Opinion
Civil Action 1:21-cv-03436-RM-SKC
03-06-2023
JACK L. MILLER III, Plaintiff, v. SGT. MEDINA, and SGT. LILES, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. 25]
S. KATO CREWS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
While Plaintiff Jack L. Miller III, an incarcerated person, was locked down in his cell on December 25, 2020, four other incarcerated persons refused to lock down until they could speak with a shift commander to address discriminatory practices in the Buena Vista Correctional Facility. [Dkt. 1 at p.4.] Defendant Liles allegedly got into a verbal altercation with one of the individuals and called Defendant Medina and others to assist him. [Id.] Defendants Liles and Medina, and other officers, began to deploy pepper spray throughout Plaintiff's unit. [Id.] According to the Complaint, despite not being outnumbered, the officers continued to unnecessarily spray the chemicals in excess causing Plaintiff to asphyxiate. [Id.]
Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting Defendants Liles and Medina violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of the excessive use of force.He seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief. [Id. at p.8.] Defendants move for partial dismissal of Plaintiff's claims based on lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.[Dkt. 25.] Plaintiff did not file a response opposing the Motion.
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court liberally construes his pleadings, but it does not act as his advocate. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against them in their individual capacities. [Dkt. 25 at p.3 n.3.]
The Motion is before this Court on referral. [Dkt. 26.] The Court has considered the Complaint [Dkt. 1], Defendants' Motion, and the applicable law. The Court has construed Plaintiff's pro se filings liberally, as the Court must. No hearing is necessary. For the following reasons, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants seek dismissal, in part, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts must have a specific legal basis for their jurisdiction. See Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994)). The determination of a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Madsen v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 1011, 1012 (10th Cir. 1987). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). “The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
Defendants also contend, under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege his entitlement to the injunctive relief he seeks. In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). The Court is not, however, “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff purports to assert his claims against Liles and Medina in both their individual and official capacities. “An official capacity claim against a government officer is really a claim against the government that employs that officer.” Strepka v. Miller, 28 Fed.Appx. 823, 828 (10th Cir. 2001). Consequently, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Liles and Medina are really claims against the Colorado Department of Corrections, which is an arm of the state. Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1134 (D. Colo. 2010) (the Colorado CDOC is an arm of the state and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.)
The Eleventh Amendment, however, “has been interpreted to bar suits against states and state agencies for money damages in federal court.” Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 2008). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages from Liles and Medina in their official capacities, the Court recommends these claims be dismissed-they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and no exception under Ex parte Young applies because the Complaint cannot be liberally construed to plausibly plead an ongoing violation of federal law or entitlement to prospective relief.
B. Injunctive Relief
In his request for relief, Plaintiff also seeks an “elaborate, detailed, comprehensive injunction concerning future use of [pepper spray]/chemical agents in [the] Colorado Correctional System.” [Dkt. 1 at p.8.] Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants Liles or Medina have any responsibility for developing or enforcing policies regarding chemical agents. To be sure, the Colorado legislature has given the executive director of the CDOC that authority. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17-1-103(1)(a.5) (develop policies and procedures governing the operation of the department). “[W]hen a state law explicitly empowers one set of officials to enforce its terms, a plaintiff cannot sue a different official absent some evidence that the defendant is connected to the enforcement of the challenged law.” Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013). Because Plaintiff has alleged no such connection, his request for injunctive relief should also be dismissed.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS the Partial Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 25] be GRANTED.
ADVISEMENT
The parties have 14 days after service of this recommendation to serve and file any written objections to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).