Opinion
Civil Action No. 95-1231 (RCL/JMF).
January 8, 2007
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Currently pending and ready for resolution is Defendants Harbert Construction Services (U.K.) Ltd. and Bill Harbert International Construction Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Government's Complaint in Intervention [#162]. For the reasons stated herein, I recommend that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
There is no genuine issue as the following finding of facts: The Testimony of Colin Edward Towsey Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. The Testimony of Alfred Hill Id. Id. The Testimony of Thomas Kitchens The Testimony of R. Terry Windle
These facts were derived by the court following their initial proposal and subsequent review by counsel for all relevant parties.
"Towsey Tr." is a reference to Towsey's deposition, which was taken in London on June 9, 2006.
"Hill Tr." is a reference to Hill's deposition, which was taken on October 24, 2006.
"Kitchens Tr." is a reference to Kitchens' deposition, which was taken on October 17, 2006.
"Windle Tr." is a reference to Windle's deposition, which was taken on October 19, 2006.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The court may exercise jurisdiction over the person of UK as to contract 20A because that jurisdiction is premised on UK's doing of an act that its agent and employees had to know would have an impact in the United States and because UK otherwise had sufficient contacts with American corporations and citizens to justify this court's exercise of its jurisdiction. There is, however, no basis to exercise jurisdiction over UK as to contracts 07 and 29.Introduction
In an earlier Report and Recommendation, I indicated that jurisdiction over the person of an alien corporation could be based on (1) the corporation's contacts with the United States, if those contacts established such a sufficient presence in the United States that the exercise of that jurisdiction could not be described as unfair (general jurisdiction); or (2) on a transaction or occurrence in which the corporation performed an act that had a reasonably foreseeable impact in the United States and the litigation is based on that transaction or occurrence (special jurisdiction). Id. at *21. Hence, I concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction over Holzmann was proper because of its plea of guilty in an American court to conspiring to rig the bids and the specificity of the government's allegations of Holzmann's direct participation with Harbert International, Inc. and Anderson in the bid-rigging conspiracy. Id. at *23. In my view, "[t]hese allegations are sufficient in themselves to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Holzmann upon the theory that they performed acts that were intended or could reasonably have been expected to have an impact in the United States, i.e., the payment from the United States Treasury of the invoices submitted under the rigged contracts." Id.
Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-CV-1231, 2006 WL 568722 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2006).
I reached a different conclusion as to UK, finding that the allegations were specific enough to warrant additional discovery to see if the United States and relator could find a sufficient evidentiary basis that would justify the exercise of either general or specific jurisdiction over UK. Id. at *22.
The Evidentiary Standard
As I indicated in an earlier Order, the district court is granted discretion as to how to resolve the issues of fact pertaining to jurisdiction that may arise when it is invited to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. In In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124-26 (D.D.C. 2003), Judge Huvelle marshaled substantial authority for her conclusion that, once a court has permitted discovery pertaining to jurisdiction, the court must accept as true allegations made as to jurisdiction by the plaintiff that are supported by "concrete evidence." Thus, the court may not resolve factual issues that have arisen during jurisdictional discovery, lest it usurp the jury's function or require the plaintiff to prove her case as a condition of proceeding with general discovery. Rather, once plaintiff supports her allegations regarding jurisdiction over the defendant's person with evidence, the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must be denied even though the parties are bitterly divided on the truth of those allegations and their division creates a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
Order of 11/28/06 at 2-3.
Fortunately, in this case, there is no real dispute as to the fundamental facts of the creation of UK, the nature of its obligations to HIE, its role in the preparation of the bids on contract 20A and its payment of certain invoices tendered by HSG, a Holzmann entity, that are described in my findings. The parties are, however, bitterly divided on the intent with which the preparation of the bids and the payments were made. To UK, these acts were innocently done without any knowledge whatsoever of any attempt to rig the bids and then disguise a payoff to Holzmann for its role in that conspiracy. According to relator and the government, UK, through its agents, participated in the bid-rigging and the payoff. But, it is certainly not necessary for me to resolve that controversy in order to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Instead, I can premise the exercise of jurisdiction on the uncontroverted facts.
A Hybrid Form of Jurisdiction
As I have explained, the court may exercise general, personal jurisdiction over an alien corporation as to any cause of action if the corporation's contacts with the United States are sufficient to render the exercise of that jurisdiction reasonable. It may exercise special, personal jurisdiction over a cause of action premised on an act, wherever it was done, when it was reasonably foreseeable that the act would have consequences in the United States and exercise of that jurisdiction is reasonable.
It must be recalled, however, that these two means of exercising jurisdiction do not exhaust the court's power. As the Restatement of Conflicts of Law § 52 (Second) (1971) points out, a court of a state or of the United States "may exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the corporation has such a relationship to the state that it is reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdiction." Thus, the court must look to all pertinent indicia to ascertain whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable.
In this case, I have concluded in my ultimate conclusion of law that UK's doing of acts pertaining to the preparation of the bid on contract 20A are in themselves a sufficient predicate for the exercise of jurisdiction. I should note that the other contacts between UK and United States citizens and United States corporations merely undergirds the reasonableness of this exercise of special jurisdiction. There is, therefore a legitimate means of creating for this case a hybrid form of jurisdiction that is both based on the act and on the contacts between UK and United States citizens and United States corporations.
The Premise for the Exercise of Special Jurisdiction
Those uncontroverted facts are that Young and Turner, agents and employees of UK, did the estimating on a bid for contract 20A and that they, along with Towsey, knew that it was a bid on a contract that was funded by an agency of the United States. Young signed a tender for contract 20A as the chief estimator for Harbert International, Inc. In my view, their work on the preparation of the bid and its submission was an act that they had to know would have the consequence of causing money appropriated by the United States Congress to be paid to Harbert International, Inc., if the bid was successful and the contract, contract 20A, was awarded. Their doing of that act, one that they had to know would have an impact on the United States Treasury, is sufficient to permit the court to exercise jurisdiction over UK as to the government and the relator's claim for relief, which is based on that act.
It is of little moment to me that the bid Young signed was not accepted and that a final tender was prepared and submitted in December 1998, when Young and Turner had left the employ of UK. Their work while still employed by UK was part of a process that began when they were employed and consummated in success, albeit after they left. The transaction or occurrence is all the work of UK done on the bid for contract 20A and that transaction or occurrence may serve as the premise of the court's jurisdiction over UK as to that contract. The Contacts Between UK and the United State Establish That the Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction Is Fair
To comply with the due process clause, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alien corporation must be fair. That showing turns on whether the alien corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice. In re Baan, 245 F. Supp at 126. In my view, although UK did no business in the United States, its contacts with United States' corporations and citizens were more than minimal and justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the claim for relief based on contract 20A.First, UK was created by American citizens, acting as agents for one or more American corporations, for the specific purpose of providing services to companies that were bidding on projects that were going to be funded by agencies of the United States.
Second, an American citizen, Anderson, acting on behalf of both American and foreign corporations, directed the projects on which UK would work.
Anderson was simultaneously vice president of Harbert International, Inc., an American corporation, and Harbert International Establishment, a Liechtenstein corporation.
Third, Anderson interviewed the men who would do the estimating on contract 20A and directed Towsey to hire them.
Fourth, UK expended nearly one million dollars in the preparation of the bid on contract 20A, money that it was reimbursed by funds appropriated by Congress. In a three-year period, UK's work on contract 20A was 50% of its business.
Fifth, UK had no capital. Every penny or pound it had was given only after its demand for funding was approved by a Harbert employee based in Birmingham, Alabama.
Sixth, while Towsey managed UK's London office, he saw himself obliged to seek direction from Harbert entities based in America with regard to the payment of HSG invoices. These invoices were paid only after an employee based in America authorized their payment. This was also true of payments to be made to the staff upon the closing of the London office.
Seventh, Harbert, an American citizen, and Towsey signed the auditing financial statement for UK in 1989, the year after the bid on contract 20A was submitted.
Eighth, it was Anderson, not Towsey, who decided to close the London office.
Ninth, an American accountant, Windle, reviewed UK's accounting statements on five or six occasions at the behest of another American, Kitchens, who worked for an American company, Harbert International, Inc. Additionally, on a monthly basis, Windle would review UK's accounting information that was sent to his office in Birmingham and, if the information was approved, he would transfer an appropriate amount of money to UK. Large payments required the approval of Kitchens or Harbert, both American citizens who were employed by or owned American companies; Kitchens was based in Birmingham.
It is not necessary to go as far as the government's theory that UK was the alter ego of an American Harbert enterprise to sustain jurisdiction. These contacts combined with UK's acts with reference to contract 20A convince me that the exercise of jurisdiction over UK on the hybrid theory I have advanced is perfectly consistent with the due process clause.
Inconvenience and Hardship
I must also take into consideration the cost and expense to UK if it has to defend itself in an American court. There are only three British citizens, former employees of UK, who could be witnesses in this case. Nobody has been able to find two of them, Stone and Turner, and the third, Towsey has already given his deposition which can be admitted into evidence. If Towsey is needed as a witness, he need only board a plane and, as the British put it, "hop over the pond."
Moreover, UK is already represented by competent counsel who are intimately familiar with this case. Thus, for UK, defense of this case can hardly be described as so burdensome that it is then so unfair as to constitute a violation of due process.
That minimal inconvenience is outweighed by the factors I have already detailed above — (a) that jurisdiction may be based on the acts performed to secure contract 20A for Harbert International, Inc., an American company; and (b) that UK has sufficient contacts with the United States and its citizens to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim for relief based on contract 20A.
There is no evidence before me of similar weight as to UK's participation in the bidding process as to contracts 07 and 29. All we know is that there was a service agreement between UK and Harbert International Establishment as to contract 07 and that some payments were made pursuant to it; there is no information as to any UK role as to contract 29. I therefore have to find that it would offend due process to exercise personal jurisdiction over UK as to these two contracts. Unlike contract 20A, there is no act by UK as to these two contracts upon which jurisdiction could be based.
I appreciate that the relator and the government assert jurisdiction on the basis of an overarching conspiracy theory that makes UK, as a conspirator, responsible for all the acts of its fellow conspirators — namely, all three contracts. I cannot however premise jurisdiction over UK on that bare bones allegation, unsupported by any evidence disclosed during the discovery I just permitted. Simply put, there is no evidence that would permit me to conclude that (1) Towsey perjured himself when he denied any knowledge of or complicity in the conspiracy to rig the bid on contract 20A and (2) Young and Turner, who worked for UK, knew of the conspiracy to rig the bid on that contract and knowingly participated in it. Without any evidence whatsoever, it is impossible for me to conclude that their participation in a conspiracy to rig that bid is a premise for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over UK on the government's and relator's conspiracy theory.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, I therefore recommend that Defendants Harbert Construction Services (U.K.) Ltd. and Bill Harbert International Construction Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Government's Complaint in Intervention [#162] be denied as to the claim for relief based on contract 20A and granted as to contracts 07 and 29.
Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations set forth in this report may waive your right of appeal from an order of the District Court adopting such findings and recommendations. See Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985).