Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:01CV-339-S
September 11, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the motion of one of the Defendants, the Administrative Office of the Courts (the "AOC"), to dismiss the claims against it. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant this motion by a separate order entered this date.
FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff, Beverly Miller ("Miller"), was employed by the AOC as a jury pool Manager for the 30th Judicial District in Kentucky. The AOC is a division of Kentucky's state government system. Miller alleges that she was fired from her job with the AOC for exercising her First Amendment rights and in retaliation for being a "whistleblower." As a result, she has alleged three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, Ky. Rev. St. § 61.102, et seq. The AOC filed this motion to dismiss arguing that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Miller's claims under the Whistleblower Act, as applied to it, violate the state Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Because we find its first argument to be determinative of the case, we need not address the validity of the Whistleblower Act under Kentucky's Constitution.
DISCUSSION
We note initially that this motion falls under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). It is not, as Miller argues, a motion for summary judgment. The only element necessary for our determination which is arguably factual, whether the AOC is an arm of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, has been admitted by Miller in her complaint. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Thus, the issue before us, whether the AOC can be sued in United States District Court, is a question of law and is ripe for our determination. Sutton v. Evans, 918 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1990).
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or in equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although the language only addresses suits by citizens of a diverse state, it has been long established that the Amendment bars suits against a state by its own citizens as well. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Congress has the ability to abrogate the effect of the Amendment in certain situations. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123-32, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). However, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to take this step and, in fact, only subjected `persons' to liability for violations of federal law. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979).
As we have already noted, there is no dispute that the AOC is an arm of Kentucky's government. This means that the AOC is entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection and does not constitute a `person' under § 1983. Therefore, we have do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Miller's claims against the AOC.
Miller attempts to circumvent this conclusion by arguing that this case "is not really about § 1983" and by pointing to cases in which, she claims, similar lawsuits were maintained. (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss, p. 4.) Of course, to the extent that Miller cites it as the foundation for her cause of action, this case is about § 1983 and will be dismissed.
Miller also cites to Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), and Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), which she claims are cases in which lawsuits against states were allowed to proceed. In Perry, the defendants were "members of the Board of Regents and the president of the college." Id. at 595, 92 S.Ct. at 2696. In other words, the suit was filed against individuals, not against the state or arms of the state. Thus, it does not support Miller's argument.
In Roth, it is not clear how or in what capacity the Board of Regents were sued. However, it is clear that the district court relied upon Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and its progeny in dismissing the defendants' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against them. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 310 F. Supp. 972, 974-75 (D.C. Wis. 1970), aff'd by 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd and remanded by 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Ex Parte Young is founded upon the proposition that a state officer, when he acts contrary the federal law, is exceeding the scope of his authority from the state and is no longer entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. at 454. Thus, Ex Parte Young only permits suits to be maintained against state officials, and even then, there are limits on liability. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (recognizing that defendant may invoke sovereign immunity where the state is the real party in interest and the suit is for the recovery of money damages). Roth, then, also fails to support Miller's argument that she is entitled to sue an arm of the state.
There is no further discussion of this issue in the appellate decisions.
CONCLUSION
We have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a suit against Kentucky by one of her citizens. The AOC's motion to dismiss will be granted by a separate order.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered this date and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion of the Defendant, the Administrative Office of the Courts, to dismiss is GRANTED. The Plaintiff's claims against it are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.