Opinion
C.A. No. 05A-01-001-RFS.
Submitted: April 4, 2005.
Decided: July 13, 2005.
April M. Miller, Seaford, DE.
Tasha M. Stevens, Esquire, Fuqua Yori, Georgetown, Delaware.
Dear Ms. Miller and Counsel:
This is my decision regarding April M. Miller's appeal of the Unemployment Insurance Agency Appeals Board's decision that she was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits. For the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claimant, April M. Miller ("Miller" or "Claimant"), was employed as a janitor at P.S. Cleaners ("P.S.") beginning October 18, 2002. On August 23, 2004, the employer representative of P.S., Pam Glenn ("Glenn") had a conversation with Miller, during which she indicated that she was seeking other employment. Miller stated to Glenn that Peninsula Regional Medical Center would be calling P.S., as a reference, regarding a position to which she had applied. Upon hearing the Claimant say that she had a sought employment elsewhere, Glenn asked her whether she was giving notice. The Claimant responded, "If that's what you want it to be." Glenn understood the Claimant's statement as giving notice to end her employment with P.S. On August 27, 2004, Miller received her last check from P.S. along with a written confirmation stating that her last day would be September 1, 2004. On August 31, 2004, Miller confronted Glenn where she was again told that her notice was effective and her last day would be September 1, 2004.
On September 3, 2004, Miller applied to the Division of Unemployment Insurance to receive unemployment benefits. The Claims Deputy ruled that Miller was qualified to receive unemployment benefits under 19 Del.C. § 3314(2) for being discharged without just cause. P.S. appealed this decision and it was heard by an Appeals Referee of the Division of Unemployment Insurance. The Referee reversed the decision of the Claims Deputy holding that Miller voluntarily left her employment, without good cause and therefore was not entitled to unemployment benefits. Miller appealed this decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("the Board"). On December 29, 2004, the Board affirmed the decision of the Referee. Miller appealed the Board's decision on January 6, 2005. The question presented is whether the Board's conclusion that Miller voluntarily terminated her employment without good cause was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.
DISCUSSION
This Court will review the decisions of agencies to inquire whether they are supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal error. General Motors Corp. v. Fritz, 2004 WL 2829053, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.). The evidence underlying the decision need only be that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id., quoting, DABCC v. Newsome, 690 A.2d 906, 910 (Del. 1996). However, the Court will not "weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings." Spicer v. Spicer Unlimited, 2005 WL 914469, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct.), citing, Boulevard Elec. Sales v. Webb, 428 A.2d 11, 13 (Del. 1981).
The Board rested its decision on 19 Del.C. § 3314, states that a person who leaves employment, "shall be disqualified for benefits: (1) For the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." The claimant bears the burden of showing "good cause" for voluntarily terminating employment. O'Neal's Bus Service, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 269 A.2d 247, 249 (Del.Super.Ct. 1970). This Court has found "good cause" where there is a "substantial reduction in wages or hours or substantial deviation in working conditions from the original agreement of hire." Short v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 1993 WL 318860, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. 1985).
With these principles in mind, there was sufficient evidence for the Board to conclude that Miller left P.S. voluntarily. The Board upheld the decision of the Referee that Miller's statement of August 23, 2004 gave P.S. the impression of her intent to give notice. When the claimant responded to Glenn's question as to whether she was giving notice and she stated "if that's what you want it to be," she created the distinct impression that she was giving notice. Additionally, when the claimant did not immediately confront P.S. to correct this impression after having received written confirmation of her last day, she conducted herself as if she had intended to separate from P.S.
As to the conversation of August 23rd, the testimony of both the Claimant and Glenn establish that the Claimant indicated to Glenn that she could consider the phone call from Peninsula Regional Medical Center as notice. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the Claimant did not tell P.S. of her intent to remain until August 31st. Although Miller has a different version of these events, the Board is charged with making credibility determinations. The record also shows that Miller quit her job in May without notice and was permitted to return a few days later when she asked for her job back. A reasonable inference can be drawn that she knew the consequences of her actions in August. Consequently, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that Miller voluntarily left P.S. after having given notice.
Based on the evidence presented, the Board concluded that the claimant had not met her burden to prove that she had left with good cause. Looking for other work is not good cause. This conclusion is supported by the record. While Miller raises new points on this subject in her brief, they were not developed below and will not be considered at the appellate stage of this case.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the decision of the Board. Moreover, there was no legal error. Therefore, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's decision disqualifying Miller from the receipt of unemployment benefits is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.