Opinion
23A-CR-2838
06-14-2024
Crystal J. Miller, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT AUDREY LUNSFORD LUNSFORD LEGAL, LLC INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHELLE HAWK KAZMIERCZAK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hendricks Circuit Court The Honorable Daniel Zielinski, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32C01-2201-F6-000043
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT AUDREY LUNSFORD LUNSFORD LEGAL, LLC INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHELLE HAWK KAZMIERCZAK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] In January 2022, Crystal Miller was a passenger in a car driven by her husband, James. Due to James's erratic driving, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop in Hendricks County but that ended in Marion County. After a search of Miller's car, officers found a methamphetamine pipe in Miller's purse and a butane canister in one of the seats. Miller was charged with and convicted of possession of paraphernalia. Miller now appeals that conviction and raises one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support venue and Miller's conviction.
[¶2] We affirm. Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On January 5, 2022, Miller was riding in the passenger seat of her car while her husband drove on Highway 40 in Hendricks County, Indiana. At some point, James cut across two lanes of traffic and turned into a parking lot, nearly hitting another car in the process. Plainfield Police Department officer Robert Sumner witnessed this series of events and initiated a traffic stop of Miller's vehicle. Although Officer Sumner initiated the traffic stop in Hendricks County, James did not stop until he was in Marion County. Plainfield Police Department corporal Michael Taylor responded to Officer Sumner's request for back up and assisted him on scene.
[¶4] Officer Sumner spoke with Miller and her husband, checked the car's registration, determined the vehicle was registered to Miller, and obtained Miller's consent to search the vehicle. After consenting to the search of her car, Miller informed Officer Sumner that James may have placed a meth pipe in her purse, which was in her car. According to Miller, she and James found the meth pipe while cleaning out their storage facility a few days prior and had not yet disposed of it. Miller also told Officer Sumner that she did not know the meth pipe was in her purse until her husband told her during the traffic stop. Corporal Taylor searched Miller's car and found a meth pipe and ten pills of gabapentin in her purse as well as a canister of butane laying in one of the seats. Neither of the Millers had a prescription for gabapentin. Miller also told the officers that she was in rehab for substance abuse and that she had previously used meth.
[¶5] On January 11, 2022, the State charged Miller with unlawful possession or use of a legend drug as a Level 6 felony and possession of paraphernalia as a Class C misdemeanor . Prior to trial, the State dismissed the unlawful possession charge. On September 26, 2023, Miller's jury trial commenced, and the jury convicted her of possession of paraphernalia as a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Miller to 60 days executed at the Hendricks County Jail plus 1 year of probation, with the possibility of early release from probation upon request. This appeal ensued.
Id. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Miller argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to establish venue in Hendricks County and to support her conviction for possession of paraphernalia. "Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments trigger a deferential standard of appellate review, in which we 'neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.'" Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)), reh'g denied (Aug. 17, 2023). In our review, "we consider only 'the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.'" Id. (quoting Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 1992)). We will reverse a guilty verdict only when no reasonable trier of fact "could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
1. The State's Evidence Established Venue Was Proper in Hendricks County
[¶7] Miller contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that venue was proper in Hendricks County, which is where the State alleged in the charging information that the crimes occurred and is also where Miller was tried and convicted. Defendants have both a constitutional and statutory right to be tried in the county in which an offense was committed. Ind. Const. art. I, § 13; I.C. § 35-32-2-1(a); Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2001).
The State is required to prove venue, although it is not an element of an offense. Baugh v. State, 801 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. 2004). As a result, the State may prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish proper venue. Evans v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 1991).Peacock v. State, 126 N.E.3d 892, 897 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). The standard of review for a claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove venue is the same as for other claims of insufficient evidence. Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (citing Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied).
[¶8] Here, Officer Sumner testified that he witnessed Miller's husband commit driving infractions in Hendricks County, and that he initiated a traffic stop on Miller's vehicle in Hendricks County. Miller and her husband just happened to be driving near the Hendricks County-Marion County border, and the final stop occurred in Marion County. There was no evidence that someone approached Miller after she was stopped in Marion County and gave her the seized paraphernalia. In the absence of explaining how the paraphernalia could have materialized in Miller's purse in Marion County, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the meth pipe was in Miller's purse at the time Officer Sumners initiated the traffic stop in Hendricks County. This evidence is sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that venue was proper in Hendricks County.
2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Miller's Possession of Paraphernalia Conviction
[¶9] Miller next claims that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for possession of paraphernalia as a Class C misdemeanor. To convict Miller of that crime, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller knowingly or intentionally possessed an instrument, device, or another object that she intended to use for introducing a controlled substance into her body. See I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1); see Appellant's App. Vol. II at 29.
[¶10] Miller contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that (a) she possessed the meth pipe knowingly or intentionally and (b) she intended to use the meth pipe to introduce a controlled substance into her body. We address each contention in turn.
a. Knowledge of Possession
[¶11] "[I]t is well-settled that [a] conviction for possessory offenses does not depend on the accused being caught red-handed in the act by the police." McCoy v. State, 153 N.E.3d 363, 366 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Smith v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1266, 1269 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018)). That is, the evidence does not need to "overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient so long as an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict." Lock, 971 N.E.2d at 74 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147).
[¶12] There are two types of possession: (1) actual and (2) constructive. Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 732-33 (Ind. 2015). "A person actually possesses contraband if he has direct physical control over it." Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011) (citing Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ind. 1999)). A person constructively possesses contraband when he has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it, id. (citing Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind.), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind.1997)), regardless of whether he had exclusive possession of the premises, Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. 2004) (citing Davenport v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (Ind. 1984)).
[¶13] The evidence shows that Corporal Taylor found the meth pipe in Miller's purse and that by Miller's own admission, it had been there for several days. Miller's argument to the contrary is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 264 (quoting Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 570).
b. Intent to Use
[¶14] "The intent to introduce a controlled substance into one's body may be inferred from circumstantial evidence," including evidence of physical signs of drug use, past drug use, prior drug convictions, or the presence of drugs. Sluder v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (citing Dabner v. State, 258 Ind. 179, 279 N.E.2d 797, 798-99 (1972); Stevens v. State, 257 Ind. 386, 275 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1971); Von Hauger v. State, 255 Ind. 666, 266 N.E.2d 197, 198 (1971); Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000); McConnell v. State, 540 N.E.2d 100, 103-04 (Ind.Ct.App. 1989)).
[¶15] The evidence shows that Miller told the officers that she had a history of using meth and that Corporal Taylor also found a butane canister in Miller's car, which he testified could have been used to heat any meth in the meth pipe in order to smoke it or to refill a torch or lighter for the same purpose. This is sufficient to establish that Miller intended to use the meth pipe to smoke meth. Based on the foregoing, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Miller's possession of paraphernalia conviction.
Conclusion
[¶16] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that venue was proper in Hendricks County and to support Miller's conviction for possession of paraphernalia. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[¶17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.