Opinion
No. 00-2573-DJW
September 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Janice Miller's Motion for reversal of the Commissioner's decision denying her supplemental security income (doc. 7).
Plaintiff applied for supplemental social security income on June 4, 1997. (Tr. 113-115). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application, finding Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 65-68). On July 2, 1999, Plaintiff received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), where the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 12-21). The Appeals Council found no basis to grant review of this decision either at law or because of additional evidence provided. (Tr. 7). On December 20, 2000, Plaintiff filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking such judicial review.
Facts
Plaintiff was born on January 29, 1967. (Tr. 25). Plaintiff received her high school graduation equivalency diploma ("GED") in 1990. (Tr. 26). Plaintiff currently resides with her two children, subsisting on Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). (Tr. 26-27). Plaintiff alleges she became disabled, and thus entitled to supplemental social security benefits, on June 1, 1996 (Tr. 160).
With regard to employment history, Plaintiff has earned minimal income from jobs of very short duration. (Tr. 27-29, 116). According to a summary of her wage earnings and her testimony, Plaintiff's earnings for the ten years immediately prior to the date Plaintiff declares she became disabled are:
1986: $ .00 1990: $ 51.26 1994: $ 189.43
1987: $359.60 1991: $ .00 1995: $ .00
1988 $ .00 1992: $ .00 1996: $ .00
1989 $ .00 1993: $403.25
(Tr. 27, 116). Plaintiff testified she was unable to maintain long term employment because of frequent hospital visits. (Tr. 27-28). Plaintiff indicated she would be unable to perform any of her past work from the past ten years "Because I'm in too much pain and I stay sick constantly." (Tr. 29).
Medical evidence on file demonstrates Plaintiff has essential hypertension, acid reflux disease, asthma and either fibromyalgia or diffuse arthralgia. (Tr. 215-216, 325-329). Plaintiff verbally asserts she also suffers from mixed connective tissue disease and possibly lupus. (Tr. 29). Plaintiff maintains she must lie down in the morning for ninety minutes and in the afternoon for forty-five minutes. (Tr. 46). Plaintiff also testified she uses a cane about twice a month to aid in relieving pain and swelling in her legs. (Tr. 32). Plaintiff described pain and swelling in her wrists and hands three to four times monthly and that she wears a wrist splint to relieve swelling when this happens. (Tr. 31).
The medical records reflect Plaintiff met with a medical provider on the following occasions between June 1, 1996 (the date the alleged disability began) and July 2, 1999 (the date of the hearing):
Date Provider Symptom/Complaint Diagnosis Tr.
06/21/96 Gamble Wheezing Asthma 284
07/29/96 Gamble Wheezing Asthma 283
04/29/97 Gamble Recurrent Asthma Asthma 282
05/27/97 Gamble Recurrent Asthma Asthma 281
06/02/97 Bethany ER
06/09/97 Admitted Difficulty Breathing Recurrent asthma, 200 hypertension, acid reflux 212
09/19/97 Gamble Cough/congestion Asthma 279
03/23/98 Gamble Body aches and joint Possible arthritis 276 pain
03/28/98 Baig/Gamble Generalized pain Inconclusive: 275 follow up with (chest, arms, ankles Gamble in one and knees) week
03/31/98 Gamble Generalized pain Inconclusive 274 (see above)
06/03/98 Bethany ER Coughing/chest pain Bronchitis 204
06/06/98 KUMC ER Difficulty Asthma and 236-239 breathing; pneumonia; joint joint pain pain unexplained — 06/09/98
06/25/98 Gamble Asthma Asthma 273
07/14/98 Lindsley Chest, arm, Fibromyalgia; 325-329 — leg pain tests Rheumatologist negative for connective tissue disease
08/03/98 Providence ER Coughing; Asthma; 311; 315 wheezing; bilateral shortness of pneumonia breath — 08/07/98
09/23/98 Gamble Muscle spasms; Undiagnosed 272 wrist pain
10/15/98 Bethany ER Body pain Acute Bronchitis; 333 poly-arthralgias secondary to lupus
12/24/98 Bethany ER Leg pain; persistent bronchitis; 332 cough possible connective tissue disease
01/26/99 Gamble Asthma Asthma 338
02/17/99 KUMC ER Wrist pain Wrist strain 367 (refer to neurologist)
04/20/99 Lindsley Follow up on Fibromyalgia; 363-365 — fibromyalgia from again, no Rheumatologis 07/14/98 evidence of connective tissue disease
04/27/99 Lindsley Leg pain and Fibromyalgia; 356-359 — swelling pain likely due Rheumatologist to prednisone usage
05/27/99 Neurology Muscle and No evidence of 349-351 Clinic joint pain neurological abnormality; EMG ordered
06/22/99 Neurology Muscle and No evidence of 345 Clinic joint pain myophathy found
With regard to medication, Plaintiff testified that she uses bronchodilators, albuterol inhalers and Prednisone to control her asthma. (Tr. 36). Plaintiff testified she was diagnosed with high blood pressure at age fifteen, but medications regulating her blood pressure were prescribed about two and one-half years prior to the date of the hearing. (Tr. 41).
With regard to daily activities, Plaintiff testified in the hearing that she gets up around 7:00 a.m. every morning, makes breakfast for herself and her children and then lies down for a mid-morning rest around 9:30 a.m. (Tr. 45). Plaintiff testified she awakens around 11:00 a.m., fixes lunch, reads to the children and then lies down at 1:00 or 1:30 p.m. for forty-five minutes. (Tr. 46). Plaintiff testified that after her second rest, she irons the children's clothes for the next day and/or does laundry, retrieves the children's pajamas and then makes dinner. (Tr. 47). Plaintiff testified that after dinner, she and the children usually watch movies until bath time at 7:00 p.m., after which she puts them to bed. (Tr. 47-48). Plaintiff testified that approximately once per week, her wheezing prohibits her from giving the children their bath and her sister performs this duty for her. (Tr. 48). Plaintiff testified that after she puts her children to sleep, she usually lies down and reads a book until she falls asleep. (Tr. 48). Finally, Plaintiff testified that in the context of her daily activities, her walking is limited to less than a block because of breathing difficulty and that because of joint pain, standing is limited to one hour. (Tr. 49).
Although Plaintiff has a history of smoking, Plaintiff states she stopped smoking about four months prior to the hearing with the assistance of a nicotine patch prescribed by her doctor. (Tr. 35).
In dictation dated June 18, 1997, Plaintiff's primary treating physician stated that "although patient has some limitations in employment and in the type of work that she can do, I do believe that if she complied with a medication [regimen] and receive[d] some job rehabilitation and [was] placed in a clear air environment, that she would be able to function quite well in the work force. (Tr. 215).
ALJ Factual Findings
• Claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time.
• The medical evidence establishes that claimant has essential hypertension; diffuse arthralgia/fibromyalgia; and asthma with an assertion of a mixed connective tissue disease, which does not constitute a severe impairment. Claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P.
• Claimant's testimony as to the severity of her impairments and attending symptoms is found to be no more than partially credible inasmuch as such testimony is inconsistent with her sparse work history, her sporadic treatment history with treatment primarily for asthma, the lack of significant an ongoing prescriptive pain medication regimen for alleged severe pain; her daily activities, the lack of clinical findings supporting a significant underlying pathology and lack of adverse side effects from any medications.
• Claimant has no past relevant work.
• Claimant has retained the residual functional capacity for a range of sedentary work where she needs to be accommodated with a clean, air-conditioned work environment.
• Claimant was born on January 29, 1967.
• Claimant has a high school equivalency education.
• Based on an exertional capacity for a range of sedentary work, and claimant's age, education and work experience, section 416.969 and the framework of Rule 201.27, Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulation No. 16 indicates that a conclusion of not disabled is appropriate.
• Although claimant has the nonexertional pulmonary limitations noted above with some pain, using the above cited rule as a framework for decision-making, there are a significant number of jobs in the State of Kansas and the national economy which she can nonetheless perform, the numbers and identities of which were specifically set forth by the vocational expert at the time of claimant's hearing.
• Claimant has not been under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act at any time.
With respect to these findings, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred (1) in determining that the testimony of Plaintiff was not credible; (2) in finding Plaintiff has the ability to perform other work in the national economy; and (3) in failing to properly analyze how the combined effects of all of Plaintiff's conditions limits her ability to work.
Standard of Review
The ALJ's decision is binding on the court if supported by substantial evidence. The court must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards. While "more than a mere scintilla," substantial evidence is only "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The court must scrutinize the record and take into account any evidence which fairly detracts from evidence that supports the Secretary's findings. Evidence is not substantial "if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion." A finding of no substantial evidence will be found "only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical evidence."
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987).
Castellano v. Sec'y of HHS, 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1996).
Nieto v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1984).
Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted).
Burkett v. Callahan, 978 F. Supp. 1428, 1429 (D.Kan. 1997) (quoting Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992)).
The court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. At the same time, however, the findings of the Commissioner should not be mechanically accepted. The court may not affirm the Commissioner's findings by isolating facts and labeling them substantial evidence, and the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine whether the Commissioner's conclusions are rational. In applying these standards, "the court must keep in mind that the purpose of the Social Security Act is to ameliorate some of the rigors of life for those who are disabled or impoverished."
Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Casias v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Ortiz v. Apfel, 39 F. Supp.2d 1275, 1281 (D.Kan. 1998).
Id.
Owen v. Chater, 913 F. Supp. 1413, 1418-19 (D.Kan. 1995).
Analysis
The Social Security Administration defines "disability" as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve months due to a medically determinable impairment. A five-step sequential process is used in evaluating a claim of disability:
Step one is whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If claimant is not, the fact finder in step two decides whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. Step three entails looking at whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. If no equivalency, step four requires the claimant to show that because of the impairment he is unable to perform his past work. The final step is to determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform other work available in the national economy, considering such additional factors as age, education, and past work experience.
Anderson v. Apfel, 100 F. Supp.2d 1278, 1281 (D.Kan. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted); see, also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920 (1996).
If the claimant fails at any of the steps in which he or she bears the burden of proof, consideration of any subsequent steps is rendered unnecessary. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the Commissioner bears the burden at step five. If a claimant satisfies steps one, two and three, she is disabled; if a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. If she satisfies step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.
Burnett v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 565, 567 (D.Kan. 1995).
Id.
Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988).
In this case, the ALJ denied benefits at step five, finding that Plaintiff is capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the economy. (Tr. 18). In making this determination, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility with regard to her subjective complaints of disabling conditions. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's testimony was only partially credible. Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in failing to consider her need to lie down twice per day when determining whether she has the ability to perform other work in the national economy. Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to take into consideration the combined effects of all of Plaintiff's conditions in finding she has the ability to work. The Court will address each of Plaintiff's allegations of error in turn.
Credibility
The Tenth Circuit has set forth the following factors for analyzing subjective complaints of disabling conditions: (1) whether claimant proves with objective medical evidence an impairment that causes the subjective condition; (2) whether a loose nexus exists between the impairment and the subjective condition; and (3) whether the subjective condition is disabling based on all objective and subjective evidence. If Plaintiff satisfies the first two factors, the ALJ must consider Plaintiff's assertions regarding subjective conditions and decide whether he believes them. In determining the credibility of Plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ should consider such factors as the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extent to which Plaintiff attempts to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence.
Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994); Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1987).
See Luna, 834 F.2d at 163.
Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 1988).
In reviewing a credibility determination, the court should "defer to the ALJ as trier of fact, the individual optimally positioned to observe and assess witness credibility." Credibility is the province of the ALJ. At the same time, the ALJ must explain why specific evidence relevant to each factor supports a conclusion that a claimant's subjective complaints are not credible. Findings as to credibility should be closely linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.
Casias v. Sec'y of HHS, 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).
Hamilton v. Sec'y of HHS, 961 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992)
Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995); but see Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000) ( Kepler does not require formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of evidence).
Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391 (quoting Huston, 838 F.2d at 1133) (footnote omitted).
In this case, the ALJ appropriately considered the factors set forth by the Tenth Circuit in determining the credibility of Plaintiff's testimony. Although the ALJ found the record contained sufficient objective medical evidence of an impairment that could cause the subjective condition and a loose nexus between the impairment and the subjective condition, the ALJ ultimately found the subjective condition was not disabling based on all objective and subjective evidence presented. More specifically, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility with regard to the subjective evidence presented based on Plaintiff's very sporadic, poor work record, Plaintiff's sporadic treatment history with treatment primarily for asthma, the lack of any significant ongoing prescriptive pain medication regimen for Plaintiff's alleged severe pain, Plaintiff's stated daily activities, the lack of clinical findings supporting any significant underlying pathology and the lack of any adverse side effects from medications. The Court will review the ALJ's opinion with regard to each of these determinations.
Poor, Sporadic Work Record
The Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff has a very sporadic, poor work record. Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to consider the fact that she was unable to maintain employment because of severe pain and frequent hospital visits for her asthma. The evidence demonstrates, however, that although Plaintiff alleges she did not become disabled until June 1, 1996 (Tr. 160), Plaintiff earned an average of less than $100 per year in wages in the ten years prior to June 1, 1996 — the date she alleges she became disabled. This fact supports the ALJ's credibility determination with regard to sporadic work history.
See Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff's poor work history relevant to credibility of subjective complaints).
Sporadic Medical Treatment History
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff has a sporadic treatment history, with treatment primarily for asthma, not pain. Medical records submitted demonstrate that
• In the one year period from June 1, 1996 (the date Plaintiff alleges she became disabled) to June 17, 1997 (the date Plaintiff filed her application for supplemental social security benefits)
• — Plaintiff was seen four times by her primary physician for breathing difficulties;
• — Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital one time for breathing difficulties.
• On June 18, 1997, Plaintiff's primary care physician noted that "although patient has some limitations in employment and in the type of work that she can do, I do believe if she complied with a medication [regimen] and receive[d] some job rehabilitation and [was] placed in a clear air environment, that she would be able to function quite well in the work force. (Tr. 215).
• In the two-year period from July 1997 (the date Plaintiff filed her application for benefits) to July 1999 (the date of the benefits hearing before the ALJ)
• — Plaintiff was seen three times by her primary care physician for symptoms related to her asthma and/or breathing difficulties;
• — Plaintiff was seen four times by an emergency room physician for symptoms related to her asthma and/or breathing difficulties (she was admitted two of these times because she ultimately was diagnosed with pneumonia);
• — Plaintiff was seen four times by her primary care physician for complaints of body aches and/or joint pain (three of which were in a one-week time frame);
• — Plaintiff was referred to a rheumatologist one time to determine the cause of her pain (she had two routine follow-up visits after the initial referral).
• — Plaintiff was seen four times by an emergency room physician for complaints of body aches and/or joint pain (two were in conjunction with asthma visits above);
• — Plaintiff was referred by the emergency room physician to a neurologist one time in order to determine to the unexplained cause of her pain (she visited the neurologist one additional time as part of the initial referral).
The Court finds the medical records support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff has had a sporadic medical treatment history, where the treatment received primarily was for asthma, not pain.
No Ongoing Prescriptive Pain Medication Regimen to Relieve Alleged Severe Pain
The evidence also support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's medical records do not show a significant ongoing prescriptive pain medication regimen for Plaintiff's alleged severe pain. Although Plaintiff testifies she takes "pain killers" (Tr. 29, 40), and the medical records demonstrate that she sporadically has been prescribed various pain medications since she allegedly became disabled (Tr. 56), the medical records do not support a finding that there is — or ever was — a significant ongoing prescriptive pain medication regimen consistent with the severe pain alleged by Plaintiff.
Lack of Clinical Findings to Support Any Significant Underlying Pathology
The Court also finds that medical records support the ALJ's conclusion that there is a lack of clinical findings to support any significant underlying pathology. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that the medical evidence indicates Plaintiff was diagnosed with fibromyalgia. While the medical evidence certainly supports the conclusion that Plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's assertion that her pain is so severe that it renders her disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ acknowledges Plaintiff's fibromyalgia causes her some measure of pain and limitation, but substantial evidence in the record — including but not limited to Plaintiff's testimony regarding her daily activities — supports the ALJ's conclusion that her impairment did not cause the degree of pain and limitation that she described.
Daily Activities
With regard to daily activities, the Court again finds the evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's testimony regarding such activities diminishes her credibility. Although Plaintiff argues her impairments interfere with her ability to perform the activities of daily living, the Court finds evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's testimony regarding her daily activities does not substantiate the exhaustive physical limitations she claims.
Plaintiff testified in the hearing that she gets up around 7:00 a.m. every morning, makes breakfast for herself and her children and then lies down with the children for a mid-morning nap around 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff testified she then awakens around 11:00 a.m., fixes lunch, reads to the children and then lies down at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 p.m. for 45 minutes. Plaintiff testified she then irons the children's clothes for the next day and/or does laundry, retrieves the children's pajamas and then makes dinner. Plaintiff testified that after dinner, she and the children usually sit down and watch movies until bath time at 7:00 p.m., after which she puts them to bed. Plaintiff testified that approximately once per week, her wheezing prohibits her from giving the children their bath and her sister performs this duty for her. Plaintiff testified that after she puts her children to sleep, she usually lies down and reads a book until she falls asleep.
With regard to daily activities, Plaintiff further testified that her walking is limited to less than a block because of breathing difficulty and that because of joint pain, standing is limited to one hour. Plaintiff did testify that she receives assistance in caring for her children from her younger sister, but beyond administration of the baths once per week and occasionally helping with the laundry and housecleaning, Plaintiff did not describe with particularity the capacity in which her sister provided such assistance. The evidence regarding Plaintiff's daily activities, when taken as a whole, constitutes substantial evidence from which the ALJ could conclude Plaintiff's testimony regarding her physical limitations was not credible.
Lack of Adverse Side Effects from Medication
Finally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility with regard to her testimony about various side effects from her medications based on the lack of documentation in the medical records indicating such adverse side effects. In her testimony, Plaintiff asserts the only side effects from her medication are the "jitters" and "stomach queasiness." (Tr. 38, 43-44). Moreover, there is no evidence in the medical records of any alleged significant adverse side effects experienced by Plaintiff as a result of her medications. Thus, the Court finds the evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that there is no evidence of adverse side effects upon Plaintiff from her medications.
Based on this discussion, the Court concludes substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not credible as to her allegations of limiting symptoms and does not find that the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff was not credible. Thus, the Court declines to remand or reverse on this issue.
Hypothetical Question Regarding Ability to Perform Other Work
In addition to challenging the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of her impairments and/or symptoms are no more than partially credible, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred when he failed to include in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert the need for Plaintiff to lie down for ninety minutes every morning and forty-five minutes every afternoon. Plaintiff thus argues the ALJ does not know whether there are jobs in the local, regional or national economy that Plaintiff can perform.
The ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert must reflect with precision all of Plaintiff's impairments that are substantially supported by the record. The ALJ need not, however, include every limitation claimed by Plaintiff, but only those limitations that he/she finds exist based upon substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's claims of disabling limitations in the context of lying down in the morning and the afternoon were not credible. The Court has affirmed those credibility findings. Thus, the Court cannot hold that the hypothetical question must include a physical limitation that Plaintiff lie down for ninety minutes in the morning and forty-five minutes in the afternoon. Accordingly, remand or reversal on the basis of defect in the ALJ's hypothetical question is not proper.
See Decker v. Chater, 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996).
Decker, 86 F.3d at 955; Hintz v. Chater, 913 F. Supp. 1486, 1495 (D.Kan. 1996).
Combined Effect of Plaintiff's Impairments
Finally, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in failing to properly analyze how the combined effects of all of Plaintiff's conditions limit her ability to work. It is true, the ALJ must consider the combined effects of impairments that may not be severe individually, but which in combination may constitute a severe medical disability. Here, the ALJ's opinion reflects he satisfied the requirement and adequately considered the combined effects of Plaintiff's impairments. In discussing the medical evidence on file and the medical information asserted by Plaintiff, the ALJ acknowledges that one or more of Plaintiff's disorders impose some limitation on her ability to function. The ALJ further states that "[n]onetheless, she does not have impairments, considered singularly or in combination, which meet or equal criteria contained in the Listing of Impairments, Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 16." (Tr. 16) (emphasis added).
See Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th Cir. 1991); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C).
Notably, the ALJ's opinion goes on to reference each of Plaintiff's alleged impairments in turn, including but not limited to her allegations of pain and of the need to lie down twice per day. The ALJ then concludes "that at all times pertinent herein[,] claimant, despite her combination of impairments, has been capable of performing jobs which exist in significant numbers in the economy and she is therefore not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, as amended." (Tr. 18) (emphasis added). The Court finds from the above-referenced statements that the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff's impairments in combination in reaching his result.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for Reversal or Remand (doc. 7) is denied.
It is further ordered that Jo Anne Barnhart is substituted for Kenneth Apfel as the party defendant in this suit, and the Clerk shall change the docket to reflect the caption as shown on this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.