We need not undertake a review of issues whose resolution is not necessary to effectively review the injunction. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. State of Minn., 48 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1995). We must determine the extent to which each issue RAC has appealed is relevant to, or interdependent with, or inextricably bound up with the injunctive relief granted in this case.

Besides, we easily could have expedited the appeal "[o]n [our] own." Fed. R. App. P. 2 ; see, e.g. , Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota , 48 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1995) ("order[ing] an expedited appeal"). Today, over a year later, we finally provide the plaintiffs with an answer but, just like the district court, slam the courthouse doors shut.

Besides, we easily could have expedited the appeal "[o]n [our] own." Fed. R. App. P. 2; see, e.g., Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 48 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1995) ("order[ing] an expedited appeal").

The issue decided in the first phase—the officers' liability in their individual capacities—resolved a threshold matter for the second phase that examined the officers' liability in their official capacities and the Monell claims against the City. We addressed a similar circumstance in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. State of Minnesota, 48 F.3d 373 (8th Cir.1995), in which we found that an appeal from Phase I orders was properly before the court at the end of Phase II because the Phase I orders were not final—that is, they resolved only threshold issues and remained reviewable following the conclusion of Phase II of the litigation. Id. at 375.

The issue decided in the first phase—the officers' liability in their individual capacities—resolved a threshold matter for the second phase that examined the officers' liability in their official capacities and the Monell claims against the City. We addressed a similar circumstance in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. State of Minnesota, 48 F.3d 373 (8th Cir.1995), in which we found that an appeal from Phase I orders was properly before the court at the end of Phase II because the Phase I orders were not final—that is, they resolved only threshold issues and remained reviewable following the conclusion of Phase II of the litigation. Id. at 375.

This conclusion finds support in decisions from the Third and Fifth Circuits. See In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Weir's statement that when a collateral order is not timely appealed, "[t]he defendant must then wait until another appealable order (normally, the final judgment) is entered, upon appeal of which he can challenge any interlocutory order that has not become moot"); Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1984) (interlocutory appeal that is not timely pursued can be revived upon entry of final judgment or some other appealable order); but cf. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 48 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1995) (deciding not to review earlier orders of the district court — whether or not they fell within the collateral-order doctrine — on interlocutory review of a later injunction because the earlier orders were not timely appealed and were not inextricably linked to the injunction issue that was properly before the court). Moreover, in the particular circumstances of this case, permitting review of the first immunity order as part of Iran's appeal from the second reflects sound appellate management, not an unwarranted expansion of the scope of collateral-order review.

This court dismissed the appeals from the district court's Phase I order as premature. 48 F.3d 373 (8th Cir. 1995). The Counties and the six Minnesota landowners also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Mille Lacs Band from violating state and federal conservation laws pending resolution of the case.

In the majority of cases involving interpretation of treaties, courts have decided the treaties' meaning either after trial or on a well developed record prepared in connection with a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784, 840 (D.Minn. 1994) (canons of construction for Indian treaties require "careful examination of the historical record to determine the intent of the parties"), appeal dismissed in part and briefing ordered in part, 48 F.3d 373 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1357 (W.D.Wis. 1978) (Indians' understanding of treaty determined on cross-motions for summary judgment), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).