On multiple occasions this Court has referred to a "probation contract" when addressing the issue of compliance with Rule 27.6 and the issue of revocation of probation. See Davis v. State, 855 So.2d 1142, 1146 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Stanley v. State, 579 So.2d 19, 20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ); Puckett v. State, 680 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ; Woodberry v. State, 625 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Salter v. State, 470 So.2d 1360, 1362 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) ); Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434, (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ; Taylor v. State, 600 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). King's assertion that he never executed a "probation contract" notified the circuit court that lack of written notice of the terms of probation was one of King's grounds for requesting reconsideration of the order revoking his probation.

We have consistently held that other claims — even those raising constitutional issues — are waivable. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 675 So.2d 44, 45 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Harrelson v. State, 651 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Woodberry v. State, 625 So.2d 1159, 1162 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); and Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434, 435 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). "Justice Maddox, in his dissent in Ex parte Helton, stated that the majority's determination in Helton that it was unnecessary for Helton to object in the trial court in order to preserve for appellate review the alleged inadequacy of the trial court's written order of revocation was apparently based on the majority's agreement with Helton's argument that he could not be required to object in the trial court to the inadequacy of the court's written revocation order when that order was not entered until after his revocation hearing.

Here, because the appellant was not afforded the minimum due process rights to which he was entitled, this cause is remanded to the trial court to conduct a probation revocation hearing in compliance with Rule 27.6(a) Ala.R.Crim.P. Additionally, the court should file a written statement of the reasons for and the evidence relied upon in revoking the probation. Rule 27.6(f), Ala.R.Crim.P.; Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). A copy of the trial court's statement should be filed with this Court within 60 days of the date of this opinion.

"Since our decision in Taylor [ v. State, 600 So.2d 1080 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992)], this court has recognized, in probation revocation proceedings, only two exceptions to the general rule that issues not presented to the trial court are waived on appeal: (1) the requirement that there be an adequate written order of revocation (see Rule 27.6(f), Ala.R.Crim.P.), as was the situation in Ex parte Helton, 578 So.2d 1379 (Ala. 1990), and (2) the requirement that a revocation hearing actually be held (see Rule 27.6(a), Ala.R.Crim.P.), as was the situation in Story v. State, 572 So.2d 510 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). We have consistently held that other claims — even those raising constitutional issues — are waivable. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 675 So.2d 44, 45 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Harrelson v. State, 651 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Woodberry v. State, 625 So.2d 1159, 1162 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); and Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434, 435 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992)."

Thus, the appellant's contention that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 27.6(c) is not preserved for appellate review. See Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). The appellant further contends that the trial court failed to enter a written order setting forth the findings of fact, the evidence relied upon, and the reasons for revoking his probation as required by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

600 So.2d at 1081 n. 1. Since our decision in Taylor, this court has recognized, in probation revocation proceedings, only two exceptions to the general rule that issues not presented to the trial court are waived on appeal: (1) the requirement that there be an adequate written order of revocation (see Rule 27.6(f), Ala.R.Crim.P.), as was the situation in Ex parte Helton, 578 So.2d 1379 (Ala. 1990), and (2) the requirement that a revocation hearing actually be held (see Rule 27.6(a), Ala.R.Crim.P.), as was the situation in Story v. State, 572 So.2d 510 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). We have consistently held that other claims — even those raising constitutional issues — are waivable. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 675 So.2d 44, 45 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Harrelson v. State, 651 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Woodberry v. State, 625 So.2d 1159, 1162 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); and Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434, 435 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). Justice Maddox, in his dissent in Ex parte Helton, stated that the majority's determination in Helton that it was unnecessary for Helton to object in the trial court in order to preserve for appellate review the alleged inadequacy of the trial court's written order of revocation was apparently based on the majority's agreement with Helton's argument that he could not be required to object in the trial court to the inadequacy of the court's written revocation order when that order was not entered until after his revocation hearing.

Armstrong requires that an order revoking probation must be written and must set forth the evidence relied upon, as well as the reason for the revocation in order for due process requirements to be met. See Wyatt v. State, 608 So.2d 763 (Ala. 1992); Miller v. State, 611 So.2d 434 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). These requirements offer the probationer some protection from an abuse of discretion by the trial court, aids an appellate court in reviewing a revocation, and prevents future revocations based on the same conduct.

PATTERSON, Judge. On August 21, 1992, we remanded this case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to file a written statement of the reasons for and the evidence relied upon in its order revoking the probationary period of the appellant's split sentence and ordering him to serve his original sentence. 611 So.2d 434. The trial court has complied with our instructions and has filed a return with this court, stating its reasons for revoking the appellant's probation and the evidence relied upon in doing so. Thus, the judgment of the trial court revoking the probationary portion of the appellant's split sentence and ordering that the original 10-year sentence be put into effect is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.