Opinion
3:22-cv-01201-JR
03-22-2023
DELANEY MILLAR-GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PORTLAND and BRENT TAYLOR, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOLIE A. RUSSO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Delaney Millar-Griffin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants City of Portland (“City”) and Brent Taylor, a Portland Police Bureau (“PPB”) officer and City employee. The City now moves to bifurcate plaintiff's claims against Taylor from those asserted against it pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). For the reasons stated below, the City's motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
“Beginning on May 29, 2020, Portlanders have been demonstrating in the streets demanding justice for George Floyd and demanding an end to police violence.” Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 11 (doc. 15). Plaintiff's claims stem from events that occurred in the late evening of August 15 and early morning of August 16, 2020, when plaintiff was part of a Black Lives Matter protest with their fiance, now spouse. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43. Heavily armed PPB officers responded to the demonstration and dispersed the group. Id. at ¶ 44. “Plaintiff believed that PPB was assaulting their fiance on the ground and ran to defend their spouse.” Id. at ¶ 45. “Several Portland Police officers grabbed Plaintiff, dragged them by their bike helmet, and threw them with enough force to break their arm.” Id. at ¶ 46. Taylor then “grabbed [plaintiff] by the face mask . . . and pepper sprayed them until they broke away.” Id. at ¶ 48. Taylor allegedly sprayed plaintiff a second time “with a high volume of pepper spray, causing them pain and injury.” Id. at ¶ 49.
On August 15, 2022, plaintiff initiated this action asserting five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first and third claims are against Taylor, alleging unlawful retaliation of protected speech in violation of the First Amendment and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The second and fourth claims allege municipal liability against the City. The fifth claim is against both defendants and asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b), “the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims” for “convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize” the proceedings. A district court “has broad discretion to bifurcate a trial to permit deferral of costly and possibly unnecessary proceedings pending resolution of potentially dispositive preliminary issues.” Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Inks.,Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may bifurcate and try certain claims first to “avoid . . . a difficult question by first dealing with an easier, dispositive issue.” Est. of Diaz v. City ofAnaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
In the Ninth Circuit, “bifurcation is the exception rather than the rule of normal trial procedure.” Benson Tower Condo. Owners Assn's v. Victaulic Co., 105 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1208 (D. Or. 2015) (citation omitted). The moving party has the burden of proving that bifurcation is appropriate. Id. Courts consider several factors in determining the appropriateness of bifurcation including whether the: (1) issues are significantly different from one another; (2) issues are to be tried before a jury or to the court; (3) posture of discovery on the issues favors a single trial or bifurcation; (4) documentary and testimonial evidence on the issues overlap; and (5) party opposing bifurcation will be prejudiced if it is granted.Clark v. Internal Revenue Serv., 772 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1269 (D. Haw. 2009) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The City contends plaintiff's Monell claims should be bifurcated due to judicial economy, efficiency, and convenience, and to avoid unfair prejudice to Taylor.
I. Judicial Economy
The City first argues that the claims for the municipal liability should be litigated separate from those against Taylor because plaintiff can only succeed on their Monell claims if they first prevail on the claims against the individually named officer. Def.'s Mot. Bifurcate 5-6 (doc. 21). Essentially, the City maintains that judicial resources will be preserved by bifurcation because, if Taylor is not found liable, there will be no need to proceed with a determination concerning municipal liability.
To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must prove that a municipal policy or custom caused the violation of their constitutional rights. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the City is correct that, if a plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation at the hands of the individual defendants, no municipal liability can attach. Quintanillav. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). The City's argument is nonetheless flawed in two respects.
First, the City presumes that plaintiff will fail on their constitutional claims against Taylor. But the City “ignores the converse situation. If Plaintiff succeeds on [their] claims against the individual Defendants, significantly more time and judicial resources would be expended litigating the related municipal liability claims in a separate, subsequent proceeding.” Pearce v. City ofPortland, 2023 WL 2182468, *3 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2023) (citation omitted). Second, “[t]he individual Defendants may be found to have caused a constitutional injury to Plaintiff but still be shielded from liability through qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, even if plaintiff does not prevail on their claims against Taylor, they “could potentially still proceed with [their] claim against the City.” Id. Although Pearce is not binding, and the City cites to alternate precedent from outside of this District, the Court finds Pearce's reasoning persuasive especially considering that the underlying complaint and bifurcation briefing in Pearce are substantially similar to this case.
In its reply, the City raises substantive challenges to plaintiff's claims against Taylor. In particular, the City notes that Taylor “strongly disputes . . . that he used pepper spray on Plaintiff” and has asserted, via his Answer, that the allegations against him “are knowingly false [and] being made in bad faith.” Def.'s Reply to Mot. Bifurcate 3 (doc. 26) (citation and internal quotations and emphasis omitted). However, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court is required to accept all well-plead allegations as true, and plaintiff does produce a pictorial depiction of the alleged pepper spraying incident. SAC ¶ 49 (doc. 15). In other words, the fact that Taylor disputes liability is neither unique to this case nor a basis to grant bifurcation.
In sum, because the issues of individual and municipal liability are intertwined and not easily separable, coupled with the fact that plaintiff's potential failure to prevail against Taylor is not necessarily dispositive given the availability of qualified immunity to individually named police officers, bifurcation would not promote efficiency or preserve judicial economy.
II. Undue Prejudice
The City next argues that bifurcation will avoid a risk of unfair prejudice to Taylor. Notably, the City points to a list of evidence that plaintiff plans to introduce in support of their Monell claims that is purportedly irrelevant to the claims against Taylor, such that this evidence “would improperly influence and taint the jury's decision about Officer Taylor's conduct on this specific occasion [even with] a limiting instruction to the jury.” Def.'s Mot. Bifurcate 11 (doc. 21).
In their discretion and when appropriate, “courts may order separate trials where the evidence supporting the Monell claim is likely to cause undue prejudice to the individual defendants.” Ryan v. City of Salem, 2017 WL 2426868, *2 (D. Or. June 5, 2017). “But it is Defendants burden to show that the individual Defendants will be prejudiced if the Court maintains the status quo and adjudicates all of Plaintiff's claims together.” Pearce, 2023 WL 2182468 at *4 (citing Benson, 105 F.Supp.3d at 1208).
The City failed to make such a showing. At this early stage, the Court cannot determine whether evidence relevant to the claims against the City will also be relevant to the claims against Taylor. “For example, determining whether the individual Defendants acted pursuant to or outside of a City policy may be important to establish their liability on Plaintiff's claims.” Id. Moreover, the City's reliance on Diaz is misplaced, insofar as Diaz concerned gang violence, which the Ninth Circuit has recognized as particularly prejudicial. Diaz, 840 F.3d at 602; see also Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[o]ur cases make it clear that evidence relating to gang involvement will almost always be prejudicial”). And as a general proposition, “[w]ritten accounts of [past similar incidents] and written policy documents are not the type of highly prejudicial evidence warranting bifurcation.” Ryan, 2017 WL 2426868 at *3. Nevertheless, any prejudice can be ameliorated through a limiting instruction where, as here, the potential evidence “offered . . . is not so prejudicial.” Id.
Thus, bifurcation is not warranted at this time. As plaintiff concedes, the City's argument in favor of bifurcation “would likely benefit from further discovery and argument at a later date.” Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Bifurcate 5 (doc. 25). As such, the City is not precluded from raising these issues and seeking bifurcation of the proceedings after discovery has been completed and dispositive motions have been finally resolved.
RECOMMENDATION
For the forgoing reasons, the City's Motion to Bifurcate (doc. 21) should be denied. The parties' requests for oral argument are denied as unnecessary.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgement or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of the party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of the fact in an order or judgement entered pursuant to this recommendation.