Miller v. Irwin

10 Citing cases

  1. Ahmed v. H E Transport, Inc.

    06 CV 2938 (CLP) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2008)   Cited 6 times
    Denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff's claim of serious injury was supported by objective medical evidence

    See, e.g., Gross v. Marc, 2 A.D.3d 681, 681, 768 N.Y.S.2d 627, 627 (2d Dep't 2003) (citing Benyarko v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 162 A.D.2d 572, 573, 556 N.Y.S.2d 761, 761-62 (2d Dep't 1990)); Hurley v. Cavitolo, 239 A.D.2d 559, 559, 658 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (2d Dep't 1997); Barba v. Best Sec. Corp., 235 A.D.2d 381, 381, 652 N.Y.S.2d 71, 71 (2d Dep't 1997);Bando-Twomey v. Richheimer, 229 A.D.2d 554, 555, 646 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (2d Dep't 1996). "[A] rear-end collision with a stopped automobile creates a prima facie case of liability in favor of the operator of the stationary vehicle, and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to explain how the accident occurred." Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546, 546, 663 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (2d Dep't 1997). In moving for summary judgment, plaintiff has submitted an affidavit claiming that he was struck in the rear while stopped at the traffic light.

  2. Aloia v. Stoffel

    273 A.D.2d 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 3 times

    On their motion for summary judgment, the respondents established that after their vehicle came to a stop, the plaintiff's vehicle stopped behind it. The appellant's vehicle then struck the plaintiff's vehicle, which caused it to hit the respondents ' vehicle. A rear-end collision with a stationary vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability against the operator of the moving vehicle unless he or she can come forward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see, Mundo v. City of Yonkers, 249 A.D.2d 522; Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546; Parise v. Meltzer, 204 A.D.2d 295). We agree with the Supreme Court that the appellant failed to come forward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the accident.

  3. Cardilli v. Munves

    273 A.D.2d 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    The evidence established that the vehicle operated by the respondent Chrystie Munves was lawfully stopped at an intersection waiting to make a left-turn and that its stop lights and left signal light were on. The vehicle operated by the defendant Inez Picani, in which the plaintiff's decedent was a passenger, hit the Munves vehicle in the rear. Accordingly, the respondents made a prima facie showing that they were not negligent as a matter of law (see, Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546; Johnston v. El-Deiry, 230 A.D.2d 715). The plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Chrystie Munves was negligent and, if so, whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident (see, Bando-Twomey v. Richheimer, 229 A.D.2d 554; Corbly v. Butler, 226 A.D.2d 418; Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635). The plaintiff's mere hope that further discovery will uncover evidence to prove his case is insufficient to warrant denial of the motion (see, Waste Servs. v. Jamaica Ash Rubbish Removal Co., 262 A.D.2d 401, 403; Quinones v. Board of Educ. of the City of N Y, 248 A.D.2d 696).

  4. Leonard v. City of New York

    273 A.D.2d 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 33 times

    ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiffs' motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for an inquest on damages. A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability in favor of the operator of the stationary vehicle unless the operator of the moving vehicle can come forward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the accident (see, Lopez v. Minot, 258 A.D.2d 564; Mundo v. City of Yonkers, 249 A.D.2d 522; Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546; Parise v. Meltzer, 204 A.D.2d 295). The operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision, because he is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to a reasonable, nonnegligent cause. If the operator of the moving vehicle cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the operator of the stationary vehicle may properly be awarded summary judgment on the issue of liability (see, Lopez v. Minot, supra). Here, the evidence establishes that the plaintiffs' decedent was bringing his vehicle to a stop because vehicles in front of him were stopping. The plaintiffs' decedent was able to bring his vehicle to a safe stop, but there was no explanation as to why the defendant driver, Michael Daddario, could not do the same.

  5. Ramrattan v. Pondfield Trip Service, Inc.

    269 A.D.2d 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 6 times

    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. "[A] rear-end collision with a stationary vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability in favor of the operator of the stationary vehicle unless the operator of the moving vehicle can come forward with an adequate, non-negligent explanation for the accident" (Mundo v. City of Yonkers, 249 A.D.2d 522, 523; Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546; Parise v. Meltzer, 204 A.D.2d 295). We agree with the Supreme Court that the deposition testimony of the defendant Robert G. Porazzo demonstrated an adequate, non-negligent explanation for the accident, and thus the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was properly denied (see generally, LaFond v. City of New York, 245 A.D.2d 268; Aldrich v. Hagan, 243 A.D.2d 432; Gross v. Napoli, 216 A.D.2d 524; cf., Sheeler v. Blade Constr., Inc., 262 A.D.2d 632 [2d Dept., June 28, 1999]).

  6. Schmidt v. Edelman

    263 A.D.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that a defense which only alleges that the defendant saw the plaintiff's vehicle lawfully stopped and applied the brakes but the vehicle nonetheless slid or skidded into the plaintiff's vehicle as insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence created by the unexplained rear-end accident

    The defendant further admitted that the plaintiffs' vehicle was stopped at the moment of impact. It is well settled that where a vehicle is lawfully stopped, there is a duty imposed upon the operators of vehicles traveling behind it to come to a timely halt ( Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546; Ayoub v. Dufont, 229 A.D.2d 368; Parise v. Meltzer, 204 A.D.2d 295). Moreover, "[a] defense which only alleges that the defendant saw the plaintiff's vehicle [lawfully stopped] * * * that the brakes of the vehicle were applied, but the vehicle nevertheless slid or skidded into the plaintiff's vehicle * * * has been held insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence created by the unexplained rear-end collision ( see, Benyarko v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 162 A.D.2d 572, 573; Young v. City of New York, 113 A.D.2d 833)" ( Pincus v. Cohen, 198 A.D.2d 405, 406 [emphasis supplied]; cf., Copeman v. Moran, 236 A.D.2d 507). Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case, the defendant was liable as a matter of law and thus the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability.

  7. Fiscella v. Gibbs

    261 A.D.2d 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 14 times
    In Fiscella, a defendant named Cone, stopped in the west-bound lane of the roadway, was struck in the rear by a vehicle which caused Cone's vehicle to be propelled, from the west-bound lane, "into the east-bound lane of traffic where it collided with the plaintiffs'" oncoming vehicle.

    We now reverse. Since the evidence established that the appellant's vehicle was lawfully stopped prior to being struck in the rear by the Gibbs' vehicle, she established a prima facie case that she was not negligent with respect to this collision ( see, Yusupov v. Supreme Carrier Corp., 240 A.D.2d 660; Rebecchi v. Whitmore, 172 A.D.2d 600; Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546; Mead v. Marino, 205 A.D.2d 669). Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the fact that the appellant may have had her wheels turned to the left in anticipation of a turn prior to her being struck in the rear does not raise a triable issue of fact.

  8. Allen v. Calderon

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 34203 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

    Here, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against defendants Seaside Beverage Corp. and Calderon by demonstrating that the host taxi was stopped for approximately 10 seconds at a red light when it was struck in the rear by the Seaside/Calderon vehicle (Cajas-Romero v. Ward, 106 A.D.3d 850, 851, 965 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561). Defendant Reid established, prima facie, his entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him and any cross-claims for the same reasons (Fiscella v. Gibbs, 261 A.D.2d 572, 573, 690 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714, citing Yusupov v. Supreme Carrier Corp., 240 A.D.2d 660, 659 N.Y.S.2d 78; Rebecchi v. Whitmore, 172 A.D.2d 600, 568 N.Y.S.2d 423; Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546, 663 N.Y.S.2d 110; Mead v. Marino, 205 A.D.2d 669, 613 N.Y.S.2d 650).

  9. Marzuez-Fuentes v. Crump

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 33574 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    Aloia v. Stoffel, 273 A.D.2d 420, 711 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2nd Dept. 2000). See also, Jaffe v. Miller, 295 A.D.2d 404, 743 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2nd Dept. 2002); Cerda v. Parsley, 273 A.D.2d 339, 709 N.Y.S.2d 585 (2nd Dept. 2000); Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546, 663 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2nd Dept. 1997). If the driver cannot come forward with evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may be properly awarded judgment as a matter of law. Hurley v. Izzo, 248 A.D.2d 674, 670 N.Y.S.2d 575 (2nd Dept. 1998). "A sudden, negligent or unexplained stop of the lead vehicle can constitute a non-negligent explanation."

  10. Lombardi-Rauchut v. Natale

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 33330 (N.Y. Misc. 2007)

    Aloia v. Stoffel, 273 A.D.2d 420, 711 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2nd Dept. 2000). See also, Jaffe v. Miller, 295 A.D.2d 404, 743 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2nd Dept. 2002); Cerda v. Parsley, 273 A.D.2d 339, 709 N.Y.S.2d 585 (2nd Dept. 2000); Miller v. Irwin, 243 A.D.2d 546, 663 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2nd Dept. 1997). In the case at bar, the evidence establishes as a matter of law that Defendant FICALORA was responsible for the happening of the accident.