Summary
In Miller II, we affirmed the Commission and held that "Enders was neither Miller and Bratt's supervisor nor their employer or employee.
Summary of this case from Curtis v. LemnaOpinion
09-888
Opinion Delivered February 25, 2010
Appeal from the Benton County Circuit Court, No. CV-09-95-3, Hon. Jay T. Finch, Judge, Appeal Dismissed.
This case began as a negligence suit brought by appellants Dee Ann Miller and Clayton Bratt against appellee Dennis C. Enders for injuries they sustained while working for Air Evac EMS, Inc. The circuit court granted Enders's motion to dismiss, finding that the tort immunity provided by the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision barred any claim against Enders. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal and argue that the Act did not provide immunity to Enders as a co-employee. Due to a lack of jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.
Miller's husband, Mike Miller, is also an appellant. He joined in the complaint against Enders and argued that because of his wife's injuries, he had suffered loss of consortium.
The relevant facts are these. On February 21, 2005, Miller and Bratt were involved in a medical-helicopter crash in Benton County, Arkansas. The helicopter was flown by Enders, their co-employee of Air Evac EMS. Miller, Bratt, and Enders had been dispatched together by Air Evac EMS to pick up a patient that was involved in a motor vehicle accident. After the patient had been loaded, Enders commenced the flight and headed toward the hospital designated as the destination. However, the helicopter lost altitude, which resulted in a high-impact landing. As a result of the high-impact landing, Miller and Bratt sustained medical injuries.
Miller and Bratt brought a negligence suit against Enders in the Benton County Circuit Court, alleging that Enders did not safely operate the helicopter according to what he knew or should have known as a licensed commercial pilot. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas; however, it was nonsuited without prejudice on October 21, 2008. Miller and Bratt filed the current suit against Enders on January 12, 2009, again alleging that the damages they sustained as a result of the crash were proximately caused by Enders's negligent operation of the aircraft.
Enders filed an answer and a motion to dismiss. In his motion to dismiss, Enders argued that he was immune from suit pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105 (Repl. 2002). Miller and Bratt argued that the existing case law extending an employer's tort immunity to a co-employee was erroneous and should be overruled because it was unconstitutional to extend that immunity. The circuit court agreed with Enders and granted his motion to dismiss based on the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Miller and Bratt requested that the court amend its order to address the specific contentions that they had raised; however, the court declined to do so. Miller and Bratt now appeal.
We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is an issue that can and indeed must be raised by this court sua sponte. See Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, ___ S.W.3d ___ (citing Viravonga v. Samakitham, 372 Ark. 562, 279 S.W.3d 44 (2008)). If the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Brock, supra; Clark v. State, 362 Ark. 545, 210 S.W.3d 61 (2005); Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 19 S.W.3d 603 (2000).
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105 provides in relevant part:
(a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer[.]
This court has held that:
[T]he exclusive remedy of an employee or her representative on account of injury or death arising out of and in the course of her employment is a claim for compensation under § 11-9-105, and that the commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact but one of law, such as an intentional tort.
VanWagoner v. Beverly Enters., 334 Ark. 12, 16, 970 S.W.2d 810, 812 (1998) (internal citations omitted). In adopting this rule, we have explained that the Commission has vast expertise in this area, and that the goals of uniformity, speed, and simplicity would best be achieved by granting the Commission the exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Carter v. Georgia-Pacific Resins, Inc., 368 Ark. 19, 242 S.W.3d 616 (2006) (citing Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R., 352 Ark. 534, 541, 104 S.W.3d 745, 748 (2003).
Therefore, when a party to a lawsuit raises a question of whether a person enjoys immunity as an employer under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Commission must first decide the issue. See McCarthy v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Div., 366 Ark. 316, 235 S.W.3d 497 (2006) (citing Moses v. Hanna's Candle Co., 366 Ark. 233, 234 S.W.3d 872 (2006); Stocks v. Affiliated Foods Southwest, Inc., 363 Ark. 235, 213 S.W.3d 3 (2005)). In McCarthy, supra, an employee died of injuries he suffered in an airplane accident while returning home from a business trip. At the time of the accident, McCarthy, who had served as the pilot, was president of the company that employed the deceased. The wife of the deceased employee argued that McCarthy was a third person who did not enjoy immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act, and this court held that the Commission had exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine whether McCarthy was an employer under the circumstances presented in that case. See id.
Similar facts are presented in the instant case. Here, the injured parties are arguing that the co-employee that piloted their flight is a third person who does not enjoy immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act. However, because the Workers' Compensation Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine that issue, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the employees' injuries were covered under our Workers' Compensation Act. Even though a constitutional issue is raised, this court has stated that "even though the Workers' Compensation Commission may not have the authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, such constitutional issues should first be raised at the Administrative Law Judge or Commission level because such issues often require an exhaustive analysis that is best accomplished by an adversary proceeding, which can be done only at the hearing level." Carter, 368 Ark. at 22, 242 S.W.3d at 618 (citing Arkansas Health Servs. Agency v. Desiderata, Inc., 331 Ark. 144, 148, 958 S.W.2d 7, 8 (1998)).
The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case, as do we. Therefore, we dismiss the instant appeal, with leave for the parties to pursue a determination before the Commission.
Appeal dismissed.