Opinion
No. 13-10-19.
Dated: September 7, 2010.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} This appeal, having been placed on the regular calendar, is sua sponte being assigned and considered on the accelerated calendar pursuant to App. R. 11.1(E) and Loc. R. 12. This decision is therefore rendered by summary judgment entry, which is only controlling as between the parties to this action and not subject to publication or citation as legal authority under Rule 3 of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Decisions.{¶ 2} Plaintiff-Appellant, George A. Miller, appeals the judgment of the Municipal Court of Tiffin, Seneca County, Civil Division, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Joseph Kinn. On appeal, Miller argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Kinn's motion for summary judgment in consolidated cases 13-10-19 and 13-10-20. Based upon the following, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} The following are the background facts pertinent to the case sub judice. In 2004, Miller filed a complaint against Kinn alleging that he had failed to pay back a loan of $6,040; that, shortly thereafter, Kinn filed a petition for a civil stalking protection order (hereinafter "CPO") against Miller; that, in January 2005, the parties entered into a consent order in the CPO case whereby Miller agreed to remain 500 feet away from Kinn and not to harass him; that, in January 2005, Kinn filed a motion for contempt against Miller claiming that he had violated the CPO by coming within 500 feet of him and by placing a sexually explicit card on the windshield of his car; that, in February 2005, the parties entered into and signed a "Mutual General Release, Agreement, and Apology" (hereinafter "the release"), which resolved both the complaint concerning the loan and the motion for contempt concerning the CPO, and provided, in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, Petitioner/Defendant, Joseph A. Kinn, and Respondent/Plaintiff, George A. Miller, have agreed to compromise and settle all the said controversies and differences as follows:
1. Defendant, Joseph A. Kinn, is relieved from all liability to Plaintiff, George A. Miller, and all related entities, his heirs, successors, and assigns as stated in the Complaint filed on October 13, 2004, in Tiffin Municipal Court Case Number CVF 0400621. * * *
2. Petitioner, Joseph A. Kinn, shall dismiss with prejudice his Motion for Rule of Contempt filed against Respondent, George A. Miller, on January 21, 2005 * * *
3. Petitioner, Joseph A. Kinn, shall not pursue any action(s), either civil or criminal, against Respondent, George A. Miller, as a result of any behavior and/or actions of Respondent, George A. Miller, that took place on or before the date of the signing of this agreement.
WHEREAS, Petitioner/Defendant, Joseph A. Kinn, and Respondent/Plaintiff, George A. Miller, for themselves, their successors, agents, servants, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge each other, and their heirs, successors, agents, servants, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, expenses and compensation whatsoever which the undersigned now have or which may hereafter accrue with regard to any actions between the undersigned parties, their heirs, successors, and assigns arising out of the said controversy or related controversies.
IT IS FURTHER AGREED, neither Joseph A. Kinn, George A. Miller, nor anyone claiming through them, after execution of this Release, will bring, commence, prosecute, or maintain or cause to be brought, commenced, prosecuted or maintained, any suit or action, either at law or at equity, in any court of Ohio or elsewhere, arising out of these controversies or related controversies. * * *
(Feb. 2005 Mutual General Release, Agreement, and Apology, p. 1). Thereafter, in October 2005, Kinn filed another contempt motion against Miller for violating the CPO on two different occasions. In April 2006, the trial court found Miller in contempt of the CPO. Soon after, in June 2006, Miller filed a motion for relief from judgment under Civ. R. 60(B), arguing that the release had estopped the filing of any subsequent motions for contempt, which the trial court denied in August 2006. In its August 2006 decision denying Miller's Civ. R. 60(B) motion, the trial court found that "[t]he release does not apply prospectively." (Aug. 2006 Journal Entry, p. 2). The record does not demonstrate that Miller appealed the trial court's August 2006 decision.
{¶ 4} In January 2007, in case number 13-10-19, Miller filed a complaint against Kinn contending that the February 2005 release provided that the parties would release each other from any and all claims, actions, or causes of action arising out of the controversy at issue or related controversies; that the release further provided that neither party would bring a cause, suit, or action in any Ohio court arising out of the controversy at issue or related controversies; that the plain language of the release estopped the filing of any motions for contempt or related actions by Kinn; that Kinn violated the agreement by filing a motion for contempt against Miller after the parties signed the release; and, that Kinn also violated the agreement by falsely accusing Miller of violating the agreement.
Case 13-10-19 corresponds to Tiffin Municipal Court case CVH 0700014.
{¶ 5} Shortly thereafter, Kinn filed a response, asserting as affirmative defenses that Miller's claim was barred by res judicata, and, that, if the release had prospective application as Miller alleged, it would also have barred Miller from filing the complaint.
{¶ 6} In April 2007, Kinn filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56, alleging that the release unambiguously had no prospective application, as it provided that "Petitioner, Joseph A. Kinn, shall not pursue any action(s), either civil or criminal, against Respondent, George A. Miller, that took place on or before the date of the signing [February 14, 2005] of this agreement." (Emphasis added). Alternatively, Kinn alleged that Miller's complaint was barred by res judicata, as the same argument had been made and rejected by the trial court involving the same CPO, the same release, and the same parties. Finally, Kinn disputed that he made any false accusation against Miller, but alleged that, nevertheless, the release did not prohibit him from making false accusations.
{¶ 7} In August 2008, in case 13-10-20, Miller filed another complaint against Kinn contending that the parties had signed a "Settlement Agreement and Release" (hereinafter "settlement agreement") in November 2004 that required Kinn to repay Miller $5,940 and prohibited Kinn from filing any further legal actions against Miller, and that Kinn had violated the terms of the settlement agreement by filing numerous legal actions against Miller. Thereafter, the trial court consolidated cases 13-10-19 and 13-10-20 for trial and Kinn's pending motion for summary judgment.
Case 13-10-20 corresponds to Tiffin Municipal Court case CVF 08000682.
{¶ 8} In April 2010, the trial court granted Kinn's motion for summary judgment and dismissed consolidated cases 13-10-19 and 13-10-20.
{¶ 9} It is from this judgment that Miller appeals, presenting the following assignment of error for our review. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
{¶ 10} In his sole assignment of error, Miller argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Kinn's favor. Specifically, Miller contends that the plain language of the release prohibited Kinn from taking any new legal action against him; that his complaint was not barred by res judicata because the issues on the matter had not yet been litigated; and, that the release prohibited Kinn from causing Miller to incur costs and expenses, which necessarily included any false accusations made by Kinn that caused him to incur attorney fees.
{¶ 11} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment order de novo. Hillyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. Accordingly, a reviewing court will not reverse an otherwise correct judgment merely because the lower court utilized different or erroneous reasons as the basis for its determination. Diamond Wine Spirits, Inc. v. Dayton Heidelberg Distr. Co., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 222, 1994-Ohio-92. Summary judgment is appropriate when, looking at the evidence as a whole: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made; and, therefore, (3) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ. R. 56(C); Horton v. Harwich Chemical Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 686-687, 1995-Ohio-286. If any doubts exist, the issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-59, 1992-Ohio-95.
{¶ 12} The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 1996-Ohio-107. In doing so, the moving party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must identify those portions of the record which affirmatively support its argument. Id. at 292. The nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. Id.; Civ. R. 56(E).
{¶ 13} Initially, we will address Kinn's assertion that Miller's claim was barred by res judicata, and, as such, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
{¶ 14} The doctrine of res judicata involves both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, overruled on other grounds by Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 1995-Ohio-331. The doctrine of issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, "holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different." Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 1998-Ohio-435, citing Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299.
{¶ 15} Here, in August 2006, the trial court interpreted the same February 2005 release at issue in the case sub judice and specifically found that, "[t]he release does not apply prospectively." (Aug. 2006 Journal Entry, p. 2). Although this decision regarded a prior contempt action of Kinn against Miller for violation of the CPO, the fact of whether the release applied prospectively was directly at issue in that prior action, and was determined by the trial court at that time. Therefore, although the case sub judice is a subsequent action between the parties concerning the CPO, we find that Miller's claim was barred by res judicata and was properly dismissed by the trial court.
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we overrule Miller's assignment of error.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, it is the order of this Court that the Judgment Entry of the Municipal Court of Tiffin, Seneca County, Civil Division, be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs are assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. This cause is remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.
{¶ 18} It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this judgment entry to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App. R. 27, and serve a copy of this judgment entry on each party to the proceedings and note the date of service in the docket as prescribed by App. R. 30.