Summary
In Miller v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 288 A.D.2d 72, 733 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1st Dep't 2001), and Jacobs v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., 7 A.D.3d 312, 776 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 2004), the New York Appellate Division clarified the fine line separating honest and defamatory job references that can form the basis for tortious interference claims.
Summary of this case from Raedle v. Credit Agricole IndosuezOpinion
November 15, 2001.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marilyn Shafer, J.), entered on or about December 20, 2000, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211, dismissing plaintiff's complaint for tortious interference with employment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
William H. Kaiser, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ricki E. Roer, for defendants-respondents.
Before: Sullivan, P.J., Mazzarelli, Wallach, Rubin, Friedman, JJ.
Plaintiff's employment contract with Elmhurst Hospital, purportedly rescinded after defendant Iona Siegal, plaintiff's former supervisor, met with plaintiff's future supervisor, was undisputedly terminable at will, and, as such, contemplated prospective contractual relations only. This being the case, the purported contract cannot support a claim for tortious interference with an existing contract (see, Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 193; see also, Snyder v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 294, 299-300). Nor does plaintiff state any claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations since there is no allegation that plaintiff's purported prospective contractual relations were interfered with by "wrongful means" as described in Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Corp., (50 N.Y.2d, supra, at 191). It was altogether reasonable for plaintiff's future supervisor to speak with her former supervisor at defendant Mt. Sinai about plaintiff's work performance. That Siegal may have given plaintiff a negative job reference or did not believe plaintiff to be a qualified candidate for the position did not constitute interference by "wrongful means". In addition, inasmuch as plaintiff concedes that Siegel's complained of conduct was within the scope of her employment duties, plaintiff has failed to allege, as she must to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations, that the sole purpose for Siegel's "interference" was to harm her (Alvord Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 281-282; see also,Slifer-Weickel, Inc. v. Meteor Skelly, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 320, 322).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.