Miller v. Anderson

4 Citing cases

  1. Johnson v. Com

    606 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    This court has consistently held that when both the alleged offense and the commencement of juvenile proceedings occur before an accused becomes eighteen, and the proceedings are still pending at the time of indictment, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction. Miller v. Anderson, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 826 (1975); Koonce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 452 S.W.2d 822 (1970). As we stated in Lowry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1968):

  2. State v. Lindstrom

    2011 Ohio 6755 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011)

    The juvenile court granted the motion two days later noting that the "complaint [was] withdrawn." {ΒΆ 28} We find persuasive the case, Miller v. Anderson (Ky. 1975), 519 S.W.2d 826, where the defendant, a minor, had proceedings commenced against him in the juvenile court. The proceedings had not concluded when the defendant turned 18 years old.

  3. Jacobs v. Commonwealth

    947 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 27 times
    Declining to address the constitutionality of the statutory provisions distinguishing the six types of homicide because the defendant did not provide the Attorney General with notice of the challenge before the trial court

    The circuit court has jurisdiction of the defendant's case but only a judge, not an interloper, can conduct the trial. See Ketcham v. Manning, 212 Ky. 325, 279 S.W. 344 (1926); Pinkleton v. Lueke, 265 Ky., 84, 95 S.W.2d 1103 (1936); Miller v. Anderson, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 826 (1975). Without authority from our constitution, statutes, or rules adopted pursuant thereto, the appointment has no legal basis.

  4. Johnson v. Bishop

    587 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    Even though the petitioners did not raise this question before or during their trial in the circuit court, they cannot be deemed to have waived the question and thereby to have conferred jurisdiction of the cause on the circuit court. That court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, and subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred by waiver, or even consent, while a question as to such jurisdiction generally may be raised at any time. Duncan v. O'Nan, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 626 (1970). Inasmuch as the Leslie Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this kind of case, the writ applied for should be granted. Miller v. Anderson, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 826 (1975). Nothing in our decision here should be interpreted as precluding the juvenile session of the Leslie District Court from proceeding to hold transfer hearings as to the petitioners in accordance with KRS 208.170. It appears to us that the legislative intent upon amending KRS 208.020(1) must surely have been that the transfer hearing provisions apply under the circumstances in this case. If this were not so, then as a practical matter, the courts would be powerless to punish or aid in the rehabilitation of offenders in situations such as this.