Opinion
May 13, 1929.
Appeals — Decree nisi — Bulk Sales Act of May 23, 1919, P. L. 262 — Interlocutory order.
1. The Bulk Sales Act of May 23, 1919, P. L. 262, has no special provision for appeals. Cases arising under the act are subject to the general rule that decided points must wait the final conclusion of all matters involved before an appeal lies.
2. Where a decree in proceedings under the act shows that things yet remain to be done which may give rise to new points for judicial determination before the case is finally determined, an appeal from such decree is premature and will be quashed.
3. Where, in proceedings under the Act of 1919, the court enters a decree declaring a sale fraudulent and determining "the fair value of the goods," and names a future day for the vendor's creditors to present their claims, and thereafter, on exceptions, without changing the findings of facts or conclusions of law, fixes by decree a later date for presenting claims, such decree is not a final one from which an appeal lies.
Appeal, No. 101, March T., 1929, by defendants, from decree of C. P. Allegheny Co., in proceedings under the Bulk Sales Act of May 23, 1929, P. L. 262, in case of C. S. Miller v. E. A. Myers et al., doing business as E. A. Myers Sons. Appeal quashed.
Proceedings under the Bulk Sales Act of May 23, 1919, P. L. 262.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Exceptions to decree declaring sale fraudulent and fixing fair value of goods.
Decree entered fixing later date for presenting claims. Defendant appealed.
Motion to quash appeal.
Error assigned was decree fixing later date for presenting claims, quoting record.
This appeal, by the defendants, is from a decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, sitting in equity, which declared a sale fraudulent under the Bulk Sales Act of May 23, 1919, P. L. 262, and, in accord therewith, held appellants liable as receivers to the creditors of the vendors. A decree nisi determined, inter alia, "the fair value" of the goods in controversy, as the act requires shall be done, and named a future day for the vendors' creditors to present their claims. Certain exceptions to the decree were sustained, and, without formally changing the findings of fact or the conclusions of law thus affected, the court fixed a later date for presenting claims. This, the last order entered, was merely an amendment of the former decree nisi; it does not appear to be a final decree, and for this reason appellee has moved to quash the appeal therefrom.
Appellants mention the Act of March 30, 1921, P. L. 60, as their authority for appealing from such decree, but no accounting is ordered by the decree and, plainly, no accounting of the character contemplated by the Act of 1921 is involved. Finally, the Bulk Sales Act of 1919 has no special provision for appeals. Cases arising under that statute are subject to the general rule that decided points must await the final conclusion of all matters involved before an appeal lies. Here, from the decree itself, it is apparent that things yet remain to be done, which may give rise to new points for judicial determination, before this case is finally concluded; hence the present appeal is premature.
The motion before us is sustained, and the appeal is quashed.