Opinion
1:22-cv-171
10-30-2023
EMMANUEL JOSHUA MILLER, Petitioner v. ARMALE, et al, Respondents
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
SUSA PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. Recommendation
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner Emmanuel Joshua Miller's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. It is further recommended that a Certificate of Appealability be denied and this action closed.
II. Report
A. Factual and procedural background
Petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the Petition). ECF No. 4. Petitioner is challenging his guilty plea and sentence in the underlying state criminal action at CP-25-CR-2288-2019.
By way of background, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Petitioner on September 19, 2019, with three counts of criminal conduct relating to the possession of cocaine, a controlled substance, with intent to deliver. ECF No. 39-1. On January 3, 2020, Petitioner entered a negotiated plea deal whereby the Commonwealth nolle prossed Counts Two and Three of the indictment in exchange for Petitioner's admission of guilt as to Count One. ECF No. 39-7 at 38-39. On March 3, 2020, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to two to four years incarceration. Id. at 39.
Petitioner fded a post-sentence motion on April 13, 2020. ECF No. 39-8 at 8. The trial court denied that motion on May 4, 2020. Id.
On November 12, 2020, Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Id. Through appointed counsel, Proper filed an amended PCRA petition on June 15, 2021. Collectively, Petitioner raised the following grounds for relief:
a) Constitutional violations in depriving Petitioner of due process for criminal charges not being commenced within seventy-two hours of his arrest;
b) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not filing a pre-trial omnibus motion;
c) Generalized and unspecified complaints about “unfair procedures” during the pendency of Petitioner's case;
d) A constitutional violation in the issuance of an arrest warrant based on a materially defective criminal compliant which failed to include an affidavit of probable cause, depriving Petitioner of due process under the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution and thus making the entire case void ab initio; and
e) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to challenge the issuance of the arrest warrant or seek dismissal of the case against Petitioner based upon the absence of an affidavit of probable cause in the criminal complaint.
ECF No. 39-7 at 40.
On June 17, 2021, the PCRA court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.” ECF No. 39-7 at 38. Over Petitioner's Objection, the PCRA court issued a final order dismissing Petitioner's PCRA on July 13, 2021. Id. at 44. Although Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal, Petitioner discontinued that appeal on his own motion on January 10, 2022. ECF No. 39-8 at 21. The instant Section 2254 Petition followed.
In his own words, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:
Ground One: Unlawful detainment violation of my 4th & 14th Amendment illegal arrest
Ground Two: Arrest without warrant
Ground Three: Detained without filing of charges for 21 days past 72 hours
Ground Four: Subject matter jurisdiction these laws don't apply to me
ECF No. 4. In his supporting brief, Petitioner explains the nature of his claims as follows:
Petitioner's averments have been lightly edited for clarity and grammar.
1. 7-30-19 Petitioner was arrested and detained without a warrant and sent to the Erie County Prison under phantom charges that wasn't even filed until 8-21-19
2. The law states if you're not charged within 72 hours which mean the filing of charges within the 72 hours then you [have] to be let go.
Petitioner was not, instead petitioner was [] convict[ed] with out any jurisdiction of any court[.] [T]he district attorney violated the petitioner by malicious prosecution with the knowledge that those charge wasn't filed until 21 days later.
3. Because charges wasn't filed within 72 hours that violated the petitioner's substantial due process and as much as constitutional rights and then sentence with jurisdiction.
4. Without a formal and sufficient indictment or information a court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction and thus an accused may not be punished for a crime.
ECF No. 25.
After receiving an extension of time, Respondents filed an answer to the Petition in which they maintain that all grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted and without merit. ECF No. 28. Petitioner filed a reply brief, see ECF No. 30, rendering this matter ripe for adjudication.
B. Applicable Legal Standards
Habeas corpus is an ‘“extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were ‘grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings.” Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)). In enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress “significantly limited the federal court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus.” Tolbert v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 4677357 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2019). Under § 2254, a district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Moreover, federal courts must give considerable deference to determinations made by state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010). Thus, if a claim presented in a § 2254 petition has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief cannot be granted unless:
the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). ft is the habeas petitioner's burden to show that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent and/or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Moreno v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 4192459, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2019).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized the heavy burden habeas petitioners bear, noting that “even ‘clear error'” by the state courts “will not suffice.” Orie v. Sec. Pa. Dept, of Corrections, 940 F.3d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2019). Rather, the state court must be wrong “beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. (citations and some internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the factual determinations of the state courts are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”).
C. Analysis and Discussion
1. Timeliness
Before the Court can address the merits of the petition, it must first decide whether it was timely filed. Romansky v. Superintendent Green SCI, 933 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2019). Pursuant to AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his federal habeas claims within one year of the date his judgment of sentence became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because he did not seek direct review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Petitioner's sentence became final for purposes of the one-year PCRA statute of limitations and the one-year federal habeas statute of limitations on June 4, 2020, 30 days after the denial of his post-sentence motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the one-year federal limitations period generally begins on the date the petitioner's judgment of sentence became final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”); Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(A)(2)(a) (providing that if a defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the order deciding the motion). When Petitioner filed his PCRA petition on November 12, 2020, the one-year habeas statute was “immediately tolled.” Nelson v. Superintendent of SCI-Retreat, 2019 WL 897296 *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019). At that point, 161 days of the limitations period had expired. Petitioner's PCRA petition remained pending in the state court system until January 10, 2022, when Petitioner filed a motion voluntarily terminating his appeal. Consequently, the instant 2254 petition, filed approximately 147 days later, was timely by almost two months.
2. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
As a general matter, a federal district court may not consider the merits of a habeas petition unless the petitioner has “exhausted the remedies available” in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement “only if [he or she] can show that [they] fairly presented the federal claim at each level of the established state-court system for review.” Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 2004). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to “give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts ... by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
In order to “fairly present” a claim for exhaustion purposes, the petitioner must advance the claim's “factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” Bennett v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 886 F.3d 268, 280 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999)). A petitioner may exhaust a federal claim either by raising it on direct appeal or presenting it in post-conviction PCRA proceedings. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Either way, the petitioner must present his federal constitutional claims “to each level of the state courts empowered to hear those claims.” Id. at 847 (“requiring state prisoners [in order to fully exhaust their claims] to fde petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State”). “Once a petitioner's federal claims have been fairly presented to the state's highest court, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Stoss v. Estock, 2019 WL 2160464, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2019) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989)).
An important corollary to the exhaustion requirement is the doctrine of procedural default. “Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address” the merits of those claims “in the first instance.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). Procedural default intertwines with exhaustion in the following manner: when a claim has never been ‘“fairly presented' to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied” due to the lack of available state process, but the claims “are considered to be procedurally defaulted.” McKenzie v. Tice, 2020 WL 1330668, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999)). Such claims may not ordinarily be reviewed by a federal court. Davila v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (“[A] federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court-that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule.”) (citations omitted).
Several caveats exist. First, “[a] state procedural rule can preclude federal habeas corpus review” only when the state rule is “independent of the federal question [presented] and adequate to support the judgment.” McKenzie, 2020 WL 1330668, at *5 (quoting Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 2007)). A rule is “independent” if it is not “‘so interwoven with federal law' that it cannot be said to be independent of the merits of a petitioner's federal claims.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 2004)). A rule is “adequate” if it was “firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the purported default.” Levya, 504 F.3d at 366 (quoting Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 372 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Second, a petitioner can overcome procedural default, thereby permitting federal court review, if the petitioner can demonstrate either: (1) “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice” as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or (2) that the failure to consider the claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To demonstrate cause and prejudice, the petitioner must show some objective factor external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to comply with a state procedural rule. Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must typically show actual innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-26 (1995).
Applying these principles, the Court concludes that the grounds for relief raised in the instant Petition are procedurally defaulted. As noted above, Petitioner maintains that trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file an omnibus pre-trial motion objecting to the following: 1) Petitioner was unlawfully detained after an illegal arrest; 2) he was illegally arrested without a warrant; 3) he was detained for over 72 hours without charges being filed; and 4) the trial court lacked “subject matter jurisdiction” over him. From a review of the record, it appears that Petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to these issues in his pro se PCRA petition, see ECF No. 39-7 at 9-21, and through counsel in his supplemental PCRA petition, see ECF No. 39-7 at 32-37. However, although Petitioner initially appealed the PCRA court's denial of his petition, he ultimately withdrew that appeal on his own motion. As such, his claims were not “fairly presented to the state courts” for “one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. See also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that, for habeas claims in Pennsylvania to be exhausted, the claims must have been presented to both the PCRA court and the Superior Court); Proper v. Clark, 2020 WL 1814390, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2020) (“Proper identified these grounds for relief in his PCRA petition but failed to appeal them to the Superior Court. As a result, they have not been fairly presented to the state courts for one full round of review.”). And, because Petitioner is now time-barred from pursuing that appeal, those claims are procedurally defaulted. Harper v. Wingard, 2020 WL 1532288, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020) (claims raised in a PCRA petition but abandoned on appeal to the Superior Court are procedurally defaulted).
Petitioner can overcome this procedural default by demonstrating either: (1) “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice” resulting from the alleged violation of federal law; or (2) that the failure to consider the claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Aside from general averments of attorney incompetence and misconduct, Petitioner advances no compelling argument to establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if this Court does not consider his claims. Instead, he appears to assert that cause exists to overcome his procedural default because PCRA appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he “didn't bother to raise [his] issue in superior [court].” ECF No. 4 at 9.
To establish a “miscarriage of justice” for purposes of overcoming procedural default, the petitioner must present evidence of “actual innocence” that is “so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error[.]” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995). The "miscarriage ofjustice" exception only applies in extraordinary cases where the petitioner demonstrates that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schulp, 513 U.S. at 316. Based on the Court's review of Petitioner's arguments and the trial record, there is no question that this is not the type of extraordinary case in which he can overcome the default of his claims by way of the miscarriage ofjustice exception.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to properly preserve claims for review in state court may suffice to constitute “cause” to excuse a procedural default. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Supreme Court further held that claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Critically, however, the exception created in Martinez does not apply to claims that appellate PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Deep v. Wingard, 2020 WL 908259, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2020) (“Martinez only serves as cause to excuse the procedural default of a trial counsel claim of ineffectiveness based only upon the ineffectiveness of PCRA trial counsel and not by any ineffectiveness engaged in by PCRA appellate counsel.”); Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Martinez made very clear that its exception . . . applies only to attorney error causing procedural default during initial-review collateral proceedings, not collateral appeals.”); McKenzie, 2020 WL 1330668, at *8 (reiterating that Martinez does not apply where appellate PCRA counsel ineffectively fails to appeal issues raised in the initial PCRA proceeding). Consequently, Petitioner's averment that his PCRA counsel failed to “raise [his] issue” on collateral appeal is insufficient to establish cause and prejudice. As a result, each of Petitioner's allegations is procedurally defaulted and cannot be reviewed by this Court.
D. Certificate of Appealability
A certificate of appealability should be issued only when a petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2). Where the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, “a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Here, the Court concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether each of Petitioner's claims should be denied for the reasons given herein. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, Miller's Petition should be denied, and no certificate of appealability should issue. The Clerk should be directed to mark this case closed.