Opinion
B297368
08-17-2021
In re Marriage of AIMEE and BRUCE MILLER. AIMEE MILLER, Respondent, v. BRUCE MILLER, Appellant.
Stolar & Associates, Steven R. Stolar and Vardui Rose Barsamyan for Appellant. James Alex Karagianides for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD574288, Christine Byrd, Judge. Affirmed.
Stolar & Associates, Steven R. Stolar and Vardui Rose Barsamyan for Appellant.
James Alex Karagianides for Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Appellant Bruce Miller (Bruce) appeals from a judgment entered after trial in this marital dissolution action. He argues, first, that the trial court erred in the manner in which it offset credits awarded to him for using his separate property to make payments on the family home (so-called Epstein credits) from the amount he owed to the community for his exclusive postseparation use of the home (so-called Watts charges). Second, he contends that the court abused its discretion in setting child support and calculating arrears. Third, he asserts that the court erred when it awarded 100 percent of a community investment to respondent Aimee Miller (Aimee) after finding that Bruce diverted and hid funds.
For ease of identification, we refer to the parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 (Epstein).
In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366 (Watts).
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The Marriage and Relevant Community Assets
Bruce and Aimee were married in April 1997. They had two children together, Holden (born Oct. 1997) and Alyssa (born Mar. 2003).
In 1999, Aimee and Bruce purchased a family home located on Rexford Drive in Beverly Hills (the Rexford home). The purchase was financed in part by a separate property contribution by Aimee, as well as a loan secured by a first deed of trust.
During the marriage, Bruce became involved in a real estate investment entity, Maryland Gardens Investors, LLC (Maryland Gardens), which acquired, improved, and ultimately sold an apartment complex in Arizona. To fund the investment, Bruce persuaded Aimee to take out a loan for $750,000 secured by a second deed of trust on the Rexford home (the Scapa loan). In 2012, Bruce extended the Scapa loan, thus increasing it to $910,000.
The Maryland Gardens apartment complex was damaged in a hailstorm. The damage resulted in an insurance settlement that netted at least $522,182.
In 2014, Bruce received over $1,000,000 from the sale of the Maryland Gardens investment.
II. Petition for Dissolution of Marriage
Aimee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in November 2012. The parties separated on August 15, 2013.
On September 6, 2013, the trial court issued an order giving Bruce “the exclusive temporary use, possession, custody and control” of the Rexford home. The following month, the parties stipulated that child and spousal support issues were reserved until the time of trial and that any support order would be retroactive to October 2013.
Aimee had moved out of the Rexford home in August 2013.
III. Trial
A bench trial took place in July and August 2018. By stipulation, the trial court was to decide (1) the characterization, valuation, and division of community property and debts; (2) requests for reimbursement; (3) claims of breach of fiduciary duties; (4) child support and arrears; (5) spousal support; and (6) requests for attorney's fees.
The following summarizes the trial evidence relevant to our analysis.
A. Aimee's testimony
Aimee testified that she asked Bruce “[m]any times” for information related to the Scapa loan during the period between 2010 to 2014, but that he did not give it to her. Aimee denied that she signed the Scapa loan extension and claimed that she only received the document through a third-party subpoena. She also denied that damage to Maryland Gardens had been disclosed to her. Nor did Bruce provide her with complete information regarding the sale and sale proceeds of the Maryland Gardens investment.
B. Bruce's testimony
Bruce claimed that he disclosed relevant documents regarding the Maryland Gardens sale to Aimee. Bruce similarly claimed that he disclosed all relevant bank accounts reflecting Maryland Gardens transactions, but he was unable to identify any such disclosures.
C. Life insurance broker's testimony
William Patterson (Patterson), a life insurance broker, testified regarding three $5 million life insurance policies that he sold to Bruce. Patterson claimed that he “advanced the money” for Bruce to pay the premiums.
Patterson provided a cashier's check to Bruce on January 4, 2013, in the amount of $122,750. Bruce wrote a check for the same amount on the same day to an insurance company.
Patterson provided another cashier's check to Bruce on March 18, 2013, in the amount of $128,600. Bruce wrote a check for the same amount to an insurance company.
Patterson provided yet another cashier's check to Bruce on April 8, 2014, in the amount of $142,700. Bruce wrote a check for the same amount to an insurance company.
According to Patterson, Bruce did not owe or pay Patterson any money or interest for Patterson advancing the funds. Patterson explained that, as the broker, he could not pay the premiums directly to the insurance companies. He claimed that he made money on the deals because his “commission was 120 percent of the premium.”
D. Forensic document examiner's testimony
Bart Baggett testified as an expert in forensic document examination. He opined that it was “highly probable” that Aimee did not sign several documents he reviewed, including those in connection with the Scapa loan extension.
E. Forensic accountant reports
Michael Krycler (Krycler), a certified public accountant retained by Aimee, testified as an expert in forensic accounting, including in business valuations in family law matters. Krycler analyzed the gross cash flow available for support by each party from 2013 to trial and calculated support using DissoMaster for each year. Reports documenting this analysis were introduced as evidence during the trial.
“DissoMaster is a computer software program widely used by courts to set child support and temporary spousal support.” (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1578, fn. 4.)
IV. Judgment
The trial court issued its statement of decision on October 26, 2018. Bruce's objections to the statement of decision were overruled. On March 1, 2019, the court entered the judgment of dissolution. The judgment fully incorporated the findings of the statement of decision.
The following summarizes the judgment's findings and orders relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
A. Credibility
The trial court found Bruce's “testimony entirely lacking in credibility on the material issues....” The court cited Bruce's “evasiveness when testifying, the contradictions between his testimony and the financial documents obtained under subpoenas to third parties, his violations of his disclosure obligation..., his misrepresentations in declarations regarding his financial situation, and the absence of evidence to support or to corroborate his testimony regarding financial dealings with” various individuals.
B. The Rexford home
Bruce had exclusive use and occupancy of the Rexford home, which was community property, for 58 months as of the conclusion of the trial in August 2018. The trial court found that the fair market rental value of the Rexford home was $11,050 per month. Accordingly, Bruce owed $640,900 in Watts charges to the community for his exclusive use and possession of the property. Bruce was entitled to Epstein credits in the amount of $408,088 for his postseparation payments of mortgages, property taxes, and homeowner's insurance.
The trial court ordered Bruce to pay Aimee “$116,406 from his share of the sale proceeds [of the Rexford home] for his half share of the Watts charges and Epstein [c]redits he owe[d] the community as of August 2018.”
C. Maryland Gardens
The trial court found that Bruce had sufficient funds to pay off the $750,000 Scapa loan for the Maryland Gardens project during its initial term. Instead of paying off the loan, Bruce obtained an extension of the loan, which increased it to $910,000. By extending the loan, Bruce breached his fiduciary duty to Aimee and to the community. The court ordered Bruce to reimburse Aimee $80,000-her half of the additional $160,000 obligation caused by the extension.
The trial court also found that Bruce diverted and hid $1,224,549 in community funds from the Maryland Gardens project. “The funds were diverted while the project was active, when the respective property was sold and also when the insurance claim relating to the damage to the... apartment complex was settled. [Bruce] hid the diverted funds from the community by placing the funds in bank accounts that he controlled but never disclosed in this action.” Finding that Bruce breached his fiduciary duty to the community and that Aimee “proved by clear and convincing evidence that [Bruce] was guilty of oppression, fraud and malice with respect to the Maryland Gardens investment[, ]” the court awarded 100 percent of the $1,224,549 community investment to Aimee.
D. Funds from Patterson
Before separation, Bruce purchased three, five-year life insurance policies. Bruce failed to disclose these policies. Patterson, the insurance broker selling the policies, claimed that “he was merely ‘financing' the premium by advancing the funds to the insured.”
The trial court rejected the notion that Patterson was merely “advancing the funds to” Bruce. Rather, the court found that Patterson “was actually giving the funds outright and not requiring [Bruce] to pay them back.”
E. Child support and arrears
The trial court accepted the analysis and DissoMaster reports prepared by Krycler, Aimee's forensic accountant. The court ordered Bruce to pay $633,032 plus legal interest in child support arrears as of July 31, 2018. Commencing August 1, 2018, Bruce was ordered to pay $34,451 per month in child support for Alyssa.
By that time, the parties' son, Holden, was no longer a minor.
V. Appeal
Bruce timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Charges and Credits for Bruce's Use of the Rexford Home
Bruce does not challenge the trial court's calculation of $640,900 in Watts charges for Bruce's exclusive use and occupancy of the Rexford home or $408,088 in Epstein credits for Bruce's home-related payments. Rather, Bruce contends that the court erred by deducting 100 percent of the Epstein credits from 100 percent of the Watts charges to find that he owed the community $232,812 and ordering him to pay Aimee half of that amount ($116,406). He argues that the court should have deducted 100 percent of the Epstein credits from 50 percent of the Watts charges, such that Aimee owes him money.
We disagree.
A. Relevant law
If one spouse has exclusive use of a community asset during the time between separation and the dissolution trial, the trial court may assess Watts charges against that spouse “‘“for the reasonable value of that use.”'” (In re Marriage of Mohler (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 788, 796-797 (Mohler).) “The reverse of the Watts charge concept is the ‘Epstein credit,' whereby a spouse who uses his or her separate property to pay a community obligation may seek reimbursement from the community estate. [Citation.] ‘Watts charges' collect from a spouse for use of property; ‘Epstein credits' repay the spouse for a payment.” (Mohler, supra, at p. 797, fn. 4.)
Watts charges are paid by a spouse to the community, while Epstein credits are paid from the community to a spouse. (In re Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 548, 553 (Jeffries).)
B. Standard of review
Because this issue involves the application of law to undisputed facts, our review is de novo. (Martinez v. Brownco Construction Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014, 1018.)
C. Analysis
By failing to provide any legal authority in support, Bruce has forfeited the argument that he should be held responsible for only 50 percent of the Watts charges but should reap 100 percent of the Epstein credits. (In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 244, 255 (Carlisle) [“‘The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as' forfeited”]; In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 227 (Davila and Mejia) [“‘Issues not supported by citation to legal authority are subject to forfeiture[]'”].)
Forfeiture aside, Bruce's contention fails on the merits. Watts charges are to be paid to the community by the spouse using the community asset, while Epstein credits are to be paid by the community to the spouse who paid community expenses. (Jeffries, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 553.) That is exactly what happened here.
Bruce owed 100 percent of the Watts charges ($640,900) to the community. After all, Bruce had 100 percent exclusive use of the Rexford home. Bruce was entitled to 100 percent of the Epstein credits ($408,088) from the community. After offsetting the Epstein credits from the Watts charges, Bruce still owed the community $232,812.
The trial court properly ordered Bruce to pay Aimee $116,406-that is, half of his remaining obligation to the community. This is entirely consistent with the requirement that, upon the dissolution of marriage, the court “divide the community estate of the parties equally.” (Fam. Code, § 2550.)
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. Child Support
Bruce argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adhere to statutory guidelines when it set child support and child support arrears. Several of his specific objections have been forfeited based on Bruce's failure to raise them in the trial court. The remainder fail on the merits.
A. Relevant law
“Statutory guidelines regulate the determination of child support in California.” (In re Marriage of Schlafly (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 747, 753.) In implementing these guidelines, courts are required to adhere to certain principles, including that (1) “[a] parent's first and principal obligation is to support the parent's minor children according to the parent's circumstances and station in life”; (2) “[b]oth parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children”; (3) “each parent's actual income and level of responsibility for the children” should be taken into account; (4) “[e]ach parent should pay for the support of the children according to the parent's ability”; and (5) “[c]hildren should share in the standard of living of both parents.” (§ 4053, subds. (a)-(d) & (f).)
Section 4055 establishes a formula that trial courts must use to calculate child support. (In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1312 (Williamson).) The amount of child support set by this guideline formula is presumptively correct. (§§ 4053, subd. (k), 4057, subd. (a).)
The formula “takes into account both parents' ‘net monthly disposable income' (§ 4055, subds. (a) & (b)), which is determined based upon the parents' ‘annual gross income' (§ 4058).” (In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 731 (Alter).) With certain exceptions, “annual gross income... means income from whatever source derived[.]” (§ 4058, subd. (a).) In this context, “‘income' should be broadly defined while the exclusions are specific and must be narrowly construed.” (Alter, supra, at p. 732.)
Loans, which carry an expectation of repayment, are generally not considered income under section 4058. (See Williamson, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312 [“‘Loans' are not included as a possible source” of income in section 4058, subdivision (a)]; In re Marriage of Rocha (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 514, 517-518 (Rocha) [student loans, which carry an expectation of repayment, are not income under section 4058].)
Income also includes that obtained “from the proprietorship of a business, such as gross receipts from the business reduced by expenditures required for the operation of the business.” (§ 4058, subd. (a)(2).)
B. Standard of review
“Child support awards are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] In conducting this review, appellate courts determine whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion-that is, whether any judge reasonably could have made such an order.” (In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1038-1039.)
C. Analysis
1. Forfeiture
“[T]o conserve judicial resources, any errors must be brought to the trial court's attention at the trial level while the error can still be expeditiously corrected.” (In re Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 144.) If a party fails to raise a specific objection to the computation of child support in the trial court, the challenge is forfeited on appeal and need not be considered by the Court of Appeal. (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 738; In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002.)
Several of the arguments raised by Bruce on appeal regarding the calculation of child support were not presented to the trial court. Accordingly, we will not consider for the first time on appeal Bruce's claims that the court erred by considering sporadic gifts from his sister as income, double counting some income for 2018, categorizing nontaxable income as taxable, and using an unrepresentative sample of his income from 2018.
Although Bruce did argue below that certain funds received from his sister were loans-distinguishable from gifts-and should not have been considered as income, he has forfeited his appellate challenge on this ground because his briefing offers no argument or citation to authority to support his characterization of the payments as loans. (Carlisle, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 255; Davila and Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 227.)
2. Funds from Patterson
Two payments from Patterson, the life insurance broker, to Bruce were included in the cash flow analysis incorporated into the judgment: $106,700 in 2013 and $142,700 in 2014. Bruce contends that the trial court erred by considering these payments as income instead of loans.
The $106,700 figure is less than the two payments Bruce actually received from Patterson in 2013 for $122,750 and $128,600. Any error in this respect benefitted Bruce and is not prejudicial. (See S.P. v. F.G. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 921, 931 [“A child support award will not be overturned absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudicial error”].)
Loans carry an expectation of repayment and, unless forgiven, are generally not considered a form of income under section 4058. (See Williamson, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312; Rocha, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 517-518.) But Patterson's payments to Bruce bear no resemblance to any conventional loan. Indeed, the trial court made a factual finding that Patterson did not merely finance the premiums by advancing the funds but “was actually giving the funds outright and not requiring [Bruce] to pay them back.”
The trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence. Patterson provided Bruce with cashier's checks that Bruce deposited into his bank account. Bruce then wrote checks from his bank account to the insurance companies for the same amount that Patterson had given him. Patterson, in turn, benefited by receiving commission of 120 percent of the premiums paid to the insurance company. But, as Patterson admitted, Bruce did not need to pay Patterson back or pay any interest for the funds. Indeed, Bruce did not give Patterson any money in return for the large sums of money that Patterson gave him.
Bruce has failed to establish an abuse of the trial court's discretion in declining to view the payments by Patterson as loans.
Bruce insists that the funds from Patterson “were and could only be considered a loan.” By failing to raise it, Bruce has forfeited any argument that the payments were irregularly occurring gifts improperly categorized as income. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 [“issues not addressed as error in a party's opening brief with legal analysis and citation to authority are forfeited”].)
3. Use of negative monthly income
Bruce also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by using a negative figure for Aimee's 2018 average monthly income, which took into consideration Aimee's substantial business losses and debts.
As an example of income, section 4058 specifically identifies “[i]ncome from the proprietorship of a business, such as gross receipts from the business reduced by expenditures required for the operation of the business.” (§ 4058, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) Bruce acknowledges this but maintains that, as a matter of public policy, he should not have to finance Aimee's business losses. He asserts that a court may only consider an income value of zero or greater and can never use a negative figure. Bruce relies solely on In re Marriage of Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626 (Sorge) for this proposition.
In Sorge, a mother sought to modify a father's child support obligation. (Sorge, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) The parties' jointly retained expert prepared a report that presented the father's income in two different ways. (Id. at pp. 634-635.) The first included the father's net losses from several startup companies that he founded; the second excluded those losses. (Ibid.) When losses were included, the father had a net monthly loss of $9,100 in 2007, and a net monthly loss of $235,600 in 2008-that is, a negative income. (Id. at pp. 635-636.) When losses were excluded, the father had a positive net monthly income of $320,800 in 2007 and $229,100 in 2008. (Ibid.)
The trial court in Sorge declined to consider the father's business losses in determining his income for purposes of calculating child support, and increased his child support obligation. (Sorge, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 636, 640.) The trial court noted that the father “maintained ‘an affluent, even wealthy lifestyle despite those business losses, '” including owning multiple homes and using private jets for international travel. (Id. at p. 639.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in determining the father's income. (Sorge, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 638.) The trial court had properly exercised its discretion to consider the father's earning capacity in calculating child support under section 4058, subdivision (b), rather than his actual income under section 4058, subdivision (a). (Sorge, supra, at pp. 638, 644-649.)
Not only is Sorge factually distinguishable, but it simply does not stand for the proposition that Bruce attributes to it. The Court of Appeal did not hold that a negative income figure arising from a parent's business losses can never be used to determine guideline support.
Bruce has failed to establish an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Including a negative figure for a spouse's income, if based on legitimate business expenditures, is consistent with the principles underlying the statutory child support guidelines, including that “each parent's actual income” should be considered and that “[e]ach parent should pay for the support of the children according to the parent's ability.” (§ 4053, subds. (c) & (d).)
Bruce does not argue that the negative income figure for Aimee was obtained by deducting expenses not required for the operation of her business.
III. Award of the Maryland Gardens Investment to Aimee
Finally, Bruce asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded 100 percent of the Maryland Gardens community investment ($1,224,549) to Aimee. He argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's finding that he failed to disclose the asset, diverted funds, or that the asset was worth the amount awarded to Aimee.
We find sufficient support in the record for the trial court's findings and conclude that the remedy selected by the court was not an abuse of discretion.
A. Relevant law
During marriage and pending dissolution, spouses owe fiduciary duties to each other in relation to community assets. (§§ 721, 1100, 2102.) This includes “a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” (§ 721, subd. (b).)
“[A]ccountability for the management of community assets is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary duties owed between spouses.” (In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1269 (Margulis).) Until a final division of property occurs, each spouse has “the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest....” (§ 1100, subd. (e).) A spouse managing a community asset is obligated “to disclose soon after separation all the property that belongs or might belong to the community, and its value, and then to account for the management of that property, revealing any material changes in the community estate, such as the transfer or loss of assets.” (Margulis, supra, at p. 1271, italics added.)
Section 1101 provides specific remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty between spouses. (Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270.) These remedies “include a mandatory award of 50 percent ‘of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs....' (§ 1101, subd. (g).) If the nondisclosure or wrongful disposition of community property ‘falls within the ambit' of Civil Code section 3294 (punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice), the court must award to the injured spouse the entire value of the asset (§ 1101, subd. (h)).” (Margulis, supra, at p. 1270.)
When awarding either 50 or 100 percent of the undisclosed or wrongfully transferred asset, “the trial court must value the assets at the highest of three possible dates: ‘... the date of the breach of the fiduciary duty, the date of the sale or disposition of the asset, or the date of the award by the court.' (§ 1101, subd. (g).)” (Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.)
The severe sanction set forth in section 1101, subdivision (h)-100 percent of the concealed asset-“serves an important purpose: full disclosure of marital assets is absolutely essential to the trial court in determining the proper [disposition] of property and resolving support issues.” (In re Marriage of Rossi (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 34, 42.)
B. Standards of review
We review the trial court's factual finding that Bruce breached his fiduciary duty “for substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision.” (In re Marriage of Kamgar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 (Kamgar).) Because a finding that Bruce's conduct involved oppression, fraud, or malice within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294 must be made by clear and convincing evidence, “the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
We review the trial court's decision concerning the appropriate remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty for an abuse of discretion. (Kamgar, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 150.)
C. Analysis
The trial court found that Bruce breached his fiduciary duty to the community by diverting and hiding funds from the Maryland Gardens project and that his conduct constituted fraud, oppression, and malice. On that basis, it awarded Aimee 100 percent of the community investment.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings. As shown by Aimee's trial testimony, as well as that of the forensic document examiner, Bruce failed to disclose, or actively concealed, information about Maryland Gardens. Bruce concealed the unnecessary $160,000 Scapa loan extension in 2012, using Aimee's forged signature. Bruce also failed to disclose the details regarding hailstorm damage to Maryland Gardens, which later netted approximately $522,182 in insurance settlement proceeds. Nor did Bruce fully apprise Aimee regarding the sale of Maryland Gardens.
Rather than acknowledging this evidence, Bruce points to trial exhibits that he claims prove that he disclosed the proceeds from the Maryland Gardens sale and insurance settlement. These exhibits include income and expense declarations submitted by Bruce in 2016 and 2017. That Bruce eventually made some disclosures-years after the transactions in question-does not exonerate his failure to disclose “soon after separation” and to account for “any material changes in the community estate, such as the transfer or loss of assets.” (Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271.)
Nor do the documents produced by Bruce in 2014, following a court order, conclusively refute the competing evidence of Bruce's breach of his fiduciary duty. “‘When a trial court's factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.'” (In re Marriage of Goodwin-Mitchell & Mitchell (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 232, 238-239.)
Finally, Bruce claims that the trial court's “award of $1,224,549 was for funds that did not even exist” given various liabilities associated with Maryland Gardens. Bruce fails to acknowledge that, for purposes of an award under section 1101, subdivision (h), “the trial court must value the asset[] at the highest of three possible dates: ‘... the date of the breach of the fiduciary duty, the date of the sale or disposition of the asset, or the date of the award by the court.' (§ 1101, subd. (g).)” (Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.) Bruce merely mentions various proceeds and encumbrances-with no specific citations to the voluminous record-but does not provide us with any clear alternative valuation of the investment at the three dates identified above. Bruce has thus failed to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's error or abuse of discretion in setting the award, which is his burden as the appellant. (In re Marriage of Gray (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 974, 978.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Aimee is entitled to her costs on appeal.
We concur: LUI, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.