We have held that a specific deposit exists when money or property is given to a bank for some specific or particular purpose, "as a note for collection, money to pay a particular note, or property for some specific purpose." See Officer v. Officer, 120 Iowa 389, 94 N.W. 947, 948, 98 Am. St. Rep. 365; In re Receivership of Security Savings Bank of Perry, 205 Iowa 171, 217 N.W. 831; Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957, 221 N.W. 543 (and cases therein cited). It is well settled that a deposit for a specific purpose creates a trust relationship between the depositor and the bank.

Where the bank fails in such a situation, the owner of the fund has a right to claim it and to receive preference in payment of it where it passes into the hands of the receiver. Other cases which agree with these conclusions are Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957, 959, 221 N.W. 543, 545 (1928) and Dugan v. Security Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 171, 173, 217 N.W. 831, 832 (1928). After stating the principles established in the quoted portion of the Andrew decision, appellants argue that, if it has been established that there was an agreement with the bank in 1938 to segregate lawyers' client trust funds, "it is not incumbent upon either [appellant] to establish that the Exchange Bank did, in fact, segregate these funds."

"Undoubtedly appellant [plaintiff] has established, as a fact, that her money was received by the bank and it is immaterial what bookkeeping entry was made with respect to it, or whether any was made. If an entry was made showing the money had been deposited or used in violation of appellant's instructions, it would not change the nature of the transaction." The case of Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957, 221 N.W. 543, 545, is also pertinent. There the plaintiff owned a note and mortgage held by the bank for his use and benefit. The mortgagors paid off the note at the bank and plaintiff instructed the bank to acquire two notes and mortgages with the money so received. One note and mortgage was acquired for plaintiff, but the bank closed before the other could be negotiated.

These propositions are so well established and so widely accepted as to suggest the absence of the necessity for the citation of authority. Support for them may, however, be found in the following: note, 31 A.L.R. 472; 3 R.C.L. 516-522; 7 C.J. 641-644, 749-750; Officer v. Officer, 120 Iowa 389, 94 N.W. 947, 98 Am. St. Rep. 365; Dolph v. Cross, 153 Iowa 289, 133 N.W. 669; Whitcomb v. Carpenter, 134 Iowa. 227, 111 N.W. 825, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 928; Smith v. Sanborn State Bank, 147 Iowa 640, 126 N.W. 779, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 517, 140 Am. St. Rep. 336; Porter Auto Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 185 Iowa 844, 171 N.W. 121; Hudspeth v. Union T. S. Bank, 196 Iowa 706, 195 N.W. 378, 31 A.L.R. 466; Iowa Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. De La Hunt, 197 Iowa 227, 196 N.W. 17; First National Bank v. Propp, 198 Iowa 809, 200 N.W. 428; Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 497, 212 N.W. 748, 215 N.W. 728; In re Receivership of Security Sav. Bank, 205 Iowa 171, 217 N.W. 831; Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957, 221 N.W. 543; Townsend v. Athelstan Bank, 212 Iowa 1078, 237 N.W. 356. Under these general rules, it may be conceded that if money was left in the Union Savings Bank Trust Company to be by the bank turned over to the successful party in pending litigation, and the bank was to be a mere stakeholder of such fund, and the bank knew of and consented to such an arrangement, then the fund would never become the bank's property; that the bank's relationship to it would be that merely of a bailee or trustee and that upon the insolvency of the bank the owner of the fund would be entitled to preference in payment if the fund passed into the hands of the receiver.

Her intention was not to deposit, but immediately reinvest the money to be received on the Blackwell note. Furthermore, Fischer, Gould Burge did not intend that the Blackwell note money should be deposited in behalf of appellee, and they did not thus accept or deposit it. All parties understood and intended that the proceeds from the Blackwell note should not be deposited for, but turned over to, appellee. Hence, the moneys received by Fischer, Gould Burge from the Blackwell note belonged to appellee when in possession of that firm. Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957; Andrew v. Security Savings Bank, 203 Iowa 546; Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 497. The moneys thus belonging to appellee constituted a trust fund, under the circumstances, when in the possession of Fischer, Gould Burge. Andrew v. State Bank of Dexter, 204 Iowa 565; Andrew v. Hamilton County State Bank, 207 Iowa 403; Andrew v. State Bank of New Hampton, 205 Iowa 1064, and other cases above cited.

The proceeds of the sale of the cattle were deposited with the bank as a special deposit for the particular purpose of meeting the Hess check, and we think the trial court correctly so ruled. Among our cases on the subject, the following may be noted: Border v. State Sav. Bk. of Dedham, 202 Iowa 27; City of New Hampton v. Leach, 201 Iowa 316; Danbury State Bank v. Leach, 201 Iowa 321; Leach v. State Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 265; Dolph v. Cross, 153 Iowa 289; Smith v. Sanborn State Bank, 147 Iowa 640; First National Bank v. Propp, 198 Iowa 809; Hanby v. First Savings Bank of Spring Hill, 197 Iowa 150; Andrew v. Security Savings Bank, 203 Iowa 546; Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957; Whitcomb v. Carpenter, 134 Iowa 227; Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. De La Hunt, 197 Iowa 227; In re Receivership Security Savings Bank of Perry, 205 Iowa 171. [3] II. Upon what portion of the assets recovered by the first receiver is this preference to be applied?

This transfer is admitted to have been made without the knowledge or consent of Mrs. Huhn. Whatever bookkeeping may have been done by the bank for its own convenience is a matter in no way controlling in this case. Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957. The receiver insists further, however, that Mrs. Huhn overdrew her private account, and subsequently issued checks, some of which the bank honored, and paid out of the proceeds of the sale.

The account, therefore, as between the society and the bank, was a general account, and their relationship was that of creditor and debtor only. None of the elements of a trust relationship between the society and the bank existed. Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957; Heckman v. Ottumwa Nat. Bank, 208 Iowa 322; Andrew v. Colo Sav. Bank, 205 Iowa, 872; and cases cited supra. It follows that the finding and decree of the court awarding preferential payment of this claim must be, and it is, reversed.

However, this case criticized In re State Bank of Elkhorn, Neb., Hanger et al. v. Luikart, Superintendent of Banks, 129 Neb. 506, 262 N.W. 15 (1935). For additional decisions upon this point, see Bank of America Nat. Trust Savings Ass'n v. California Savings Commercial Bank, et al., 218 Cal. 261, 22 P.2d 704 (1933); Miller v. Andrew, 206 Iowa 957, 221 N.W. 543 (1928); Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Merchants' Bank Trust Co., 193 N.C. 696, 138 S.E. 22 (1927); and Moore Mill Lumber Co. v. Curry County Bank et al., 200 Or. 558, 267 P.2d 202 (1954). The deposit herein is delineated as a deposit for a special purpose. It necessarily follows that the ultimate question of garnishment in aid of execution and its application or prohibition to or upon a deposit of such nature must be squarely determined.