Opinion
No. CR-99-2282.
Decided January 6, 2004.
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court (CC-99-792), D. Al Crowson, J.
William R. Hill, Jr., and J. Haran Lowe, Jr., Clanton, for Appellant.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Tracy Daniel and Andy Scott Poole, asst. attys. gen. for, Appellee.
The appellant, Alan Eugene Miller, was convicted of capital murder in connection with the deaths of Lee Michael Holdbrooks, Christopher S. Yancy, and Terry Lee Jarvis. The murders were made capital because they were committed "by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct." See § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975. After a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Miller be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Miller to death by electrocution.
Miller raises a number of issues for this Court's review. However, our initial review of the record reveals that we must remand this case for additional action by the circuit court so that we may adequately address the merits of several of Miller's claims.
I.
On June 17, 2000, the jury returned an advisory verdict recommending that Miller be sentenced to death. Thereafter, on July 31, 2000, the circuit court accepted the jury's recommendation and orally sentenced Miller to death by electrocution. However, the Court advised the parties that as soon as it could it would enter written findings, as required by Alabama law.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Miller's trial counsel requested that the court appoint other counsel to represent Miller on appeal, stating, "the reason being that I need to be scrutinized as well as the facts in this case." (R. 1473.) The court granted trial counsel's request, and it appointed new counsel to represent Miller on appeal. On August 1, 2000, Miller's newly appointed appellate counsel filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was "contrary to law and the weight of the evidence."
On August 24, 2000, the circuit court entered its written order sentencing Miller to death by electrocution. The following day, Miller's appellate counsel filed an amendment to Miller's previous motion for a new trial. Included in the amended new-trial motion was a claim that Miller's trial counsel was ineffective. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At the evidentiary hearing, Miller's new attorneys focused on two issues: (1) the competency of Miller's trial counsel; and (2) Miller's mental condition at the time the murders were committed. Miller's trial counsel testified at length concerning his representation of Miller. New counsel also presented testimony from two mental health professionals regarding Miller's mental state at the time of the murders. Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties were given the opportunity to brief the issues raised during the hearing. On February 21, 2001, the circuit court summarily denied Miller's motion for a new trial. The court entered no written order and made no specific findings of fact as to the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing. The case action summary merely indicated that Miller's new-trial motion was being denied.
Because the circuit court summarily denied Miller's motion for a new trial without making specific, written findings of fact, despite holding a hearing and receiving evidence and briefs regarding the claims asserted in the motion, we must remand this case to the trial court for it to make specific written findings of fact regarding each of the claims Miller raised during the hearing on his motion for a new trial. The circuit court's failure to make such findings hampers this Court's ability to fulfill its statutory mandate as set out in § 13A-5-53, Ala. Code 1975. "Because the trial court presided over the trial and the hearing on the motion for a new trial, we believe that that court is in the best position to make findings of fact regarding the appellant's claims." Tubbs v. State, 753 So.2d 1209, 1210 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999); see also Davis v. State, 826 So.2d 894, 896 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000); Stallings v. State, 793 So.2d 867, 869 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000).
II.
Miller argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the facts of this case warranted a finding that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel when compared to other capital offenses. Specifically, Miller challenges the constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance, on the ground that this aggravating circumstance is "impermissibly vague and overly broad." He further argues that "[s]uch a standard has become meaningless in recent years precisely because the State has chosen to use this as a catchall and effectively made every murder worthy of capital punishment."
Before we can address the merits of Miller's claim, however, we must remand this case for the circuit court to make specific findings of fact regarding its finding that the murders committed by Miller were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, when compared to other offenses.
When considering whether a particular capital offense was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," this Court adheres to the standard set out in Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330, 334 (Ala. 1981), namely, that the particular offense must be one of those "conscienceless or pitiless homicides which are unnecessarily torturous to the victim."
Here, the circuit court found that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel as compared to other capital murders. The court, in its sentencing order, stated merely:
"The Court finds the conduct of the Defendant constituted an intentional killing of two or more persons pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct [and] that this capital murder offense committed by the Defendant was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital murder offenses."
The court's order fails to comply with Ex parte Kyzer, because the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact as to why it believed that this aggravating circumstance existed. Although the circuit court made findings of fact in another part of its three-part sentencing order, those facts do not establish specific findings addressing the standard set forth in Ex parte Kyzer. See, e.g., Stallworth v. State, [Ms. CR-98-0366, September 28, 2001] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2001).
This Court has approved the application of this aggravating circumstance when the testimony has established that the victims were stabbed multiple times and that they suffered before they died. See Price v. State, 725 So.2d at 1062; Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461, 471 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994), aff'd, 673 So.2d 473 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 (1996); Hallford v. State, 548 So.2d 526, 546 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 (1989). However, when a circuit court has found this aggravating circumstance to exist, this Court has required the court to make specific findings of fact explaining why this aggravating circumstance was applicable. We quote the circuit court's sentencing order in Barbour, where the court stated:
"`The Court does find that Roberts did suffer before she was killed, because she was savagely beaten by Barbour, Mitchell and Hester into a stupefied state or into a state of unconsciousness. In any event, she was rendered helpless. What Roberts's thoughts were during this attack, we will never know. However, common sense dictates that when attacked by three relative strangers, one must be fearful of their ultimate fate. Thus, Roberts suffered psychologically. In addition, the blows were surely painful.
"`The Court finds that based on a consideration of all the circumstances from the moment the attack began until Barbour, Mitchell and Hester left Roberts's home, the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the capital offense was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This legal conclusion is based on an amalgam of the case law on this subject. . . .
"`A summary of the facts is appropriate. Roberts was beaten into a helpless state. She was then raped by Hester as she lay helpless. Barbour concluded that she must die because she knew who her attackers were, and he stabbed her nine times with such force that two of the blows penetrated Roberts'[s] back. Barbour left the murder weapon protruding from Roberts' chest. Barbour then set a fire or fires in an attempt to hide the criminal act. The fires resulted in some mutilation of Roberts's body.'"
673 So.2d at 471 (emphasis in Barbour).
We do not wish to question the existence of this aggravating circumstance. However, given that the circuit court found only one aggravating circumstance to exist — that this offense was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital offenses" — we must remand this case to the circuit court for specific findings of fact as to why the court found that the murders were "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" when compared with other capital murders.
For the reasons stated in Part I of this opinion, we remand this case for the circuit court to make specific written findings of fact as to the claims that Miller raised during the hearing on his motion for a new trial. In addition to the findings of fact, the circuit court shall include in its return to remand any documentary evidence it considered in making these findings, including, but not limited to, the mental health evaluation conducted on Miller by psychologists at Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility that was filed under seal with the circuit court and the mental evaluation of Miller by his expert, Dr. Charles Scott.
We note that these two reports were referenced at various stages of the trial proceedings; however, the circuit clerk neglected to forward the reports to this Court as part of the certified record on appeal.
For the reasons stated in Part II of this opinion, this case is remanded for the court to correct its sentencing order and make specific findings of fact regarding the existence of the aggravating circumstance that this offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel when compared to other capital offenses. Our remand of this case for the circuit court to correct its sentencing order should not be taken as a judgment on the merits of Miller's guilt-phase arguments. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we have simply chosen to have a single remand so that the circuit court can comply with Alabama law, in order that this Court may better review the merits of each of Miller's arguments, without the need for another remand
The circuit court shall take all necessary action to see that the circuit court makes due return to this Court at the earliest possible time and within 90 days of the release of this opinion.
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
McMillan, P.J., and Cobb, Baschab, and Shaw, JJ., concur.