Opinion
1:20-cv-183
07-23-2021
EMANUEL MILLER, Plaintiff v. SCI GREENE, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that Plaintiff Emanuel Miller's Amended Complaint be partially dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 7, 2020, by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. In the accompanying Complaint, Plaintiff stated that he had been “confined at SCI Green were my grievance was denied of me being illegally detained.” ECF No. 1-2 at 2. As Defendants, Plaintiff named SCI Greene and the Erie County Court of Common Pleas. Id.
On September 3, 2020, the undersigned conducted an initial screening of Plaintiff s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. After reviewing Plaintiffs allegation, the Court issued an Order advising Plaintiff that his Complaint suffered from two fatal defects: he had failed to supply any sort of factual narrative in support of his claim, and neither of the named Defendants were amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 3 at 2. Rather than recommend dismissal pursuant to § 1915, the Court provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his pleading. Id.
In response, Plaintiff filed several documents that the Court construed together as his Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 11. In the consolidated pleading, Plaintiff identified six new Defendants: Officer Victory of the Erie Police Department; Erie County Prison Warden Kevin Sutter; defense counsel Kadida Wadeeah Horton; District Attorney John Doe; and Superintendents Michael Zaken and Mark Capozza. According to Plaintiff, at approximately 9:30 a.m. on July 30, 2019, Officer Victory arrested him without a warrant or probable cause for his arrest, resulting in his illegal confinement. ECF No. 11 at 2. That arrest led to a malicious prosecution by the John Doe district attorney and illegal incarceration by Warden Sutter and Superintendents Zaken and Capozza. Id. at 3-5. With respect to Horton, Plaintiff alleges that she allowed the prosecution to take place despite knowing that it was illegal because she was “on her way to becoming a district attorney.” Id. at 3.
B. Analysis
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfiilly pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims against Horton, his defense attorney, must be dismissed because she is not a state actor. To establish a claim under 28 U.S.C. §1983, it is axiomatic that a plaintiff must allege the deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under the color of state or territorial law. Williams v. Dark, 844 F.Supp. 210, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff d, 19 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). “[P]urely private acts which are not furthered by any actual or purported state authority are not acts under color of state law.” Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1994). Notably, an attorney acting on behalf of his client is not a state actor for the purposes of a §1983 claim. Polk County v. Dobson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). See also Coudriet v. Vardaro, 2012 WL 5990344, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2012) (“Private attorneys, including public defenders, acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors, and therefore, cannot be held liable under §1983.”); Valerio-Mendez v. Yeager, 2013 WL 790245, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013) (“Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”). Plaintiffs claims against Horton should be dismissed, with prejudice.
In addition, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against Sutter, Zaken or Capozza. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personalfly] involvefd]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. AM. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs only factual averment regarding Zaken or Capozza is that each superintendent “housed [plaintiff] at his facility under illegal jurisdiction.” ECF No. 11 at 4. His only allegation against Sutter is that he accepted Plaintiff into his facility “without the proper documents.” Id. at 3. Based on these allegations, it is apparent that Plaintiff is attempting to hold each prison official responsible for the unconstitutional action of other individuals based entirely upon their supervisory role in the prison system. As described above, this type of averment is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL 4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made aware of several issues of the plaintiffs and ... failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim for reliefs) participation in an administrative appeal process); Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official's only involvement is investigating and/or ruling on an inmate's grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of that official.”). Because Plaintiffs claims against Sutter, Zaken and Capozza are based entirely upon their supervisory roles in the prison system, those claims should be dismissed.
Finally, in addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks an order directing that he be “set free with all charges dropped and erased from [his] record.” ECF No. 11 at 4. It is well-settled, however, “that inmates may not use civil rights actions to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement or to seek earlier or speedier release.” Black v. Moser, 2018 WL 3239775, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2018) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1975)). This is because, “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. See also Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000) (“State prisoners who want to challenge their convictions, their sentences, or administrative orders revoking good-time credits or equivalent sentence-shortening devices, must seek habeas corpus, because they contest the fact or duration of custody.”). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks his release from custody, said request should be dismissed.
In contrast, a challenge to the constitutionality of a state procedure may proceed under § 1983 when “success of the procedural challenges would not necessarily require immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” Black, 2018 WL 3239775, at *2. Such is not the case here.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that portions of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint [ECF No. 11] be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). More specifically, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Horton, Sutter, Zaken and Capozza, as well as his request to be released from custody. Moreover, leave to amend should not be permitted as: (1) there is no set of facts that would allow Horton, a private individual, to be considered a state actor, and (2) Plaintiff s claims against the supervisory Defendants are based entirely on their roles as the Warden/Superintendent of their respective institutions rather than their personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that curative amendments should be permitted by the Court unless “it would be inequitable or futile.”).
Conversely, it is recommended that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be served upon Officer Victory and the Erie County District Attorney. Should this Report and Recommendation be adopted, the undersigned will promptly issue an order to that effect.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).