Opinion
DOCKET NO. 2:01 CV 0859
June 5, 2002
MEMORANDUM RULING
The plaintiffs have filed objections to the Report and Recommendation (RR) prepared by the Magistrate Judge. In their objections, the plaintiffs assert that the RR did not properly consider the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c), a district court may remand cases when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. As originally enacted, § 1447(c) stated "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case. . . ." In analyzing this version of § 1447(c), courts made clear that removal was the critical jurisdictional juncture. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293, 58 S.Ct. 586, 592, 82 LEd. 845 (1938) (stating "events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable . . . do not oust the district court's jurisdiction").
Under the original version of § 1447(c), the proper inquiry, as noted by the Magistrate Judge, was whether the court had jurisdiction at the time of removal. If the court did have jurisdiction at the time of removal, that jurisdiction was unaffected by subsequent acts, such as loss of diversity or loss of the required amount in controversy. See Freeport-McMoR an, Inc. v. KNEnergy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428, 111 S.Ct. 858, 860, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991) (noting the Supreme Court has "consistently held that if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events"); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity, 303 U.S. at 293, 58 S.Ct. at 592; Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 456 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a district court's jurisdiction is fixed at the time of removal); Van Meter v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., I F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
Section 1447(c) was amended in 1988 to read as follows: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." The plaintiffs are arguing that § 1447(c), as amended, authorizes this court to look at post-removal events to determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.
This same rationale was argued in Poore v. American-Amicable LWe Ins. Co. of Texas, 218 F.3d 1287 (C.A.1 I (Ga.), Jul 20, 2000). While the district court in Poore concluded the amended § 1447(c) suggests that the time of removal is no longer the focus of the inquiry, the Court of Appeal expressly rejected this theory and held that the proper inquiry is still whether the court had jurisdiction at the time of removal. Poore at 290; See Snapper v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1256-5 7 n. 14 (11th Cir. 1999).
The court in Poore discussed the analysis of this statute by several courts:
the Sixth Circuit has held that "the timing question is dispositive because, despite the change in the' wording of § 1447(c) . . . courts still read that section as authorizing remand when a district court determines that jurisdiction had been lacking at the time of removal, rather than later. . . ." Baldridge, 983 F.2d at 1348. See MaUer ofShell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[n]either the text of the revised § 1447(c) nor its legislative history implies that Congress altered the traditional view that jurisdiction present at the time a suit is filed or removed is unaffected by subsequent acts"); Hudson United Bank v. Litenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 157 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1998) (commenting "we will assume Congress did not mean to upset [the focus on jurisdiction at the time of removal] and that they remain in effect unchanged by the intervening textual modifications to § 1447(c)"); Doddy, 101 F.3d at 456 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that" § 1447(c) cannot be read to overrule the repeatedly expressed view that changes after removal cannot eliminate jurisdiction and require remand"); see also Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 2053, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998) (in discussing a different issue, noting that "[a] case such as this one is more closely analogous to cases in which a later event, say the change in the citizenship of a party or a subsequent reduction of the amount at issue below jurisdictional levels, destroys previously existing jurisdiction. In such cases, a federal court will keep a removed case."); Freeport-McMoRan, 498 U.S. at 428, 111 S.Ct. at 860 (in dicta, commenting that jurisdiction is fixed at the time of removal).
Poore at 291.
This court concurs with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Poore and will accordingly affirm the decision of the Magistrate Judge.