Milledge v. City of Hartford

10 Citing cases

  1. Rawls v. Wormuth

    4:21-cv-00763-SGC (N.D. Ala. Sep. 30, 2024)

    .See also Burns v. BrandSafway Sols., LLC, No. CV 1:23-00395-JB-B, 2024 WL 1745045, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2024) (mere fact that plaintiff's co-workers were of a different race held insufficient to plausibly suggest intentional race discrimination); Milledge v. City of Hartford, No. 3:19-CV-01104 (JAM), 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. June 29, 2020) (β€œ[A] claim for discrimination is not made plausible simply because the person who has engaged in an adverse action is of a different race than the plaintiff.”); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010)

  2. Burns v. Brandsafway Sols.

    Civil Action 1:23-00395-JB-B (S.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557); Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1301 (finding plaintiff's assertion that he β€œwas subjected to a hostile discriminatory environment on the basis of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981” to be insufficient to state a claim for relief). The mere fact that Burns' co-workers were of a different race than him is insufficient to plausibly suggest intentional race discrimination. See Milledge v. City of Hartford, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114201, at *7, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. June 29, 2020) (β€œ[A] claim for discrimination is not made plausible simply because the person who has engaged in an adverse action is of a different race than the plaintiff.”);

  3. Flaherty v. Dixon

    22 Civ. 2642 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023)   Cited 10 times

    The PSAC's allegations to support an inference of race discrimination are almost exclusively that Plaintiff is white and that she had negative interactions with coworkers who are not white. The fact that most of Plaintiff's coworkers were of a different race, and that they did not get along, does not give rise to an inference of race discrimination. See, e.g., Milledge v. City of Hartford, No. 3:19 Civ. 1104, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. June 29, 2020) (β€œLaw does not blindly ascribe to race all personal conflicts between individuals of different races ....” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v. New York City, No. 12 Civ. 8034, 2013 WL 6409326, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013) (collecting cases); cf. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff β€œoffered no reason to suspect” racial bias β€œother than his assertion that” decision-makers were of a different race). The PSAC alleges one incident in which a coworker allegedly spoke to Plaintiff in Gaelic, apparently making assumptions about Plaintiff's ethnic background.

  4. Tawfiq v. Cauley

    1:22-cv-10176 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2022)

    Although Tawfiq alleges that he is a β€œmix[ed] [B]lack male,” he does not allege that Cauley discriminated against him based on his race. (ECF No. 1, PageID.78); see Milledge v. City of Hartford, No. 3:19-cv-01104, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. June 29, 2020) (β€œ[A] claim for discrimination is not made plausible simply because the person who has engaged in an adverse action is of a different race than the plaintiff.”); Langston v. UFCW Local 19, 2019 WL 6839336, No. 3:19-cv-00841, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2019).

  5. Milledge v. City of Hartford

    3:19-cv-1104 (JAM) (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2022)

    See Milledge v. City of Hartford, 2020 WL 3510813 (D. Conn. 2020) (order granting partial motion to dismiss); Doc. #24 (amended complaint). Doc. #43.

  6. Saez v. The State of Conn. Judicial Branch

    3:21-cv-915 (JAM) (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2022)

    But the mere fact that a manager or supervisor is of a different race than the plaintiff does not plausibly suggest that the manager or supervisor acted for racially discriminatory reasons. See Langston v. UFCW Loc. 919, 2019 WL 6839336, at *3 (D. Conn. 2019) (collecting cases); see also Milledge v. City of Hartford, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. 2020) (same). Accordingly, I will dismiss Saez's Β§ 1983 equal protection claim against Ericson.

  7. Nettles v. Bruno

    1:22-cv-10535 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    However, courts routinely hold that one cannot reasonably infer discrimination from the mere fact that a member of one classification took an adverse action against a member of a different classification. Milledge v. City of Hartford, No. 3:19-cv-01104, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. June 29, 2020) (β€œ[A] claim for discrimination is not made plausible simply because the person who has engaged in an adverse action is of a different race than the plaintiff.”);

  8. Pinder v. Conn. Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Servs.

    3:20-cv-1918 (JAM) (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Pinder alleges in Count One a Title VII claim for race discrimination. This type of claim requires an employee to allege enough facts to allow for a plausible inference that the employer took adverse action against the employee and that the employer did so because of the employee's race. See Milledge v. City of Hartford, 2020 WL 3510813, at *2 (D. Conn. 2020). As the Second Circuit has explained, β€œthe facts alleged in the complaint must provide at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.”

  9. Ramirez v. The Town of Oxford

    3:21-cv-240 (JAM) (D. Conn. Dec. 13, 2021)   Cited 2 times

    Nor has Ramirez alleged facts to plausibly show that he was singled out for testing requirements or discipline on the basis of race; to the contrary, he alleges that a non-Hispanic officer faced the same testing requirements and was similarly disciplined for storage of ammunition. See Milledge v. City of Hartford, 2020 WL 3510813, at *2-3 (D. Conn. 2020) (dismissing disparate treatment claim because plaintiff failed to show a connection to his race). Finally, Ramirez has not alleged a violation of Title VII based on his placement on administrative leave (and attendant loss of overtime) pending criminal charges and an internal investigation, because such suspensions do not constitute adverse employment actions absent allegations that Ramirez's regular pay was suspended or that Oxford acted unreasonably and at odds with its own disciplinary procedures by suspending him.

  10. Tyson v. Connecticut Dep't of Energy & Envtl. Prot.

    3:21-cv-736 (JAM) (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2021)

    See Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York, 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2015); Groeber v. Friedman & Schuman, P.C., 555 Fed.Appx. 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2014). Nor does the fact that the co-worker was of a different race than Tyson, standing alone, plausibly suggest that the co-worker abused Tyson because of his race. See Milledge v. City of Hartford, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (D. Conn. 2020) (citing cases).