Opinion
12-19-1957
Matter of Thomas A. MILLER, a Person Under the Age of Twenty-One Years. Civ. 22696.
John Joseph Hall, Los Angeles, for appellant Rita Casper. Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Lynn Henry Johnson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Dec. 19, 1957.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1958.
Hearing Granted Feb. 11, 1958. *
John Joseph Hall, Los Angeles, for appellant Rita Casper.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Lynn Henry Johnson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
ASHBURN, Justice.
Appeal from order directing the mother of a ward of the juvenile court to pay $25 a month to the county of Los Angeles by way of reimbursement of the expense of maintenance of said minor.
Thomas Casper, also known as Thomas A. Miller, a minor of 15 years, was declared a ward of the juvenile court and committed to the care and custody of the Youth Authority. Thereafter his mother, Rita Casper (or Rita Kip Pines) was cited to show cause why she should not be ordered to pay for the support of the child pursuant to the Juvenile Court Law. After hearing held the juvenile court ordered her to pay to the county $25 a month toward the expense of support of the boy, beginning December 17, 1956, and continuing so long as he is maintained at the expense of the county.
The court orally ruled: 'Well, in the light of the things we have already developed here, there is no question in the world but that the mother is financially able to contribute $25.00 a month on this. * * * The Court finds that the mother is financially able to reimburse the County in the sum of $25.00 per month. It is so ordered, commencing as of the date of placement of the minor with the Youth Authority.'
Thereupon a minute order was made and entered, reading as follows: 'Minor's mother is sworn and testifies. Minor's mother, Kip Pines, * * * is ordered to pay to the County of Los Angeles, the sum of $25.00 per month, beginning Dec. 27, 1956, and continuing during all of the time minor is maintained at the expense of the County of Los Angeles pursuant to orders of this court.' No mention is made therein of a written order to be prepared or to be signed by the judge. However, two days later, on June 13th, a document entitled 'Findings and Order of Court' was filed bearing the judge's signature. The portion presently pertinent reads: 'Findings of Fact 1. That Kip Pines is the mother of said minor person and is charged with the support of said minor person and is the owner of property of the reasonable market value of $2300.00,* has income of $ unknown per month, reasonable monthly expenses of $472.00,* and liabilities and debts of $2708.72; CONCLUSION OF LAW That Kip Pines is able to reimburse County of Los Angeles at the rate of $25.00 per month for the expense of support and maintenance of said minor person. ORDER OF COURT It is therefore ordered that Kip Pines pay to County of Los Angeles the sum of $25.00 per month beginning the 17th day of December, 1956, and continue during all the time said Thomas A. Casper a minor person is maintained at the expense of County of Los Angeles pursuant to orders of this Court. * Community.'
The appeal rests upon the proposition that the findings of fact do not support the order. Appellant contends that this is true because they state that her monthly income is unknown and her monthly 'community' expenses are $472, while her debts exceed her assets by $408.72. No claim is advanced that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that appellant is able to pay $25 a month toward the boy's support, and indeed no such claim could be made. The transcript shows that the trial judge had before him a statement of Seaboard Finance Company as to appellant's earnings, as well as a probation officer's report, and that same probably furnished the information upon which assets and liabilities were computed; neither document is included in the record in this court. But that is a minor matter. The real vice in the finding contained in the June 13th order is that the monthly income is stated to be unknown. The evidence shows that the mother had been earning regularly monthly sums ranging from $308.32 to $395.78. The court designated the monthly expenses as 'community' because, as the transcript shows, her reputed husband, Pines, should bear at least half of same. Comparing an average of $350 income with $236, half of outgo, it appears that the mother does have the ability to pay $25 a month toward the boy's support.
It is doubtful whether the order filed on June 13th has any efficacy at all. Section 864, Welfare & Institutions Code, says: 'If the court finds * * * that the parents or guardian of such ward or other minor person * * * is able to pay, either in whole or in part, for the expense of his support and maintenance, the court shall further order, and direct that the county be reimbursed, in whole or in part, for its expense of support and maintenance of him * * * by his parents, guardian, or other person liable for his support.' This phrasing, 'if the court finds,' does not require a written finding in this type of proceeding (In re Steiner, 134 Cal.App.2d 391, 396-398, 285 P.2d 972), and the familiar rule of procedure is that a minute order disposing of a motion and making no mention of a later written order constitutes the final memorial of the ruling, the appealable order. This is provided in Rule 2(b) of the Rules on Appeal. See, also, Herrscher v. Herrscher, 41 Cal.2d 300, 304, 259 P.2d 901. The minute order of June 11th contains an implied finding of ability to pay and no more than that was needed.
But counsel have joined in treating the signed order of June 13th as the one which determines the appeal, and the matter will be discussed from that standpoint. The statement therein that the mother 'has income of $ unknown per month' is inconsistent with the later finding (under the caption 'Conclusion of Law') that she 'is able to reimburse County of Los Angeles at the rate of $25.00 per month for the expense of support and maintenance of said minor person,' which is a finding of fact misplaced as one of law. The other statements as to finances found under the caption 'Findings of Fact' are clearly probative and unnecessary. It is also true that the statement that appellant 'has income of $ unknown per month' is but a probative finding.
'The finding of an ultimate fact usually, if not always, involves one or more conclusions. The rule which requires findings of facts does not require the finding of evidentiary facts but only that ultimate facts be found; it does not exclude conclusions of facts but only conclusions of law. [Citations.] Whether a finding is one of an ultimate fact of a conclusion of law depends on the nature of the evidence. 'If, from the facts in evidence, the result can be reached by that process of natural reasoning adopted in the investigation of truth, it becomes an ultimate fact, to be found as such. If, on the other hand, resort must be had to the artificial processes of the law, in order to reach a final determination, the result is a conclusion of law.' [Citations.] 'Ultimate facts are the logical conclusions deduced from certain primary facts evidentiary in character.' [Citation.]' Hayward Lbr. & Investment Co. v. Construction etc. Corp., 110 Cal.App.2d 1, 3, 241 P.2d 1054, 1055. See, also, Gossman v. Gossman, 52 Cal.App.2d 184, 192, 126 P.2d 178; Fitzpatrick v. Underwood, 17 Cal.2d 722, 727, 112 P.2d 3.
The quoted finding found under the caption 'Conclusion of Law' states the ultimate fact and therefore the evidentiary matter which precedes it must be disregarded. '[H]owever unsupported, however lame, however inconclusive, any number of the findings may be, if in any case there be one clear, sustained, and sufficient finding upon which the judgment may rest, every presumption being in favor of the judgment, it will be here concluded that the court did rest its judgment upon that finding, or those findings, and the others may and will be disregarded.' American National Bank v. Donnellan, 170 Cal. 9, 15, 148 P. 188, 190. To the same effect see, Daniels v. Daniels, 140 Cal.App.2d 430, 440, 300 P.2d 335.
In order to clear the record and dissipate any misunderstanding as to its import the following portion of the written order, filed June 13, 1957, is stricken, 'and is the owner of property of the reasonable market value of $2300.00,* has income of $ unknown per month, reasonable monthly expenses of $472.00,* and liabilities and debts of $2708.72; *Community. Conclusion of Law.'
The order directing appellant to pay to the county of Los Angeles $25 a month, beginning December 27, 1956, and continuing during all the time the minor is maintained at the expense of the county of Los Angeles pursuant to orders of court is affirmed.
FOX, Acting P. J., and RICHARDS, J. pro tem., concur. --------------- * Pursuant to stipulation on file the order is reversed. The remittitur to issue forthwith, March 31, 1958.