Opinion
No. 33053
Decided February 4, 1953.
Appeal — Workmen's compensation — Claimant failed to prove himself son of deceased workman — Evidence conflicting — Appellate court may not substitute its judgment for trial court's — Illegitimate child as dependent — Proof of paternity.
Where an illegitimate child, claiming that he is the son and was a dependent of a workman who was killed in his employment, is denied the right to participate in the State Insurance Fund by the Industrial Commission after hearing upon the evidence, and where upon appeal the Court of Common Pleas finds and holds upon conflicting evidence that the claimant failed to prove that he is the son of the deceased workman, the Court of Appeals, on appeal on questions of law only, may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and hold that the claimant was, as a matter of law, a dependent of the deceased workman and entitled to participate in the death benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Belmont county.
This action arose in the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio, as an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission of Ohio denying plaintiff the right to participate in the State Insurance Fund under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio.
Plaintiff, a minor ten years of age, brought the action by Queen Esther Robison, his next friend. He alleges that he is the son of Tie P. Miller, deceased, and was a dependent of said Tie P. Miller when the latter was injured by an explosion in a mine and died as a result of the injuries. Hestine Mobley, mother of the plaintiff, died approximately seven months after his birth. The petition alleges that the Industrial Commission disallowed his claim, the reason given being that the testimony failed to show that Jesse Miller, plaintiff herein, was dependent upon the deceased at the time of decedent's death within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, judgment was rendered against the plaintiff.
The Court of Common Pleas rendered an extended "opinion and decision" which discussed the evidence at length. The decision of the court is included in the closing paragraph which reads:
"The court has been most liberal in applying the rules relating to hearsay evidence and exceptions to the rule to the testimony offered by the claimant in this case, but much of the testimony offered by plaintiff is of questionable weight and credibility. In view of all the evidence, facts and circumstances, it is the conclusion of the court that the claimant has not proven that he is the child or son of Tie P. Miller and, applying the rule that the assumption by an employee of the support of a child, not his own, does not serve to make such child his dependent, the claimant is not entitled to participate in the workmen's compensation fund."
The journal entry of the Court of Common Pleas is as follows:
"This cause came on to be heard upon the pleadings and the evidence contained in the record of rehearing before the Industrial Commission of Ohio and, neither party having demanded a jury, the cause was submitted to the court;
"Upon consideration whereof, the court finds upon the issues joined in favor of the defendant and against the right of plaintiff to participate in the State Insurance Fund under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio."
Notice was filed by the plaintiff in the Common Pleas Court that appeal was being taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of law and fact. The Court of Appeals on its own motion dismissed the appeal as on questions of law and fact and retained the appeal as on questions of law. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, its journal entry being in the following language:
"This cause came on to be heard upon an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in and for Belmont county, Ohio, upon questions of law, and for the court upon consideration of the facts set out in the record in this case as existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of the employee, Tie P. Miller, find, upon the sole issue herein, that, as a matter of law, the complainant, Jesse Miller, was a dependent of the deceased within the meaning of Section 1465-82 of the General Code of Ohio, and is entitled to participate in the death benefits of the compensation act.
"It is therefore hereby adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Belmont County, be, and is hereby reversed as being contrary to law, and final judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff. The Industrial Commission is hereby ordered to proceed to make the proper award to the plaintiff, Jesse Miller, according to law and in accordance with the judgment of this court."
The cause is in this court upon the allowance of a motion by the Industrial Commission to certify the record.
Mr. L.P. Henderson, for appellee.
Mr. C. William O'Neill, attorney general, Mr. Chalmers P. Wylie and Mr. Robert B. Rady, for appellant.
This cause was heard by the Court of Appeals on questions of law only. The Court of Common Pleas heard and considered the evidence and found thereon that the plaintiff had not carried the burden of proving that he is the son of Tie P. Miller. Study of the record convinces this court that there was evidence upon which the trial court could reach that decision. Under such circumstances the Court of Appeals could not substitute its judgment as to the significance and effect of the evidence for that of the Court of Common Pleas, reverse the judgment of that court and render final judgment contrary to the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. In re Estate of Johnson, 142 Ohio St. 49, 49 N.E.2d 950; Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co., 143 Ohio St. 541, 56 N.E.2d 164; State, ex rel. Squire, Supt., v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709; In Re Estate of Murnan, 151 Ohio St. 529, 87 N.E.2d 84; Henry v. Henry, 157 Ohio St. 319, 105 N.E.2d 406; Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 106 N.E.2d 772.
The most that the Court of Appeals had the power to do was to reverse on the weight of the evidence and remand for further hearing.
The problem as to whether an illegitimate child is a "child" as that term is used in Section 1465-82, 4 (B), General Code, is not reached until the paternity of the child is established.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings according to law.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., TAFT, MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, JJ., concur.