(brackets and citation omitted)); Miller v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, 471 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (1st Dep't 1984) ("Where, as here, the suit has been one to recover for economic loss, it has consistently been held that a cause of action does not lie against a remote manufacturer for the breach of an implied warranty."), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 1081, 489 N.Y.S.2d 904, 479 N.E.2d 249 (1985).

The implied warranty of merchantability under New York's Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 is generally limited to parties in privity with the defendant. See, e.g., Miller v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 1081 (1985) ("Where, as here, the suit has been one to recover for economic loss, it has consistently been held that a cause of action does not lie against a remote manufacturer for the breach of an implied warranty."). Plaintiffs contend that two exceptions to this privity requirement apply under New York law: the "thing of danger" exception and the "third-party beneficiary" exception.

37 AD2d 747). Insofar as the first cause of action is asserted against Fleetwood, defendants established that plaintiff failed to comply with the Lemon Law's notice requirement ( see § 198-a [n] [former (6)]). With respect to the second cause of action, alleging breach of express warranty, defendants met their burden by establishing that Colton effectively disclaimed any express warranty ( see UCC 2-316) and that Fleetwood did not manufacture the defective components of the motor home and excluded those components from its express warranty ( see generally Jones v W + M Automation, Inc., 31 AD3d 1099, 1101, lv denied 8 NY3d 802). With respect to the third cause of action, alleging breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness ( see UCC 2-314), defendants established that Colton effectively disclaimed those warranties ( see UCC 2-316; Gale v Kessler, 93 AD2d 744) and that plaintiff is not in privity with Fleetwood ( see Miller v General Motors Corp., 99 AD2d 454, affd 64 NY2d 1081; Antel Oldsmobile-Cadillac v Sirus Leasing Co., Div. of Sirus Enters., 101 AD2d 688). Finally, with respect to the fourth cause of action, seeking relief under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, defendants established that they are not "`warrantor[s]'" with respect to the defective components of the motor home ( 15 USC § 2301). We conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion ( see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562).

Thus, to recover against DaimlerChrysler, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she was in privity with the manufacturer. While privity would exist if Storms was DaimlerChrysler's sales or leasing agent (see, Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., supra), the allegation in the complaint that Storms is "an authorized dealership/agent of [DaimlerChrysler] designated to perform repairs on vehicles under [DaimlerChrysler's] automobile warranties" is insufficient to support a claim that Storms was a sales or leasing agent (see, Miller v. General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081). To the contrary, the documentary evidence submitted by DaimlerChrysler in support of its motion demonstrates that Storms was not its agent.

Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of defendants American Telephone and Telegraph Company and ATT Information Systems (ATT) for summary judgment dismissing the first, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of action in plaintiff's complaint against them. Plaintiff had no contract with ATT and thus the breach of contract cause of action should have been dismissed. The cause of action alleging breach of implied warranties also should have been dismissed because it seeks recovery for economic loss and the parties lack the requisite privity for such cause of action (see, Miller v General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081; Jaffee Assocs. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 89 A.D.2d 785, affd 58 N.Y.2d 993; Butler v Caldwell Cook, 122 A.D.2d 559, 560). The causes of action alleging breach of express warranties and fraudulent misrepresentations should have been dismissed. It is undisputed that only one of the four persons alleged by plaintiff to have made such oral warranties or misrepresentations ever worked for ATT, and it is undisputed that that person had no contact with plaintiff until after the contract was executed.

The warranty document issued for the vehicle clearly shows that WWV's role regarding customer complaints is solely as the agent or representative of VWoA, the express warrantor. Without explicit evidence that WWV, as agent, intended individually to be bound regarding the warranties, its acting as agent for a disclosed principal regarding repairs of defects is insufficient to establish sales warranty liability (see, Spain v. Howard Holmes, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 741, 742-743; Miller v. General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081). Plaintiffs' cause of action for a refund on the purchase price of the vehicle under the Lemon Law must also fail. As previously noted, there is nothing in the record which would establish that WWV was anything more than an agent of VWAG or VWoA in this entire transaction, including its rejection of plaintiffs' request for arbitration. Although, under the Lemon Law, a manufacturer's agent may be obligated with respect to repairs of a defective vehicle (General Business Law § 198-a [b]), the law in both its original form (General Business Law former § 198-a [c]) and as amended (General Business Law § 198-a [c] [1], as amended by L 1986, ch 799, § 3) imposes liability for a refund only upon the manufacturer.

Memorandum: Special Term properly denied plaintiffs' motions for permission to amend their complaints to assert causes of action for breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, and deceptive business practices. Because plaintiffs, in their proposed complaint, have not alleged that they were in privity with defendants, they may not recover on a claim of breach of implied warranty (see, Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto. Serv., 89 A.D.2d 785, affd 58 N.Y.2d 993; see also, Miller v General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081). The proposed cause of action for breach of express warranty is insufficient because of failure to set forth the terms of the warranty upon which plaintiffs rely. A complaint for breach of contract must allege the provisions of the contract upon which the claim is based (Bomser v Moyle, 89 A.D.2d 202; Shields v School of Law, 77 A.D.2d 867; Lupinski v Village of Ilion, 59 A.D.2d 1050).

The causes of action alleging deceptive business practices (General Business Law § 349 [h]; § 350-d [3]) were properly dismissed because of the failure to state facts showing that plaintiffs relied to their detriment upon deceptive practices occurring after the effective date of the statute (see, Burns v Volkswagen of Am., 118 Misc.2d 289, affd 97 A.D.2d 977; Estruch v Volkswagenwerk, AG., 97 A.D.2d 977, lv dismissed 61 N.Y.2d 904). The causes of action based upon breach of implied warranties of workmanlike construction and habitability were properly dismissed as to those plaintiffs who lacked privity with defendants (see, Miller v General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081; Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 89 A.D.2d 785, affd 58 N.Y.2d 993). Also properly dismissed were the causes of action in favor of remote purchasers based on express warranties.

Special Term correctly concluded that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and Toshiba. It is now settled that no implied warranty will extend from a manufacturer to a remote purchaser not in privity with the manufacturer where only economic loss and not personal injury is alleged (Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Servs., 58 N.Y.2d 993; Miller v General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081; Hole v General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715). As stated in Hole v General Motors Corp. (supra, at p 716): "The question thus presented is whether the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness run from a manufacturer to a remote purchaser, not in privity with the manufacturer, who has sustained no personal injury but only economic loss.

Fourth, the defense of lack of privity applies in this case only to the extent that it precludes recovery by plaintiffs of economic losses under the manufacturer's implied warranties, if any ( Jaffe Assoc. v. Bilsco Auto. Serv., 89 A.D.2d 785, affd 58 N.Y.2d 993, supra; Miller v. General Motors Corp., 99 A.D.2d 454, affd 64 N.Y.2d 1081; Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715). However, under the facts of this case, we do not view the absence of a direct contractual relationship between plaintiff Carbo and the manufacturer and seller of the subject motor vehicle as a bar to recovery by Carbo.