Opinion
Case No. 02-2498-JWL
December 17, 2002.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed suit against defendant General Motors and various individual defendants alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. This matter is presently before the court on defendant Navita Johnson's motion to dismiss (doc. #16) and defendant Joseph Biondi's motion to dismiss (doc. #18). Ms. Johnson and Mr. Biondi move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that they, as individuals, simply cannot be held liable to plaintiff for alleged violations of the federal anti-discrimination laws. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed against Ms. Johnson and Mr. Biondi.
Pursuant to Local Rule 6.1(e)(2), a party has twenty days to respond to a motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, "[i]f a respondent fails to file a response within the time required by Rule 6.1(e), the motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted without further notice." Plaintiff has not filed a response to defendants' motions to dismiss and, thus, the motions are uncontested. Nonetheless, as should be clear from the court's order, the court is not granting the motions on the grounds that plaintiff failed to respond to those motions; the court is granting the motions based solely on the merits of the arguments contained therein.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an "employer" to "refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the ADA and the ADEA make it unlawful for an "employer" to discriminate on the basis of disability and age, respectively. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 12111(2); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Thus, Ms. Johnson and Mr. Biondi are subject to liability under these statutes only if, at the time of the alleged discrimination, they meet the statutory definition of "employer," to wit: "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 205 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (same definition under ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (substantially the same definition under ADEA).
It is well settled in the Tenth Circuit that individuals are not "employers" for purposes of Title VII, Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996) (Title VII liability is appropriately borne by employers, not individual supervisors), or the ADA, Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (expressly reaffirming Haynes decision in context of the ADA). Moreover, although it has not directly addressed the issue, the Circuit has clearly suggested that the same result necessarily would obtain under the ADEA. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 744. Simply put, Haynes and Butler mandate the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Ms. Johnson and Mr. Biondi.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT Navita Johnson's motion to dismiss (doc. #16) is granted, Joseph Biondi's motion to dismiss (doc. #18) is granted and plaintiff's complaint against Ms. Johnson and Mr. Biondi is dismissed.