrest are all common themes as well. Thus, just as in Solomon, we find there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of specific intent to kill.
[¶19] In sum, Miller fails to convince us that this is one of the "very rare occasion[s]" in which it is necessary to overturn an attempted murder conviction over insufficient evidence establishing an intent to kill. Kiefer, 761 N.E.2d at 805. Thus, we affirm Miller's attempted murder conviction.
[¶20] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.