"[T]he grounds for the demotion of an administrator are left to the sound discretion of the Superintendant and board of education as long as they do not act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner." Board of Educ. of McCreary County v. Williams, 806 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Ky. App. 1991) (citing to Miller v. Board of Educ. of Hardin County, 610 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. App. 1980)). A decision is arbitrary if it is not supported by substantial evidence, meaning the evidence presented was not "of substance or relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men."

Petett v. Board of Educ. of Monroe County, 684 S.W.2d 7 (Ky.Ct.App. 1984) (discretionary review denied 1985). In Kentucky, administrators have a sort of quasitenure in that, before three years, they may be removed for any reason that is not illegally discriminatory or arbitrary and capricious. Board of Educ. of Kenton County v. Paul, 846 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1993); Hooks v. Smith, 781 S.W.2d 522 (Ky.Ct.App. 1989); Miller v. Board of Educ. of Hardin County, 610 S.W.2d 935 (Ky.Ct.App. 1981). If the administrator has served more than three years in that capacity, certain procedures must be followed. KRS 161.765.

According to Appellant, then, the demotion of an administrator does not become final until the full procedural protections of KRS 161.765 have been observed. Appellant cites Banks, supra, as well as Daugherty v. Hunt, Ky.App., 694 S.W.2d 719 (1985), and Miller v. Board of Educ. of Hardin County, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935 (1980), to support his contention that, in this case, the Board's failure to take official — and presumably, final — action prior to May 15 violates KRS 161.760 (3) and invalidates any attempted demotion. Indeed, we readily agree that Banks, Daugherty, and Miller bolster Appellant's argument that, in order to effect a demotion accompanied by a reduction in salary, a school board must pass on the decision prior to May 15.

Our interpretation of these statutes is consistent with two earlier pronouncements by the Court of Appeals. In Miller v. Board of Education of Hardin County, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935, 939 (1981), specific reference is made to "the May 15 deadline" for demotion of third year administrators. More recently in Hooks v. Smith, Ky.App., 781 S.W.2d 522, 523 (1989), in referring to KRS 161.765, the Court of Appeals stated:

The phrase "within the same school district" appears nowhere in Hooks . The case is not merely consistent with our interpretation of KRS 161.765 ; Hooks gives support to that interpretation. See alsoMiller v. Bd. of Ed. of Hardin County , 610 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Ky. App. 1980) (referring to the statute’s distinction between "less experienced administrators" and "the more experienced"), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated inEstreicher v. Bd. of Ed. of Kenton County , 950 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1997).Three years after Hooks , our Supreme Court interpreted the statute, quoting Hooks and highlighting the words "with at least three years experience [.]" Board of Ed. of Kenton County v. Paul , 846 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Ky. 1992). Again, in 1997, the Supreme Court focused on the experience component of the statute, stating: "The power to demote an administrator with three years or more of experience , such as Appellant, comes from KRS 161.765...." Estreicher v. Bd. of Ed. of Kenton County , 950 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Ky. 1997) (emphasis added).

" In Hooks v. Smith, this Court stated: Miller v. Board of Education of Hardin County, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935, 937 (1980) (superceded by statute on other grounds by KRS 160.390 and KRS 161.760).Id.

The grounds for demotion of an administrator are left to the sound discretion of the superintendent and board of education so long as they do not act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Miller v. Board of Education of Hardin Co., Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935 (1980). Without the specific reasons as required by statute and an opportunity for Williams to present his response thereto, the court cannot evaluate the demotion to determine whether or not it was based on valid grounds.

Strictly speaking, however, an administrator has been given no right of tenure to an administrative position and may be removed from such position by the local board of education upon recommendation of the superintendent for any reason not offending some right protected by the state or federal constitutions or KRS 161.162. See KRS 161.765; Miller v. Board of Education of Hardin County, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935 (1980). At best, the statute gives an administrator with at least three years experience an additional procedural opportunity to convince the board of the lack of merit in the superintendent's recommendation of demotion, or that it violates a constitutional or statutory right.

The appellant raises a number of issues on appeal. After reviewing the record and the well-considered opinion of the circuit court, we are convinced that the appellant was accorded due process in the proceedings concerning his demotion and that the court properly found that the school board had sufficient grounds to follow the superintendent's recommendation of demotion. As the circuit court noted, the facts in this case are quite similar to those in Miller v. Board of Education of Hardin County, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935 (1980), and we believe that what we said there applies here with respect to all but one of the questions raised by the appellant. The appellant asserts that the circuit court erred in not permitting the members of the school board to be sued individually.

The appellant argues that although the superintendent made his recommendation before May 15, the Board did not act on that recommendation until June 2. Furthermore, he argues that the only written notice relative to a possible change in his employment was the letters of April 24, May 11, and May 14, and that such letters failed to comply with the notice requirements of KRS 161.760(2). The appellant relies on the decision of the Court in Miller v. Board of Ed. of Hardin Cty., Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 935 (1981), for the proposition that both the superintendent and the board must affirmatively act on a proposed demotion prior to May 15 for such demotion to be effective. In Miller, the appellant was not sent notice of her proposed demotion until May 18, three days after the statutory deadline.