Opinion
No. CV07-5003467
May 28, 2008
ARTICULATION OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #110
FACTS
The plaintiff, Brenda Miller-Black, filed a four-count revised complaint on August 21, 2007, alleging in counts one and two, respectively, that the defendant, Regional School District 11 (school district), wrongfully terminated her employment as a special education teacher in violation of public policy and defamed her character and abilities by falsely characterizing the reason for her termination in a public document. With respect to her wrongful discharge claim in count one, the plaintiff more specifically avers that she was terminated in an effort to mask various deficiencies of the school district, such as the purported lack of training and supervision of its teachers. In connection with her defamation claim in count two, the plaintiff alleges that the school district defamed her reputation by publishing to the general public minutes of a school board meeting that stated she was terminated for cause. The plaintiff seeks, inter alia, punitive damages from the school district for the injuries that she allegedly suffered.
On September 4, 2007, the defendant filed a motion to strike both the wrongful discharge and defamation claims, as well as the claim for punitive damages. The defendant submitted a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition on September 19, 2007, and a supplemental memorandum on September 21, 2007. On January 16, 2008, this court (Martin, J.), granted the defendant's motion to strike the wrongful discharge and defamation counts, and denied the motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. On February 5, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for articulation of this court's ruling with regard to the denial of the motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The following is an articulation of this court's analysis in deciding the motion with regard to claim for punitive damages.
DISCUSSION CT Page 8943
Before addressing the merits of this motion, it is first necessary to set forth the applicable standard of review. "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican, 286 Conn. 548, 552 (2008). "We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Thus, we assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so, moreover, we read the allegations broadly . . . rather than narrowly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). "Practice Book . . . § 10-39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
The plaintiff seeks "punitive damages, including attorneys fees" for the alleged injuries that she suffered as a result of the tortuous conduct alleged in her revised complaint. In its memorandum of law in support of its motion to strike, the school district argues only that our case law broadly prohibits any award of punitive damages against a municipality and neglects to articulate those circumstances when a statute could permit such damages. Although the defendant is correct in stating that an award of punitive damages against a municipality is generally unavailable as a matter of public policy, there are exceptions to this rule. See Hartford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 760, 49 Conn.App. 805, 817-18, 717 A.2d 258, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998). Indeed, "[i]n the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered [whether a municipality is liable for punitive damages], it is now firmly established that exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable unless expressly authorized by statute or through statutory construction." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. International Ass'n. of Firefighters, Local 760, supra, 49 Conn.App. 817. Accordingly, a proper examination of the prayer for punitive damages in this case entails the court assessing whether the defendant is an agent of a municipality and whether the plaintiff referenced, in her revised complaint, a statute that explicitly provides for the recovery of punitive damages.
With respect to the question of whether the defendant is an agent of the municipality it serves, our statutes and case law confirm that it is. See General Statutes § 10-240 ("Each town shall through its board of education maintain the control of all the public schools . . ."); General Statutes § 10-47 ("Regional boards of education shall have all the powers and duties conferred upon boards of education by the general statutes . . ."); see also Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 3-4, 587 A.2d 423 (1991) (noting that a town board of education is an agent of the municipality). In Board of Education v. New Haven, 237 Conn. 169, 181, 676 A.2d 375 (1996), our Supreme Court held that "[l]ocal boards of education . . . are . . . agents of the municipalities that they serve." See also Caruso v. Milford, 75 Conn.App. 95, 99, 815 A.2d 167, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 907, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). Accordingly, the court concludes that the defendant is an agent of a municipality and is not subject to punitive damages "unless expressly authorized by statute or through statutory construction." Hartford v. International Ass'n. of Firefighters, Local 760, supra, 49 Conn.App. 817.
Turning to the question of whether the plaintiff has referenced, in her revised complaint, a statute that explicitly authorizes an award of punitive damages, our jurisprudence answers this question in the affirmative as well. It is first observed that the plaintiff alleges having availed herself of workers' compensation benefits subsequent to being attacked by a student at work and that one reason for her termination was "her application for workers' compensation benefits in violation of Connecticut General Statutes Section 31-290a." Section 31-290a explicitly provides in relevant part: "No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge . . . any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits . . . The court may also award punitive damages." Moreover, our case law establishes that boards of education are employers subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.g., Mele v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 751, 855 A.2d 196 (2004) (reviewing decision of workers' compensation commissioner in § 31-290a dispute between city's board of education and former guidance counselor); Musshorn v. East Hampton Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 98 0086958 (January 14, 2000, Rogers, J.) (denying school board's motion for summary judgment in § 31-290a action brought by former teacher); Rancourt v. Meriden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 940245150 (April 26, 1996, Dorsey, J.T.R.), (entering judgment in § 31-290a dispute between city's board of education and former head custodian). Consequently, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages is denied because the plaintiff has alleged a statutory cause of action pursuant to which a court may award punitive damages.
Although these cases do not specifically decide the question of whether a board of education is an employer within the meaning of this statute, the cases cited certainly support the conclusion that they are, as they all involved § 31-290a disputes between a board of education and former school employees.
CT Page 8945
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages is denied insofar as such damages are limited to the plaintiff's claim under § 31-290a.